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Institutional Decolonization: The Internationalization of the Conflict Over 
Organized Labor in British Guiana, 1946-1961 
Abstract 
This dissertation argues that an internationalized struggle for control of British Guiana’s trade 
unions after 1946 resulted in institutional dysfunction and violence in the early 1960s. Some 
Guianese nationalists, who eventually became leaders of the People’s Progressive Party (PPP), 
wanted to replace the institutions imported from Great Britain with trade unionism geared 
towards a Guianese version of communism. Conversely, reformist Guianese labor leaders were 
intent on establishing a left-leaning capitalist framework of labor relations, primarily based on a 
British model of unionism. Guianese unionists’ ideological proclivities shaped their international 
affiliations, adding a transnational dimension to the struggle between the colony’s nationalist 
leaders. Thus, this dissertation argues that key British, American, and Eastern-bloc trade union 
connections were established in the colony in the late 1940s, well before the violent conclusion 
to Guianese decolonization. 
 
Meanwhile, economic weakness, international pressure, and strategic calculations, convinced 
British policymakers to allow self-government in the colonies after assuring the territories were 
integrated into a British-led capitalist system. United States policymakers turned their attention 
to British Guiana when it became evident that the PPP represented a threat to break the colony’s 
connections with the West and undermine American hegemony at the height of the Cold War. 
Thus, this dissertation analyzes decolonization and the Cold War through a single analytical 
frame, arguing that the two dynamics were mutually reinforcing. 
 
In response to the PPP’s pursuit of social revolution, the Colonial Office engaged in institution- 
building projects to preserve pro-British capitalism in the colony. Simultaneously, American 
trade unionists and policymakers pursued institution-building to replace British influence and 
design Guiana’s post-colonial labor relations based on American trade union practices. This 
dissertation demonstrates that British trade unionists deferred to American labor leaders in 
British Guiana after 1960, and argues that the colony’s transition into the American sphere of 
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“In most countries, the progressive trade union movement is the backbone of the national 
liberation struggle. Trade unions, by the very nature of their organization and activities must, of 





“Once the crucial phase of the liberation struggle begins to take shape, a group of indigenous 
union leaders decides to create a national labor movement. The locals desert en masse the 
previous organization imported from the metropolis. The formation of this union is another way 
for the urban population to exert pressure on the colonial authorities…The national labor unions 
born out of the liberation struggle are…above all political and nationalist.” Frantz Fanon, The 




The Cold War and Decolonization 
 
Throughout the twentieth century the system of international relations underwent 
extensive transformations. Competition between world powers, and the impact of 
industrialization, culminated in two massive world wars from 1914 to 1918 and 1939 to 1945. In 
part as a consequence of those conflagrations, the distribution of global power shifted away from 
European empires toward the United States and the Soviet Union, and ambiguously toward 
European colonies.
3 
American and Soviet policymakers opposed the perpetuation of colonial 
 
systems for ideological and strategic reasons; however, the two nations’ leaders had 





Janet Jagan, “To Working People of Guiana: Join the Struggle for Self-Rule,” Thunder, May 2, 1959, Cheddi 
Jagan Research Center (hereafter: CJRC). 
2 
Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, 2004), 73 (originally published in 1961). 
3 
Nigel Bolland offers a concise explanation of World War II’s impact on the British Empire. See: O. Nigel Bolland, 
The Politics of Labour in the British Caribbean: The Social Origins of Authoritarianism and Democracy in the 
Labour Movement (Oxford: James Currey, 2001), 381-383. See also: John Darwin, “Diplomacy and 
Decolonization,” in, Kent Fedorowich and Martin Thomas, eds., International Diplomacy and Colonial Retreat 
(London: Frank Cass, 2001), 13-18; William Roger Louis, Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the 
Decolonization of the British Empire 1941-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978). 
4 
Ideology: Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1977); Michael Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1987); Michael E. Latham, Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and “Nation 
Building” in the Kennedy Era (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000); John Fousek, To Lead 
the Free World: American Nationalism and the Cultural Roots of the Cold War (Chapel Hill: The University of 
2  
often pursued engagement with the superpowers based on the type of economic and social model 
they thought would best apply to their newly independent countries. As a result, the Cold War 
rivals courted colonial leaders, and frequently intervened in decolonizing areas, to expand 
capitalist or communist systems. The Cold War and decolonization were mutually constitutive 
expressions of the larger changes in international relationships. 
In the British Guiana, the Political Affairs Committee (PAC), which became the People’s 
Progressive Party (PPP) in 1950, attempted to break from the American-led capitalist system. 
PAC and PPP leaders attempted to establish Guianese socialism as a means of addressing the 
colony’s severe poverty, and their efforts included establishing ties to socialist countries in the 
Eastern-bloc.
5 
At the same time, opponents of the PAC/PPP exploited connections to British and 
American labor leaders to oppose the social revolution and institutionalize capitalism and 
connections to Great Britain and the United States. The combination of internal debates over the 
structure of society and appeals to Cold War rivals initiated a Cold War conflict in the colony. 
American and British labor and political leaders were influenced by Cold War ideology and 
appealed to it; however, at a basic level their opposition to the PAC/PPP was rooted in a desire to 
integrate the Guiana into the Western system prior to its independence.
6 
This is particularly 
evident at the institutional level when examining the conflicts between trade unionists in Guiana, 
Great Britain, and the United States; and it helps to explain why non-state actors played the most 




North Carolina Press, 2000); Frank Ninkovich, The Wilsonian Century: U.S. Foreign Policy Since 1900 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1999). Geo-strategic concerns: John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold 
War History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); Robert A. Pollard, Economic Security and the Origins of the 
Cold War, 1945-1950 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985). 
5 
Jan Koura and Robert Waters, “Cheddi Jagan and Guianese Overtures to the East: Evidence from the Czech 
National Archives,” Cold War International History Project, e-Dossier No. 54, Wilson Center, 2015. 
6 
Though as will be explained in chapter three, British and American policymakers disagreed strongly on which 
nation’s institutional values should shape the Western capitalist system. 
3  
in that it suggests British colonists engaged in a conflict of ideologies before the Cold War 
began. 
The Cold War centered on United States officials’ attempt to build and integrate capitalist 
democracies into an American-led system and Soviet leaders’ advocacy for development based 
on Soviet-styled communism in conjunction with increased Russian influence.
7 
Importantly, 
scholars note that American and Soviet policymakers feared that the expansion of their rivals’ 
political-economic ideology would manifest in a loss of relative power and represent an 
existential threat to their own survival.
8 
European empires faced domestic constraints, economic 
weakness, nationalist movements in colonial territories, and international pressures from state as 
well as non-state actors that further eroded their ability and, at times, desire to reassert control 
over colonial territories.
9 
Post-1945 international relations can be understood to a great extent as 
a period of adjustment in the international structure that Matthew Connelly refers to as a 
 
7 
Thomas J. McCormick, America’s Half-Century: United States Foreign Policy in the Cold War (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1989); Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the 
Making of Our Times (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Victoria De Grazia, Irresistible Empire: 
America’s Advance through Twentieth-Century Europe (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 2005); Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, eds., The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol. 1: 
Origins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Vladislav M. Zubok, A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union 
in the Cold War From Stalin to Gorbachev (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007); Kathryn C. 
Statler and Andrew L. Johns, eds., The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World, and the Globalization of the 
Cold War (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2006). 
8 
Melvyn Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992); John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: 
W.W. Norton & Company, 2001). 
9 
The desire to retain empire varied with time and place; however, the broad reappraisal of colonial policy after 
World War II trended toward decentralization of formal colonial control and eventually toward decolonization. 
While not an exhaustive list, the following works are most useful in overviewing decolonization’s central themes. 
For a more complete list, see Bibliography. Matthew Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria’s Fight for 
Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); John Darwin, 
“Decolonization and the End of Empire,” in Robin Winks and William Roger Louis, The Oxford History of the 
British Empire, Vol. 5 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Niall Ferguson, Empire: The Rise and Demise of  
the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power (New York: Basic Books, 2002); Cary Fraser,  
Ambivalent Anti-Colonialism: The United States and the Genesis of West Indian Independence, 1940-1964 
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994); Ronald Hyam, Britain’s Declining Empire: The Road to Decolonisation 
1918-1968 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); William Roger Louis, Ends of British Imperialism: The 
Scramble for Empire, Suez, and Decolonization (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006); Spencer Mawby, Ordering 
Independence: The End of Empire in the Anglophone Caribbean, 1947-1969 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2012); Jason Parker, Brother’s Keeper: The United States, Race, and Empire in the British Caribbean, 1937-1962 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
4  
“simultaneous fragmentation and integration of the world community.” Importantly, Connelly 
and Jason Parker demonstrate that the Cold War involved a critical North-South conflict in 
which actors in the developing world exerted disproportionate influence through non- 
governmental organizations.
10 
That international reorientation was complicated by ideological 
and national rivalry between the United States and Soviet Union for dominance in the revised 
system. 
British Guiana’s Significance in the Post-War Period 
 
Guyana is a small country located between Venezuela, Brazil, and Suriname on the 
Caribbean coast of South America. Territorially Guyana is slightly smaller than Idaho, has a 
population of around 735,000, and as of 2014 is among the poorest countries in the hemisphere 
with a per capita GDP marginally higher than Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Honduras.
11 
The area that 
became Guyana when it gained independence from Great Britain in 1966 was previously known 
as British Guiana beginning in 1815 when the British formally assumed control of the colony 
after defeating the Dutch in the Napoleonic Wars.
12
 
At first glance, British Guiana appears to scholars of United States foreign relations as 
 
merely another example of American intervention, an interesting and temporary sideshow for 
global superpowers during the Cold War. Appearances, however, can be deceiving. The 
progression toward self-government in British Guiana was not as violent as decolonization in 





Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution, 10. Parker, Brother’s Keeper. 
11 
CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/llibrary/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gy.html 
12 
Stephen G. Rabe, U.S. Intervention in British Guiana: A Cold War Story (Chapel Hill: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 2005), 15. 
13 
In particular, it is noteworthy that there is a considerable amount of scholarship on British Guiana that addresses 
the colony as part of broader studies of decolonization or American intervention. Placing the Guianese experience in 
a comparative context allows scholars to illuminate important general concepts; however, these works are inherently 
limited in their ability to closely analyze the process of decolonization in the colony. See: Sara Abraham, Labour 
and the Multiracial Project in the Caribbean: Its History and Its Promise (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 
5  
Nonetheless, Guiana played a key role in shaping the post-war world. It was the largest British 
colony in the Caribbean where there was a strong possibility that self-determination would have 
led to social revolution and close association with the Eastern-bloc.
14
 
In British Guiana the PAC represented the earliest, most consistent attempt at peaceful 
 
social revolution within the British Empire. PAC and PPP leaders attempted to move toward a 
Marxist-Leninist development model and established connections with the Eastern bloc to 
address the extreme poverty that had long plagued the colony’s people. The PAC/PPP met 
constant resistance from reformist Guianese leaders wary of Marxism-Leninism, beginning with 
the PAC’s founding in 1946. At the same time, British and American political and labor leaders 
and Western international trade unionists responded to the PPP with political intervention and  
the first attempt at full-scale post-war institution-building. The political, social, and physical 
conflicts that rocked the colony between 1946 and 1965, and the appeals of competing Guianese 
labor leaders to both sides of the Cold War divide, evidence an important connection between the 
Cold War and decolonization. The Guianese experience also provides a clear example of the 
significant influence of non-state actors on post-1945 international relations. 
The British Empire slowly receded in the Caribbean beginning in the late 1930s, creating 
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Throughout this dissertation I use the terms Guiana and British Guiana to refer to the colony. 
6  
leaders played an important role in the larger Cold War conflict.
15 
The PAC/PPP’s most 
important leader, Cheddi Jagan, was born into poverty on the Guianese plantation at Port 
Mourant in 1918. Jagan, who was of East Indian descent, used his family’s life savings to travel 
to the United States where he studied from 1936 to 1943. Upon his return, Jagan entered politics 
and, along with his American-born wife, Janet Rosenberg, helped found the PAC. In 1953 Jagan 
introduced a proposal that expanded the communist-dominated World Federation of Trade 
Unions’s (WFTU) efforts in colonial territories and, in 1961, he became one of the first colonial 
leaders to speak at the United Nations (UN).
16 
Leaders of the Manpower Citizens’ Association 
(MPCA), the PAC/PPP’s most consistent rival, responded by playing a central role in founding 
the Caribbean Area Division of the Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers 
(CADORIT), the local arm of the Anglo-American dominated, staunchly anti-communist, 
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU).
17
 
In 1954 the British Trades Union Congress (TUC) designated the MPCA, a reformist 
 
Guianese sugar workers’ union, as the first colonial labor organization to be the recipient of a 
full-scale institution-building program. Colonial leaders and British trade unionists argued that 
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7  
without external funding, training, and support in negotiations, the MPCA would collapse, 
destroying the Guianese labor movement. British assistance aimed at increasing the size and 
effectiveness of reformist Guianese labor organizations. As organizing improved, the British 
sought to strengthen structural connections between the unions and employers while 
institutionalizing reformist trade unionism within the state apparatus—embedding a capitalist 
system in British Guiana. The precedent-setting program directly taxed British workers and 
combined their funds with covert aid from the Colonial Office to aid the MPCA.
18 
In 1959 the 
 
British Guiana Trades Union Council (BGTUC) became the first colonial trade union delegation 
received by the Colonial Office and TUC in London for the purpose of discussing territorial 
development.
19 
The extent of British support for reformist trade unions in Guiana suggests that 
policymakers, colonial officials, and trade union leaders in the United Kingdom considered the 
colony among the most important strategic challenges of the late-1950s and early 1960s. 
American policymakers and trade union leaders exhibited similar concern about the 
colony. Serafino Romualdi, the inter-American representative of the American Federation of 
Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), acknowledged that beginning in 1951 
he did “everything in [his] power” to oppose the Jagan-led PPP after becoming convinced the 
Guianese leader was a dedicated communist. The AFL and CIO (and later the AFL-CIO) 
unwaveringly followed Romualdi’s lead throughout the 1950s and early 1960s.
20 
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three months after the Bay of Pigs fiasco, Senator Thomas Dodd of Massachusetts warned 
legislators that Cheddi Jagan was “more dangerous than [Fidel] Castro.”
21   
American concern 
with controlling Guianese decolonization reached the highest levels of the United States 
government. Historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Special Assistant to President John F. Kennedy, 
noted in 1962 that the United States spent more man-hours per capita on British Guiana than any 
other area.
22 
By 1964 AFL-CIO representatives suggested that British Guiana was among the 
most strategically important areas of the world and warned TUC leaders that Guiana, Cuba, and 
Vietnam represented the key areas of potential communist subversion.
23 
Crucially, U.S. 
policymakers’ hostility toward the PAC/PPP followed American labor leaders’ opposition to the 
Jagan-led movement and the AFL-CIO’s antagonism to the party was largely a response to 
appeals from the MPCA. 
The PPP’s rejection of the Anglo-American post-war system preceded more famous 
examples of leftist regional movements in Cuba, Chile, and even Guatemala, and there is some 
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According to Ricardo Garcia, Cuban Ambassador to Guyana, a man named Osvaldo Cardenas claimed that Che 
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9  
importantly, however, local conflicts in the colony underlay international tensions in part due to 
the competition between the communist and non-communist blocs. Guianese leaders faced a 
decision to choose one of two paths forward as the colony moved toward self-government. Both 
reformist and revolutionary Guianese leaders appealed to external actors for assistance, thus 
internationalizing the conflict within British Guiana. The Marxist-Leninist-dominated PPP had 
the strongest support among the Guianese people and attempted to peacefully alter the structures 
of society to establish an Eastern bloc-oriented socialism in Guiana. Ultimately, the PPP had 
considerably more domestic support and greater ties to the Eastern bloc than Salvador Allende. 
The colony is also significant in that like Chile, British Guiana was progressing toward the 
establishment of a popularly elected Marxist government before United States intervention 
exploited local conflicts to topple a democratically elected leader.
25 
The PPP also symbolized the 
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psychology of decolonization provides an important framework with which to examine the 
conflicts in British Guiana. Specifically, Fanon’s analysis of trade unions’ role in decolonization 
illuminates the most important aspect of the conflicts that shaped the Guianese path toward 
political independence, a process I term institutional decolonization. 
The term institutional decolonization refers to the process through which colonial 
structures were contested in the last phase of British colonization and during the transition to 
political independence in former colonies.
26 
In British Guiana, British, American, and Guyanese 
trade union and political leaders negotiated, cooperated, and clashed over how post-colonial 
society should be structured. In addition to colonial officers and State Department officials, other 
participants in the struggle included international labor organizations, regional labor leaders and 
politicians, private citizens who helped finance each side, and trade unionists in Eastern Europe. 
The concept of institutional decolonization clarifies and adds depth to what Nigel Bolland 
describes as the institutionalization of trade unions during the final phase of British colonialism 
in the Caribbean. Bolland argues that the TUC engaged Caribbean labor movements primarily to 
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protect property interests and reinforce employers’ control of workers in preparation for British 
withdrawal from the West Indies. He suggests that British programs contributed to authoritarian 
tendencies in theoretically democratic institutions resulting in anti-democratic propensities in 
post-colonial West Indian governments.
27 
Similarly, Spencer Mawby argues that colonial 
administrators established various structural frameworks to slow down decolonization and assure 
independence was ordered in a way beneficial to British objectives.
28 
As Bolland and Mawby 
suggest, British efforts to build the trade union movement in Guiana aimed at solidifying a 
capitalist system of labor relations in the colony to protect British interests as the colony 
advanced toward self-government. While acknowledging that British officials wielded 
substantially superior power in shaping the nature of colonial labor relations, this dissertation 
adds that Guianese actors played a major role in internationalizing the colony’s institutional 
decolonization. 
The concept of institutional decolonization also draws on John Darwin’s Unfinished 
Empire which argues that decolonization is most accurately understood as “the break-up or 
dismantling of…a ‘globalized’ system of imperial domination centered upon Europe.”
29 
Examining Guianese decolonization through Darwin’s prism of systemic control permits a 
deeper analysis of the challenge to colonial structures that previous scholarship on Guianese 
decolonization only peripherally addressed due to a focus on Cold War political intervention. 
The PAC/PPP’s ideology is examined in chapter four; however, the most important aspect of the 
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into an American-led system.
30 
In this sense, PAC/PPP efforts to restructure Guianese 
institutions simultaneously rejected colonial control and resisted the possibility of American 
expansion of power into the void left after British withdrawal.
31
 
Finally, the international dynamics of institutional decolonization are best understood in 
the context of Jason Parker’s Brother’s Keeper, which argues that transnational connections 
heavily influenced British Caribbean decolonization. Parker’s work discusses the ways non- 
governmental relationships eased the transition to independence in most of the West Indies.
32 
This study argues that similar tendencies existed in British Guiana and that some Guianese labor 
leaders’ connections to American, British, and pro-Western international trade unions improved 
their organizations’ ability to negotiate with foreign employers. However, the most influential 
Guianese leaders rejected the establishment of institutional connections with Anglo-American 
trade unions and instead pursed relations with Eastern-bloc organizations. Consequently, heavy- 
handed American intervention and domestic conflict shaped Guianese decolonization in contrast 
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regarding the role of trade unions as social institutions led to domestic and international conflicts 
that shaped decolonization and the Cold War in the British Caribbean. 
Analyzing decolonization at the institutional level allows for a deeper analysis of political 
objectives and ensuing international conflicts more effectively than the examination of political 
rhetoric or public discourse. For example, PPP leader Cheddi Jagan and MPCA founder Ayude 
Edun both framed their political ideas as a form of socialism; however, the institutional models 
with which Jagan and Edun attempted to shape labor relations differed dramatically.
33  
Nationalist leaders’ attempts to shape the institutional foundations of society explain more about 
their aims than requests for foreign aid. The PAC/PPP’s unofficial international relationships are 
more illuminating than their official diplomatic relations with other nations. Cheddi Jagan, for 
example, requested aid from the United States and Great Britain but never opened to the 
possibility of permitting existing labor relations to be based on a British or American model. As 
a result, the PAC/PPP led early efforts to replace Guianese trade unions integrated into Western 
labor’s international structures. PAC/PPP efforts to retain connections to the Eastern-bloc labor 
international, the WFTU, while resisting integration into the Western-bloc’s ICFTU helps 
explain the reasons American labor leaders became involved in the colony well before United 
States policymakers expressed concern about the Guianese labor movement. Institutional 
objectives influenced international relations when the PPP increased political connections to 
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An inter-disciplinary perspective allows for a focus on Guianese decolonization at the 
institutional level that illuminates three important and previously underappreciated aspects of 
labor conflict in British Guiana. First, political-scientist Kathleen Thalen’s study of institutional 
evolution is useful in identifying the incompatible objectives of the various actors in Guiana.
35 
Thalen notes that political and social institutions can develop for several purposes. British 
colonial officials, trade unionists, and employers wanted labor institutions in British Guiana to 
preserve labor relationships and maintain stability to protect British interests. American labor 
leaders and policymakers expressed similar objectives while hoping to advance United States 
interests as British control receded. Reformist Guianese leaders in the MPCA and BGTUC 
agreed and hoped to advance workers’ interests within that system of labor relations.
36 
Conversely, the Jagan-led members of the PAC and PPP viewed the labor institutions as a means 
through which they could alter economic relationships and challenge the dynamics of power 
relations in the colony. 
Second, Thalen’s study suggests that institutions can change considerably in subtle ways 
while superficially remaining consistent, thus allowing for a greater appreciation of institutional 
change during periods when labor relations seem stagnant. Applying Thalen’s framework to 
Guiana suggests that conservative labor leaders played a more complex role than historians 
appreciate and did not act as a barrier to advancing trade union objectives even though their 
efforts failed to address stifling poverty and did not avert the emergence of the PPP.
37 
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15  
the PPP’s existence as a radical alternative provided an important motive for employers to 
embrace reform and the MPCA’s successes derived largely from British fears that inaction 
would lead to political radicalism. Nonetheless, close examination suggests a gradual expansion 
of the reformist labor movement in British Guiana. Thalen’s work also helps explain why most 
labor leaders who held leadership positions in Guianese trade unions did not insist on structural 
breaks with the Anglo-American model of labor relations and opposed the PAC/PPP model of 
labor relations. MPCA leaders, Richard Ishmael in particular, appreciated the small but 
important advancements in labor relations between 1946 and 1961 and expressed optimism that 
those changes would meaningfully impact workers over time. In short, they expressed 




Finally, tracing institutional conflicts allows for greater appreciation of the underlying 
factors shaping the racial split in the labor movement after 1957. Walter Rodney, a Guianese 
scholar and political activist, noted that colonization shaped employment patterns and 
contributed to racial tensions in the colony in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
Rodney’s insights shed light on racial conflicts in the 1950s as well.
39 
Differences in labor 
relationships made possible the Anglo-American exploitation of racial tensions discussed by 
scholars. Even though colonialism embedded racial conflict within Guianese society, the PPP 
withstood ethnic divisions and external attempts to destroy the movement until the party became 
the administrating authority against which predominantly Afro-Guianese civil service unions 
negotiated for wage increases. The PPP’s advocacy of strikes to demand wage increases for 
overwhelmingly East Indian sugar workers negotiating against foreign capitalists stood in stark 
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contrast to their resistance to increasing taxes to raise pay for government employees. Thus, 
labor relations, rather than race, explain why predominantly Afro-Guianese civil servants bitterly 
opposed the PPP in the early 1960s. 
Matthew Lange, like Stephen Rabe, emphasizes external factors undermining Guianese 
democracy; however, Guianese leaders independently at times chose to subvert institutional 
democracy within their organizations. The radical movement pushed forward reforms, but also 
led to a current of authoritarianism and anti-democratic features within the reformist trade 
unions, which resulted in institutional dysfunction over the long-term. While Thalen’s study 
suggests that examining Guianese institutional development closely will help appreciate gradual 
but important changes in labor relations, Lange’s work on British Guiana suggests that the period 
between 1945 and 1961 represented a critical juncture in Guianese history. Lange argues that 
external intervention in Guiana resulting from Anglo-American Cold War concerns destroyed 
efforts at change and led to institutional failure after independence. Importantly, Lange argues 
that absent intervention British Guiana should have been expected, as a directly-ruled colony, to 




Four perspectives were most important in shaping the process of institutional 
decolonization—those of British trade union and political leaders, those of American trade union 
and political leaders, those of the revolutionary Cheddi and Janet Jagan-led left-of-center 
Guianese leaders, and those of reformist left-moderate Guianese leaders.
41 
Anglo-American trade 
unionists and political leaders agreed that British Guiana should be transitioned from a colony to 
an independent capitalist democracy even though they disagreed on the specifics of institution- 
building efforts in the 1950s and competed for influence in the post-colonial Caribbean. 
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Significantly, American policymakers resisted promoting free trade for British Guiana and 
insisted that liberalized trade with the Eastern-bloc represented a threat to American national 
security during the Cold War.
42 
Thus, Anglo-American policy aimed at integrating the Guianese 
economy with the Western capitalist system rather than accepting autonomy for the Guianese 
people or promoting free trade. 
Ultimately, British, American, and Guianese leaders viewed the establishment of specific 
types of institutionalized labor relations in British Guiana as an opportunity to achieve broader 
objectives regarding the nature of post-colonial society and Guiana’s place within the 
decolonized post-war international system. 
Capitalism, Colonialism, and the British Guianese Economy 
 
Capitalism and imperialism, closely related in the British experience though not 
inherently connected, resulted in the concentration of economic power that defined social 
relations in developed countries and colonies. The primary institutional mechanisms through 
which capitalist societies maintained stability and democracy were representative political bodies 
and industrial organizations designed to protect workers’ interests. In British Guiana, as in most 
colonial territories, political representation was severely restricted leaving workers’ movements 




the Colonial Office considered Guianese trade unions weak and thoroughly inadequate 
throughout the late-colonial period, a far greater percentage of the population was able to express 
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electoral politics before 1950.
44 
Paradoxically, Guianese trade unions’ inability to meaningfully 
address workers’ extreme poverty in the 1940s and 1950s convinced many laborers that unions 
were useless unless they were connected to a political party that could provide financial support 
and legislative representation as was the custom in the British Caribbean. 
Labor relations in British Guiana were a matter of international affairs, and trade union 
actions were episodes in foreign relations in addition to being the most important type of 
democratic activity in the colony. Colonialism created an economy in British Guiana 
overwhelmingly based on exporting raw materials, particularly sugar and bauxite, limiting the 
ability of the Guianese people to address the colony’s intense poverty.
45 
Booker Brothers’ 
McConnell & Co., the largest sugar company in the colony, consolidated control over the 
Guianese economy after 1900, particularly between 1920 and 1940, deepening the plantation 
economy in British Guiana. Nigel Bolland argues that, as a result, “the survival of the plantation 
system meant the persistence of the monoculture economy, of dependency and foreign control, 
and consequently of the absence of sustained diversification and development,” leaving the 
population “condemned to poverty and powerlessness.”
46 
Booker Brothers, a private sugar 
company owned and operated by British investors, so thoroughly controlled the Guianese 
economy that British Guiana was often derisively referred to as Booker’s Guiana. Historian Sara 
Abraham notes that Booker Brothers was responsible for at least 45% of government revenue 
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Moreover, Inter-American Regional Organization of Labor (ORIT) economic reports 
suggested that in the early 1950s over 60% of the colony’s revenue derived from the sugar 
industry, that 75% of the population were low income wage-earners, and that the vast majority of 
wage earners were dependent on the sugar industry.
48
 
Similarly, the expansion of American aluminum companies in the bauxite industry 
 
limited Guianese workers to employment in raw material extraction. United States labor laws 
restricted employment to American seamen on ships transporting bauxite, limiting Guianese 
workers’ opportunity to benefit from their country’s resources for employment beyond mining.
49 
Bauxite was British Guiana’s second largest economic interest and the colony was the world’s 
second largest producer of the ore. However, the Aluminum Company of America (Alcoa) held 
virtual monopoly over the industry through its subsidiaries the Demerara Bauxite Company, Ltd. 
(Demba) and Aluminum Company of Canada (Alcan).
50 
Moreover, American policymakers 
considered control of Guianese bauxite a national security issue and emphasized access to the 
strategic mineral.
51 
Thus, British and American companies exerted overwhelming influence over 
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British and American policymakers argued that exploitation in monopolistic 
relationships, however, could be countered through other democratic institutions. Specifically, 
they suggested that trade unions were the lynchpin of international capitalist interests. British 
policymakers sought to adjust the imperial framework to preserve commercial and political 
connections while decentralizing authority and, at least in the Caribbean, gradually preparing the 
colonies for increased self-government and eventually political independence as they assessed 
the Empire in the decade after World War II.
52 
The key to preserving the benefits of the Empire 
 
in new circumstances, they argued, was the establishment of British-modeled institutions and the 
retention of political and unofficial connections between former colonies and Great Britain. 
Conversely, United States policymakers sought to expand American influence into colonial 
territories as British control lessened. Both British and American policymakers argued that the 
preservation of capitalism in former colonies was important and both pursued policies designed 
to keep colonies within the Anglo-America Cold War camp. However, the American and British 
political-economic systems differed in small but important ways, with Britain moving toward a 
welfare state and the United States slowly drifting away from some of the progressive economic 
programs of the 1930s.
53 
Moreover, British and American labor leaders long disagreed on the 
 
role of trade unions in capitalist society, and political leaders in both countries related to unions 
differently. 
As a result, Anglo-American trade union and political leaders loosely cooperated to 
promote reformist trade unions in British Guiana. British and American political and labor 
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leaders argued that developing colonial institutions to support specific social and political- 
economic relationships to shape post-colonial societies, and thus their international orientation, 
was the most important aspect of decolonization. They tended toward agreement on national 
lines with trade union leaders acting in accordance with official policy rather than toward a 
program of international labor solidarity. British and American policymakers and labor leaders 
described defining and developing post-colonial institutions in different ways and, despite shared 
broad objectives in the early Cold War, they conflicted in their pursuit of decolonizing colonial 
institutions. Most importantly, colonial officials and TUC leaders expressed strong opposition to 
allowing American labor practices to shape trade union development in British Guiana. 
Nonetheless, the TUC reduced its involvement in British Guiana in mid-1957, which increased 
AFL-CIO influence in the Guianese labor movement. 
Guianese labor and political leaders also disagreed on the best way to establish a 
diversified industrial economy and on how to pursue their foreign relationships. Nationalists 
sought to develop and strengthen their institutions in preparation for independence based on the 
type of post-colonial society they hoped to establish. It would be overly simplistic to suggest that 
Guianese leaders merely appealed to European ideas in imagining an independent Guyana; 
however, their designs were based on variations of capitalism, socialism, or communism 
adjusted for local circumstances. Significantly, a number of the colony’s key figures in politics 
and organized labor were educated in English-run schools and several of the most influential 










Cheddi Jagan attended Howard University in Washington D.C. and dental school at Northwestern University in 
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and living for extended periods in Western societies. Those overseas experiences shaped 
Guianese perceptions of institutional decolonization. 
Historiography 
 
This dissertation engages scholars who have begun to examine the ways that regional 
actors influenced events and to challenge the notion that the United States imposed its will on 
Latin American and Caribbean peoples uninfluenced by local circumstances. It reinforces the 
notion that regional actors influenced the course of events to a larger degree than earlier 
scholarship appreciated. As Michael Gambone suggests, regional developments are best 




While Cold War concerns provided an overarching framework for Guianese 
decolonization, the consistent American pursuit of regional hegemony was most important in 
explaining U.S. involvement in the colony’s progression toward self-government.
56 
Scholars 
have long appreciated that the United States exerted control throughout the hemisphere though 
they disagree on the motives of American actors and the extent to which other countries in the 
region influenced American foreign policy. Orthodox and some post-revisionist scholars suggest 
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focused on advancing a collective set of regional ideals.
57 
Revisionists and some post- 
revisionists counter that U.S. actions are most effectively understood as a form of imperialism 
based primarily on economic domination frequently maintained through the use of military 
force.
58 
While scholars debate the drivers of the United States’ hemispheric policy they agree on 
the consistency of American aims and suggest that decolonization and the Cold War offered a 
different backdrop that merely reframed long-standing issues.
59 
The merging of the specific Cold 
War challenges to traditional American policy in the hemisphere was made clear in 1954 when 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles informed the National Security Council that his 




United States involvement in British Guiana’s decolonization demonstrates a continuity 
 
of policy based on efforts to integrate the region into an American-dominated neo-liberal 
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Memorandum of Discussion at the 188th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, March 18, 1954, 




As James Siekmeier and others have shown, United States policymakers 
fervently opposed economic nationalism in the Western Hemisphere.
62 
At the same time, as 
Marc-William Palen points out, U.S. officials did not consistently advocate a true “Open Door 
Policy” designed to foster free trade in Latin America. Instead, U.S. policymakers and labor 
leaders pursued an ever-expanding, pro-United States closed door.
63 
The Cold War reinforced the 
tendency to limit regional free trade. The National Security Council specifically stated its 
opposition to restricting the trade of raw materials between the Caribbean and the Soviet Union  
if those materials would “break certain bottlenecks” in the Soviet economy.
64 
In that context, 
British colonists attempted to improve their position within the international system and 
nationalists pursued social, structural, and political-economic changes domestically with the 
objective of modernizing in their own way, often appealing to the American and Soviet models.
65 
In British Guiana the relative importance of economic, ideological, and strategic concerns varied 
among the range of actors involved in the process of decolonization, though to the Guianese 
economics were the heart of the debate. 
Several scholars have also emphasized the importance of appreciating the domestic 
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Guianese labor leaders established connections to the AFL-CIO and appealed to 
American policymakers to advance their own objectives before the United States became 
involved in the colony. Ultimately, the PAC/PPP’s attempt to address extreme poverty and 
asymmetries of power through social revolution and connections with the Eastern-bloc 
challenged both short-term and long-term American interests. Guianese leaders’ internal 
disagreements and conflict with colonial authorities led to American involvement through a 
weak attempt at institution-building cast aside for intervention when the project failed. 
In addition to using the prism of institutional decolonization to explain the process of 
negotiation and conflict in British Guiana between 1946 and 1961, this dissertation makes use of 
Guianese sources made available on a large scale in the past five years through the Cheddi Jagan 
Research Center.
67 
It juxtaposes those sources with British and American governmental and 
trade union records, many previously unexamined, to explain the multifaceted and 
internationalized conflict over British Guiana’s institutional development. Conflicts between 
Guianese labor leaders over the nature of post-colonial institutions were internal and emanated 
outward, suggesting that in at least one way the ideological disagreements that shaped the Cold 
War unleashed conflict which began between Guianese trade unionists before American, Soviet, 
and British leaders acknowledged a state of Cold War among the world’s most powerful nations. 
Nonetheless, it is critical to acknowledge that Great Britain and later the United States imposed 
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The literature on Guianese decolonization primarily emphasizes the importance of 
external actors in shaping the colony’s transition to political independence and, as a result, 
focuses on the 1953 suspension of internal self-government and later Anglo-American 
subversion of the PPP government before the colony gained political independence.
68   
In the 
earliest study on the subject, Leo Despres identifies important cultural and ideological 
differences that disrupted Guianese society; however, he suggests that external actors were the 
decisive factor in the disintegration of a unified nationalist movement.
69   
The Guianese people 
elected Cheddi Jagan to office in 1992 in the country’s first fair elections since the Anglo- 
American intervention in 1964 which laid the foundation for Forbes Burnham’s dictatorship. 
Soon after Jagan’s return, Cary Fraser and Stephen Rabe wrote highly critical studies arguing 
that narrow anti-communism drove American policymakers to manipulate the Guianese labor 
movement and exert pressure on the British government to delay independence until the PPP 
could be removed from office. American policymakers, they argued, misunderstood Jagan, and 
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Similarly, Nigel Bolland and Spencer Mawby argue that British officials pursued policies 
designed to shape decolonization and institutionalize capitalist labor relations to preserve British 
interests in the Caribbean. Bolland and Mawby agree that British policies resulted in 
authoritarian tendencies in the institutions tasked with assuring social democracy, especially 
West Indian trade unions.
71   
Colin Palmer agrees that colonialism’s legacy was the creation of 
schisms in Guianese society and that British and American actions during decolonization 
contributed to increasing violence as Guiana progressed toward independence. However, Palmer 
suggests that Guianese leaders’ manipulation of racial conflicts for political gain contributed to 
the colony’s devolution into violence and repressive government.
72   
The fundamental 
historiographical challenge to these works revolves around Cheddi and Janet Jagan’s political 
orientation and the degree of the PPP’s connection to the Eastern-bloc. Robert Waters argues that 
the depiction of Cheddi Jagan as a socialist victim of overzealous anti-communism too easily 
dismisses the PPP’s Marxist ideology and its attempts to secure connections with 
Czechoslovakia, Cuba, and the Soviet Union.
73
 
The existing literature captures the connections between the Cold War and 
 
decolonization, British attempts to shape labor relations, and the importance of colonial 
structures on racial violence during decolonization, and it is beginning to explain the complexity 
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of Guianese leaders’ relations with both sides of the Cold War divide. However, none of it has 
adequately tackled the fundamental issue that shaped Guianese decolonization: the debate over 
the institutions that would shape post-colonial society. Guianese labor leaders’ political 
ideologies influenced, but also grew out of their experiences in seeking improvements for the 
colony’s impoverished workers through the labor movement. Political and trade union ideologies 
shaped transnational relationships and were the basis of the relationship between the Cold War 




Ultimately, British, American, and Guianese leaders viewed the establishment of specific 
types of institutionalized labor relations in British Guiana as an opportunity to achieve broader 
objectives regarding post-colonial society and Guiana’s place within the decolonized post-war 
international system. After 1946, a conflict emerged between Guianese labor leaders who 
supported the idea of decolonization within the existing system and those who interpreted 
decolonization as a more fundamental break from British and American control, objectives 
achievable only through greater association with the Eastern-bloc. Guianese leaders played a 
more important role in late-colonial struggles than scholars realize, and the conflict in the 
colony’s labor movement was considerably internationalized by mid-1950s. 
American involvement in British Guiana shifted from institution-building and political 
intervention to subversion. The CIA and AFL-CIO intervened to exacerbate domestic unrest as a 
means of undermining the PPP government between 1962 and 1964 at the same time the 
Kennedy administration pressured British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan to hold new 
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between the PNC and United Front (UF) to replace the PPP before the colony became 
independent in 1966 and set the stage for a twenty-seven-year PNC dictatorship in the colony. 
The relationships the CIA exploited, which are the focus of Rabe’s and Fraser’s work, grew out 
of the efforts of reformist Guianese labor leaders to use contacts in British and American trade 
unions in the 1950s. The PPP’s attempt to resist its Anglo-American orchestrated removal, in 
part through cooperation with Cuba, ended in failure.
75 
Ultimately, disagreements between the 
 
Guianese owing largely to the structure of colonial society assured conflict during 
decolonization; however, the PPP’s removal and Burnham’s subsequent dictatorship were the 
result of U.S. intervention to protect American interests. Thus, the internationalization of 
Guianese trade union struggles contributed to the corruption of the labor movement and the 
destruction of democracy in Guyana. 
The remainder of this dissertation proceeds as follows: Chapter two explores the context, 
ideology, and objectives that drove AFL/AFL-CIO international activities after World War II, 
arguing that American labor leaders were willing to undermine democracy and self- 
determination abroad to advance pro-American capitalism. Chapter three juxtaposes British and 
American foreign policies after World War II and argues that both nations’ labor and political 
leaders connected the expansion of reformist trade unions to the preservation of global 
capitalism. Chapter three also shows that British and American policymakers and trade unionists 
competed to advance national interests while advancing shared objectives. Chapter four shows 
that Guianese trade unionists and political leaders clashed over the political-economic system 
through which they hoped to develop Guiana, and as a result the foreign relationships Guianese 
leaders pursued. Moreover, this conflict began in the Guianese labor movement before the start 
of the Cold War. Chapter five suggests that the PAC’s founding in 1946 represented a first phase 
75 
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of institutional decolonization during which revolutionary Guianese labor and political leaders 
rejected the British-imposed model of trade unionism and struggled to break from institutional 
connections to the West. This first phase culminated in the PPP’s electoral victory and ended 
when the colonial government suspended the Waddington constitution and re-imposed direct rule 
in the British Guiana. 
Chapters six and seven explain Anglo-American institution-building programs in British 
Guiana and argue that Anglo-American rivalry limited cooperation in the colony during a second 
phase of institutional decolonization. As a result, reformist Guianese trade unionists appealed to 
both British and American trade unionists, as well as Western international labor organizations, 
to counter the PPP’s revolutionary program in the colony. Thus, reformist Guianese labor leaders 
were the driving force behind external involvement in the colony between 1954 and 1961. 
Together, those chapters show that the internationalization of labor relations paradoxically 
sustained the reformist labor movement and helped it gain important institutional advancements, 
while increasing Guianese unionists’ dependence on external assistance and contributing to the 
loss of democracy within those organizations. This dissertation concludes with a brief overview 
of the third phase of institutional decolonization, the period during which institutional 
breakdown in the labor movement resulted in U.S.-supported subversion of the elected PPP 
government between 1962 and 1964. Ultimately, American intervention through relationships 
developed at the behest of reformist Guianese labor leaders was the decisive factor in removing 
the PPP and placing Forbes Burnham at the head of the colony’s government when Guyana 
became independent in 1966. 
 





The American Federation of Labor (AFL), Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), 
and Trades Union Congress (TUC) pursued activist foreign policies after World War II that 
promoted democracy, economic development, and international solidarity in the pursuit of global 
peace and a liberal capitalist international economic system. Anglo-American labor leaders 
expected those objectives to be mutually reinforcing, and they often were; however, they were 
also frequently incompatible. As labor’s Cold War grew in intensity in the late 1940s and early 
1950s, Anglo-American labor leaders increasingly pursued foreign policies that subordinated 
promoting democracy abroad to imposing liberal capitalism and business-unionism on colonial 
areas. Thus, British and American trade unions’ institution-building efforts in British Guiana in 
the 1950s and early 1960s were part of a broader effort to integrate colonial unions into a liberal 
capitalist economic system centered in the U.S. and Great Britain. Despite national rivalry, 
tactical disagreements, and organizational conflicts, the AFL, CIO, and TUC agreed on the 
importance of integrating colonial trade unions into the Western system through the labor 
movement. 
The existing scholarship on American labor’s post-war foreign policy objectives is best 
understood as falling into three general schools of thought; orthodox, revisionist, and post- 
revisionist. The earliest significant studies of American labor’s Cold War foreign policy were 
written in the 1960s and 1970s and varied between praise for American labor’s defense of 
freedom abroad and criticism of the motives, actions, and especially consequences of AFL-CIO 
international activities. Orthodox labor scholars accepted AFL-CIO leaders’ public explanations 
of policy and encouraged or defended their actions as a form of positive anti-communism. The 
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earliest orthodox work, George Lodge’s, Spearheads of Democracy, was published for the 
Council on Foreign Relations in 1962. The author, who was Secretary of Labor in the late 1950s, 
submitted a draft of his work to several labor leaders for approval before publishing a manuscript 
that called for greater labor-government cooperation in international relations. Despite its bias, 
Lodge’s work is useful in hinting at the underlying institutional issue at the center of this 
dissertation. The author criticizes the United States government’s ineptitude and American 
businesses abroad for failing to realize that undermining trade unions in developing countries 
reinforced arguments for class struggle and missed “the opportunity to build a relationship and 




between the United States government and the AFL-CIO, Lodge argued, was crucial to 
advancing the political-economic system designed in the United States and, specifically, to 
combatting the international Communist conspiracy directed from Moscow.
2
 
Ronald Radosh’s, American Labor and United States Foreign Policy is the foundational 
 
revisionist work on American labor’s international relations. Radosh argues that American labor 
leaders accepted a role as junior partners cooperating with the United States government to 
reinforce the capitalist political economic system and pursue an expansionist foreign policy. 
Radosh suggests that labor leaders expected American economic expansion to lead to increasing 
employment, wages, and benefits for American workers.
3 
Furthermore, Radosh suggests that 
American labor leaders’ support for an imperialist United States foreign policy led to labor’s 
adoption of reactionary overseas activities including support for dictatorial leaders who 
suppressed free trade unions as a means of limiting the forces of social change. Radosh contests 
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labor leaders’ public statements, which argued that the AFL-CIO’s aggressive foreign policy 
grew out of the post-war threat of expansionist totalitarian Communism emanating from the 
Soviet Union. The AFL/AFL-CIO, Radosh argues, consistently contributed to an expansionist 
foreign policy in pursuit of the Open Door ideal, or the free flow of trade and investments, since 
the early twentieth century. Radosh suggests that anti-communist rhetoric was a guise to increase 
overseas activities in opposition to revolutionary or nationalist movements that threatened 
corporate capitalism after World War II.
4 
Significantly, Radosh argues that labor leaders often 
 
took aggressive anti-communist positions in advance of official United States policy, including 
in British Guiana. Nonetheless, he argues that once official policy was determined, the 
AFL/AFL-CIO frequently became pawns for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), State 
Department, and American corporations who used trade unionists to build institutions overseas 
to forestall social revolutions.
5
 
Philip Taft examines AFL-CIO archives for his work, Defending Freedom, and uses the 
 
organizations’ materials to defend American labor leaders’ expansion of overseas activities after 
World War II. Taft rejected revisionist criticism of AFL-CIO foreign policy as the work of 
“conceited politicians” or “lazy and arrogant liberal intellectuals.”
6 
He praises labor leaders, such 
as Jay Lovestone, George Meany, Matthew Woll, William Green, Serafino Romualdi, and David 
Dubinsky for identifying totalitarianism as a “monstrous evil” as well as recognizing the 
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similarities between Soviet domination of trade unions and German, Spanish, and Italian fascist 
repression of workers in the 1930s.
7 
Those men, Taft argues, laid the foundation for an 
aggressive post-war policy of anti-communism designed to promote democracy and defend 
workers across the world from falling under the control of communist, fascist, or colonial 
totalitarian governments.
8 
Taft suggests that the CIO joined the AFL in advocating a staunchly 
anti-communist policy by 1949 in response to the Soviet Unions’ antagonism in the World 
Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), the international labor organization established in 1945 to 
unify trade unions across the globe.
9 
Taft’s work articulates the AFL-CIO’s stated foreign policy 
objectives; however, it is limited in that it uncritically accepts labor leaders’ public statements 
and organizations’ official policies without examining the underlying nature of those programs 
or their consequences. Perhaps most damaging, Taft defends the AFL-CIO from allegations of 
complicity with the CIA in carrying out subversive activities overseas, activities which have 
since been confirmed with the release of classified materials. Nonetheless, Taft made a 
significant contribution to the historiography in arguing that American labor leaders pursued 




Jon Kofas’s The Struggle For Legitimacy argues that anti-communism was the driving 
 
force behind AFL/AFL-CIO foreign policy after World War II; however, like Radosh he 
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broader context of consistent opposition to Latin American economic nationalism.
11 
Kofas 
agrees that the State Department drove labor’s foreign policy, suggesting that as a result the 
United States government was the most important actor in shaping the foreign policies of 
international organizations to which American labor belonged, especially the Inter-American 
Regional Organization of Labor (ORIT).
12 
Kofas, however, notes disagreements between 
American labor leaders and suggests that the CIO occasionally pressured the AFL to implement 
progressive policies, including the adoption of a position of strong opposition to right-wing 
dictatorships as a central tenet of ORIT policy.
13 
Other revisionist works expounded on the same 
ideas, primarily focusing on American labor leaders’ negative anti-communism, cooperation 
with or subordination to agencies within the United States government, and pursuit of a foreign 
policy that undermined workers and subverted democracy.
14
 
Post-revisionist scholars examining Anglo-American labor foreign policy have begun to 
 
synthesize earlier efforts. They acknowledge that AFL and CIO leaders supported an 
expansionist and often self-interested economic policy while emphasizing that anti-communism 
and the promotion of “free trade unionism” were central to American labor leaders’ foreign 
 
11 
Jon V. Kofas, The Struggle for Legitimacy: Latin American Labor and the United States 1930-1960 (Tempe: 
Arizona State University, 1992), 310, 351. 
12 
Kofas, The Struggle for Legitimacy, 344. 
13 
Kofas, The Struggle for Legitimacy, 300, 351. 
14 
For other works suggesting American labor leaders’ virulent anticommunism undermined collaborative 
international labor efforts and/or increasingly allowed the AFL/AFL-CIO to be used as tools of agencies advancing 
United States foreign policy, see: Gary K. Busch, The Political Role of International Trades Unions (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1983); Michael E. Gordon and Lowell Turner, ed., Transnational Cooperation among Labor Unions 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000); Fred Hirsch and Richard Fletcher, The CIA and the Labor Movement 
(Nottingham, UK: Spokesman Books, 1977); Judith Stepan-Norris and Maurice Zeitlin, Left Out: Reds and 
America’s Industrial Unions (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Beth Sims, Workers of the 
World Undermined: American Labor’s Role in U.S. Foreign Policy (Boston: South End Press, 1992). Sims 
importantly describes the relationship between labor and governmental leaders as symbiotic. Ake Wedin, T.L. 
Johnston, trans., International Trade Union Solidarity: ICFTU 1957-1965 (Stockholm: Bokforlaget Prisma, 
Publishers, 1974). Wedin argues that AFL-CIO foreign policy was a result of AFL dominance and that CIO leaders 
tried to act more collaboratively in international affairs. For more on the conflicts between AFL and CIO leadership 
regarding American labor’s foreign policy, see: Alfred O. Hero, Jr. and Emil Starr, The Reuther-Meany Foreign 
Policy Dispute: Union Leaders and Members View World Affairs (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications, Inc., 
1970). 
36  
policymaking. While often critical of the outcomes of AFL-CIO policy, some scholars have 
begun to nuance previous explanations of labor leaders’ motives.
15 
Martin Halpern, John Fousek, 
and Nelson Lichtenstein note the domestic context in which labor leaders developed their foreign 
policies. Halpern and Fousek argue that labor leaders adopted conservative policies to solidify 
New Deal gains in the face of an anti-labor backlash in the late 1940s.
16 
Lichtenstein agrees and 
notes that CIO President Walter Reuther determined to pursue a policy of staunch anti- 
communism coupled with a program to reinforce and adjust the existing capitalist system that he 
thought most effectively advanced workers’ interests.
17
 
Post-revisionist scholarship makes several other contributions that are significant for the 
 
purposes of this dissertation. Anthony Carew argues that the Cold War was merely a new context 
in which long-standing debates over theories of trade unionism were reignited.
18 
His assertion 
that different interpretations of “free trade unionism” were central to post-1945 conflicts in 
international labor anticipates the work of scholars like Edmund Wehrle, Geert van Goethem, 
Dustin Walcher, Robert Waters, Federico Romero, and Victor Silverman, who have begun to 
examine the role of free trade unionism as an ideological factor in shaping American labor 
leaders’ foreign policies. Silverman also considers the TUC ideal of “voluntaryism,” which he 
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Walcher’s and Romero’s essays in American Labor’s Global Ambassadors and 
Silverman’s Imagining Internationalism in British and American Labor, like Lichtenstein, note 
that American labor leaders’ sincere belief in the universal applicability of American-style liberal 
trade unionism and corporatism contributed to the development of an ideology that justified 
activist overseas policies. Specifically, Walcher suggests that American labor leaders embraced 




Walcher and Romero suggest that American labor leaders adopted as a viable system to export 
the concept of a liberal trade unionism that focused on preserving labor’s autonomy and ability 




Silverman argues that British and American views of liberal political economy and trade 
 
unionism precluded state interference in union activities and therefore rejected the Leninist 
principle of centralization that contributed to communist methods of unionization.
22 
Despite what 
Silverman describes as the TUC’s attempt to take the helm of a new postwar system to avoid 
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communism by 1949, which he suggests was the AFL view all along.
23 
Carew is more specific in 
noting the differences between AFL and TUC ideology. He suggests that the AFL favored a 
definition of free trade unionism that included emphasizing organizational independence from 
political parties, government, employers, or churches. The TUC, in contrast, favored a looser 
definition that merely suggested freedom from external domination and allowed a degree of 




Kim Scipes’, AFL-CIO’s Secret War Against Developing Country Workers, like 
 
Silverman, applies a post-revisionist methodology to draw a nearly revisionist conclusion.
25 
Scipes agrees that American labor leaders determined AFL-CIO policy even when policy 
mirrored or contributed to government policy and programs. Nonetheless, Scipes aggressively 
criticizes AFL-CIO policy, arguing that it was based on an imperialist attempt to impose 
American-style “business unionism” on foreign unions.
26 
Like Radosh, Scipes suggests that 
AFL-CIO policy did not fundamentally change after the Russian Revolution and as a result is not 
 
most effectively understood as merely anticommunist.
27 
Scipes insists that AFL-CIO 
rationalizations of their policy as supportive of freedom of association are “a complete and utter 
fraud.”
28 
He argues that United States labor leaders were inconsistent in their use of power; 
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American Empire in a non-democratic, non-transparent manner, and that labor leaders’ policies 
frequently worked against the interests of both American workers and laborers abroad.
29
 
Less critically, Edmund Wehrle’s Between a River and a Mountain addresses the concept 
of free trade unionism and rejects the notion that American labor leaders acted as “junior 
partners” taking orders from the United States government. Wehrle suggests instead that 
American trade union leaders designed AFL-CIO foreign policy based on labor’s objectives and 
exerted considerable influence in relations with the United States government. He argues that 
labor leaders consistently pursued a foreign policy that promoted the ideal of trade unions acting 
as “essential components of democracies- the sole defense of workers against a multitude of 
threatening interests and institutions” in modern society.
30 
Wehrle acknowledges that various 
 
factors contributed to labor’s foreign policy; however, he suggests that the most significant was 
the idea of free trade unionism, which he defines as trade union autonomy and “activist 
internationalism, a commitment to maintaining the essential autonomy of trade unions and 
advocacy of aggressive full-employment economics.”
31
 
Post-revisionists also nuance earlier explanations of the relationship between American 
 
labor leaders and United States government agencies. Wehrle suggests anticommunist labor 
leaders became more prevalent in the CIO after 1947 and AFL and CIO leadership coalesced 
around an anti-communist policy in the late 1940s despite deep differences regarding tactics. 
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Wehrle notes that the unions’ merger in 1955 muted dissention in practice.
32 
Wehrle also 
suggests that the close relationship between AFL-CIO leaders and the Kennedy and Johnson 
White House in the 1960s may have contributed to a more aggressive United States foreign 
policy.
33 
When considered in conjunction with his explanation of free trade unionism, Wehrle 
convincingly argues that American labor leaders pursued an interventionist, anti-communist 
foreign policy to further their own objectives rather than as tools of United States government 
agencies. 
Ted Morgan’s biography of Jay Lovestone, A Covert Life, expands on Wehrle’s 
suggestion that labor leaders influenced foreign policy in important ways. Morgan suggests that 
Lovestone, who held a variety of positions within the AFL international apparatus, acted covertly 
as one of the most influential foreign policymakers in the United States between 1944 and 1974. 
Lovestone influenced Presidential appointments, Senatorial speeches, and operated covertly 
overseas before the establishment of the CIA.
34 
Morgan suggests that Lovestone and his AFL 
 
associates collaborated closely with the CIA at the highest levels by 1950 at times altering 
policies with which they disagreed; however, he suggests that AFL influence decreased after 
1958.
35 
Hugh Wilford’s, The Mighty Wurlitzer further nuances the relationship between 
 
American labor leaders and the CIA. Wilford notes that Lovestone’s faction in the AFL 
frequently disagreed and conflicted with official policy and ultimately the CIA-AFL-CIO 
connection ended when the CIA attempted to exert more control over labor activities than labor 
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leaders were willing to concede.
36 
Quenby Olmsted Hughes’ In the Interest of Democracy is the 
most thorough examination of the AFL-CIA relationship and more generally the ideological 
foundations of American labor leaders’ anti-communism. Hughes argues that labor-government 
cooperation was based on shared ideological objectives, as well as the realization that 
organizational weaknesses could be offset through collaboration, and that the relationship ended 
when labor leaders’ concluded the CIA was attempting to control trade union foreign policy.
37
 
Finally, scholars from all three schools address the question of when labor leaders 
 
became engaged in the Cold War, an issue that is critical for this study. The scholarship is 
virtually unanimous in concluding that American labor leaders, particularly in the AFL, became 
widely engaged in a Cold War before the United States government. American labor leaders 
frequently deemed foreign unionists or political leaders communist in advance of the United 
States government and pursued more aggressive policies to combat the perceived threat of 
communist expansion.
38   
Victor Silverman suggests that the reverse was true in Great Britain, 
arguing that despite pressure from the Foreign Office and some trade union leaders, rank-and-file 
concern with economic self-interest and the avoidance of war acted as a counterforce that slowed 
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Anti-communism was the defining characteristic of the AFL’s international activities no 
later than 1944 and it was increasingly significant to the Western world’s labor internationalism 
after the establishment of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) in 
December 1949. Nonetheless, anti-communism was not a reflexive policy or an end in itself; it 
was the dominant theme in Anglo-American labor’s foreign policy because it was seen as the 
most immediate threat to the preservation of the Anglo-American dominated capitalist system 
labor leaders thought would protect trade union independence and increase material benefits for 
workers, promote peace and economic growth, and advance American and British national 
interests. Labor leaders argued that communist trade unions operated based on a theory of trade 
unionism incompatible with Western labor, a practice that was designed to introduce a 
revolutionary political economic system that did not protect workers’ freedom. Moreover 
American and British labor leaders argued that communists frequently attempted to infiltrate 
non-communist unions to turn the organizations into tools of political subversion rather than to 
collaborate in pursuit of workers’ interests. Ultimately, they feared that communist unions would 
facilitate the expansion of a political-economic system that concentrated economic and political 
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American and British labor leaders increasingly adopted anti-communism in the late 
1940s and in the 1950s as a means of preserving the international system, which they expected to 
decentralize power and increase workers’ influence. As a result, they expected that their 
objectives could only be attained within the Anglo-American-led capitalist system with trade 
unions designed to perpetuate that system.
41 
Several scholars place their analyses of American 
labor’s foreign policy in this broader structural context.42 Ultimately, the TUC and CIO followed 
the AFL into a Cold War, engaging in institution-building activities designed to subvert potential 




Labor leaders representing the AFL, CIO, and TUC disagreed on a wide range of tactical 
 
questions regarding their organizations’ roles in international labor and the international labor 
movement’s role in post-World War II international relations; however, they agreed that peace, 
economic stability, democratic principles, workers’ rights, and the interests of British and 
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American workers could only be preserved within the existing capitalist system.
44 
More 
importantly, they argued that the trade union movement, based on British and American trade 
union practices, was fundamental to the preservation of the capitalist system and democratic 
politics. Crucially, instability in the post-war international system, the near assurance that 
colonies would gain a degree of autonomy, and the appeal of communism to many colonial 
leaders, convinced many labor leaders that the development or imposition of specific 
institutional structures was the only safeguard against the collapse of international capitalism, 
democracy, economic stability, and peace, as well as British and American workers’ interests. 
Thus, Anglo-American trade union leaders engaged in a post-war policy of institution building in 
colonial areas that was more aggressive than pre-war TUC, AFL, or CIO activities. 
Peace and Democracy 
 
AFL, CIO, and TUC post-war institution-building centered on the theoretically mutually 
constitutive promotion of peace, economic growth, democracy, and self-determination; however, 
contradictions in British and American labor foreign policies undermined those ideals in 
practice. British and American labor leaders consistently emphasized trade unions’ and 
international labor institutions’ importance as associations to preserve peace during and after the 
Second World War. Sidney Hillman of the CIO, who historian Jennifer Luff argues was part of a 
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States during the 1930s, was one of the most influential men in founding the WFTU in 1945.
45 
The first of several aims Hillman listed as organizational purposes at the WFTU’s founding was 
its role in contributing to an enduring global peace.
46 
When the ICFTU was founded in 1951, 
largely for the purpose of opposing the WFTU, its leaders acknowledged that one of the WFTU’s 
most important objectives was to promote peace even though they determined that it failed as an 
organization.
47 
Furthermore, in articulating its broad responsibilities and defining its relations 
with United Nations agencies in the Western Hemisphere, the ICFTU emphasized the  
importance of workers’ self-organization, collective bargaining, and improved standards of  
living as central to “the responsibilities of the trade union movement of America and the World 
toward peace founded on justice.”
48
 
British and American labor leaders emphasized the importance of using trade union 
 
activity to preserve peace in their bilateral meetings as well. Richard Walsh, an AFL 
representative who met with the TUC in 1952, emphasized in his speech that “the first task of the 
free world is to prevent World War III and not refight World War II.”
49 
Individual unions 
explained part of their post-war mission in similar terms. The United Auto Workers (UAW) 
adopted a resolution in 1953 emphasizing the important role that their organization and other 
trade unions played in acting as a deterrent to “reactionary isolationists” and “trigger-happy 
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force in disagreements between communist and non-communist countries.
50 
Walter Reuther, who 
was president of the UAW and vice president of the AFL-CIO, echoed the resolution in a speech 





In addressing the second ORIT convention in December 1952, AFL representative 
William Doherty identified the greatest challenge facing the organization as the “ability to find a 
way to insure lasting peace and international security as well as economic and social 
advancement.” Doherty argued that peace, through a broadly defined freedom, was possible only 
with the strength of organized labor, noting that Adolf Hitler’s Germany and Benito Mussolini’s 
Italy first asserted dictatorial powers through dissolution of their nation’s trade unions. In 
addition to identifying peace as an ideal, Doherty’s speech identified communist dictatorships as 
the primary threat to peace, arguing that non-communist dictatorships used “identical methods 
and employ the same basic techniques” as in communist countries. The means of undermining 
communist dictatorship and preserving post-war peace, Doherty argued, was to “strengthen all 
instruments of democracy, including the free-trade union movement.” Doherty suggested that 
grassroots organizing and people’s participation in civic enterprises were essential and in their 




Doherty’s address illuminated two important conclusions AFL leaders drew regarding 
foreign policy by 1952. First, in associating dictatorship with the use of communist methods, it 
insinuated that communism was the source of oppression, rather than totalitarianism. In doing so 
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it sought to delegitimize communist ideology of local as well as Soviet origin and also discredit 
the use of “communist methods;” specifically, the use of trade unions for organizing anti- 
capitalist political activities. It also opened the possibility of compromise with right-wing 
dictatorships as a temporary means of defeating communism since the latter was explained as the 
root cause of tyranny. To be clear, America labor leaders actively, if inconsistently, opposed 
right-wing authoritarian regimes that suppressed trade unions. The AFL-CIO refused several 
requests from the State Department to participate in an International Labor Organization (ILO) 
conference in Caracas, Venezuela in 1955 in protest to the Perez Jiménez regime’s suppression 
of trade unions.
53 
Similarly, American labor leaders’ and other members of ORIT issued a 
 
statement emphasizing the organization’s opposition to military dictatorships that repressed 
citizens and made it difficult to counter communism in 1957.
54 
Nonetheless, the tendency in 
American labor circles was to identify communism as the most significant threat to democracy 
and peace. Secondly, the speech directly asserted that the only means of preserving workers’ 
freedom was institution building, the establishment of trade unions based on AFL methods. 
Labor leaders, particularly in the AFL, reinforced the notion that trade unions played a 
crucial role in preserving peace and that doing so was central to their mission; however they 
acknowledged that peace was unachievable without action and may not be an end in itself. The 
AFL’s views increasingly influenced debates within international labor organizations as 
American labor leaders tried to work from within the ICFTU and especially ORIT in the early 
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established ICFTU in 1950 noted that peace and democracy were mutually compatible; however, 
it argued that pacifism could not adapt to a modern society with constant threats of 
totalitarianism. International labor organizations, the memorandum argued, needed to use all 
means possible of advancing democracy which experience taught was the only means of 
providing for people’s spiritual and material needs.
55 
Examination of international organizations 
founding documents strongly suggests that the AFL’s international relations philosophy 
permeated the ICFTU and especially ORIT.
56
 
After the AFL engineered the replacement of TUC General Secretary Vincent Tewson as 
 
president of the ICFTU with Omar Becu in early 1953, the AFL News Reporter took pride in 
claiming that the new leadership would “transform the ICFTU from a dormant debating society 
into an active and militant organization” to “advance peace, without appeasement.” The 
inclusion of the phrase “without appeasement” is subtle but significant. The qualification 
acknowledged that preserving peace was less important than pursuing aggressive anti-communist 
policies from the perspective of AFL leadership. Specifically, the article noted that the new 
leadership allowed for a shift away from Tewson’s strategy of negotiation toward a policy that 
encouraged active engagement against communism.
57 
Pierre Ferri-Pisani, a French trade unionist 
who worked closely with Lovestone, Brown, and the AFL’s covert Free Trade Union Committee 
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efforts at peaceful coexistence in international labor relations.
58 
Ferri-Pisani criticized the 
ICFTU, arguing that neutralism was akin to “cowardice” and “pathological indecision.”
59 
Similarly, George Harrison, Chairman of the AFL-CIO Committee on International Affairs, 
reminded delegates to a Conference on World Affairs in 1960 that American labor did “not want 
peace with chains and slavery” in a speech edited by Lovestone and Mike Ross, Director of the 
AFL-CIO International Affairs Department. Harrison’s speech argued that communist expansion 
would result in “the peace of the prison or the cemetery.”
60
 
As mentioned above, Anglo-American labor leaders’ foreign policy rhetorically aimed at 
 
protecting and advancing democratic principles through international trade union activity after 
World War II because democracy and peace were deemed mutually constitutive. Regarding trade 
unions’ preservation of democracy, David Dubinsky, one of CIO leaders most responsible for the 
organization’s foreign policy, noted that Communist control of the trade unions in 
Czechoslovakia presaged the 1948 Soviet coup d’état in that country.
61 
He argued that, “the 
catastrophe that has befallen Czecho-Slovakia confirms that once a country falls under the yoke 
of a totalitarian regime, free unions perish. There can be no democracy without free trade 
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concluded that, “Free trade unionism and genuine democracy need each other like a fish needs 
water or like a human being needs air to breath and live.”
62
 
A report presented to the CIO International Committee in 1950 argued that strengthening 
free labor abroad was essential “so that we can promote democracy now and save lives later.” 
The report warned that supporting free labor abroad “stands today as the only firm and reliable 
bulwark against further infiltration of red totalitarianism” and the “double threat of reaction from 
the Right and subversion from the Left.”
63 
The merged AFL-CIO reiterated similar objectives 
and emphasized the mutually dependent relationship between trade unions and democratic 
societies during their first convention in December 1955. Furthermore, the AFL-CIO defined the 
organization’s international role as the pursuit of good relations to foster “and promote enduring 
peace and freedom” and “to encourage mutually advantageous trade… in order to advance 
common economic stability and social well-being.”
64
 
Perhaps the most direct and illuminating examples of the difficult and sometimes 
 
ambiguous nature of balancing several post-war ideals are two speeches found in Jay 
Lovestone’s files among the records of the AFL-CIO. The first speech is untitled and seems to 
have been given by an AFL representative, possibly Lovestone, to the TUC in 1954. It 
acknowledged that the two organizations occasionally clashed in international activities but 
expressed hope that they had “learned to disagree without being disagreeable.” It suggested that 
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failure to cooperate was suicide and that “above all, we do not want to have [sic] fight a World 
War III.”
65 
The speech illuminates labor leaders’ continued fear of military engagement, 
reinforces the notion that they viewed their role in the post-war world as advancing solidarity 
between national trade union fronts to avoid conflict, and makes clear that the AFL and TUC 
disagreed on how to achieve those objectives. 
The second speech seems to have been given to the TUC in 1955 by either C.J. Haggarty 
of the AFL or Lovestone. Lovestone, who was perhaps more influential than anyone else in 
establishing and implementing the AFL’s foreign policy program, almost certainly contributed to 
or at least approved the speech. The speech outlines the importance of democracy and trade 
unions’ role in upholding it, emphasizing that the AFL could not support non-free unions even if 
official United States policy was supportive of a dictatorial government. However, the speech 
cautions that “In the quest for peace, we must be prepared to sup with Satan.” After reinforcing 
the superiority of democratic ideals and demanding caution when “dining with the devil,” 
Lovestone continues, arguing that “Ballerina, prima dona, and concert tours, trade missions and 
exchange of sundry sorts of delegations, may appear attractive but they are not effective means 
for reducing international tension.”
66 
While stressing labor leaders’ ideals for the post-war world 
 
and their willingness to stand for free trade union principles even faced with conflicting policies 
on the part of their own government, the speech insinuates a willingness to engage in anti- 
democratic activities when necessary to achieve broader objectives. 
Furthermore, members of the AFL-CIO were allied with the Cold War Council, Council 
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in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The Cold War Council openly justified its willingness to unite 
with totalitarian governments. The Council argued that “All totalitarian tyrannies are bad, but 
only the Communists aim at the destruction of the U.S. and the enslavement of all mankind,” 
while noting that the United States aligned with the Soviet Union to defeat Nazi Germany. 
Similarly, they argued, cooperation with non-communist dictators may be necessary to combat 
Communism.
67 
Thus, some American labor leaders were willing to temporarily sacrifice 
 
democratic principles abroad to defeat what they viewed as an immediately and existential threat 
to democracy. 
Importantly, labor leaders’ views of dictatorship and democracy mirrored those expressed 
in President Dwight Eisenhower’s National Security Council (NSC) and pursued throughout the 
1950s during the period under examination in this dissertation. Nelson Rockefeller,  
Eisenhower’s special assistant on foreign affairs, told the NSC that dictators were “a mixed 
blessing.” Rockefeller suggested that authoritarian Latin American leaders effectively combat 
communism; however, he warned the NSC that it was in the best interest of the United States to 
back democratic governments. Eisenhower’s agreement with Rockefeller’s assessment suggests 
that American labor and governmental leaders shared a belief in promoting regional democracy 
while expressing a willingness to see democratic principles temporarily compromised to defeat 
communism.
68 
Furthermore, Stephen Rabe notes that Eisenhower worked with dictatorial 
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Lovestone’s cryptic speech and the Eisenhower administration’s reluctant support of 
anti-communist dictators are sobering acknowledgments of the contradictions American labor 
leaders and policymakers faced and the compromises they were willing to make in the pursuit of 
foreign policy objectives. 
Economic Development, Stability, and Institution Building 
 
Anglo-American labor leaders consistently argued in favor of economic policies and 
trade agreements designed to promote economic growth and stability overseas; however, their 
idealism was trumped by motives rooted in protecting their constituents’ economic status and 
combatting communism to preserve liberal, Western-oriented capitalist system and their 
favorable position within it.
70 
There were notable differences, however, in the economic 
philosophies of AFL, CIO, and TUC leaders and those dissimilarities contributed to the 
ideological outlook that shaped overseas activities in the 1950s as well as Guianese political and 
labor leaders’ response to Western international organizations. The AFL’s gradual assertion of 
dominance over American labor’s foreign policy and eventually within the ICFTU, ORIT, and 
the Caribbean Area Division of ORIT (CADORIT), led to a more conservative economic stance 
that was increasingly hostile to the Guianese labor leaders’ socialist tendencies. 
Sidney Hillman spoke of the need for international cooperation to industrialize 
underdeveloped areas, pursue reconstruction after the war, and to “fully utilize the rich resources 
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the men and women of all nations,” at the World Trade Union Congress in 1945.
71 
Hillman’s 
speech was not radical, particularly in the context in which it was given--during World War II as 
an appeal for international trade union cooperation in rebuilding the world and contributing to a 
lasting peace. Nonetheless, there was criticism within the AFL regarding Hillman’s insinuation 
of international cooperation. In June 1945 Robert Maisel warned AFL President William Green 
that Hillman’s proposal to “provide other credits and facilities” for reconstruction were part of 
“the economic chess game that we now see being played before our eyes, to make American 
resources available to Russia and Russia’s allies after World War II.”
72
 
A comparison of two reports written by CIO Executive Secretary Ernst Schwarz 
 
illuminates the ways in which labor’s emerging Cold War contributed to the contradictions CIO 
leaders faced in balancing economic ideals with Cold War context. Schwarz’s first report 
articulated the difficulties facing transnational labor cooperation in economic development 
programs in an analysis he wrote for the WFTU Economic and Employment Commission in 
1948. In his study, Schwarz acknowledged a split among trade union leaders in the WFTU over 
the type of economic development programs proposed for needy countries. CIO, TUC, and 
French trade unionists argued that agricultural development and private foreign investment 
should form the basis of economic programs to underdeveloped countries. Conversely, Eastern 
European trade unionists argued that industrialization and self-sufficiency were the central 
components of economic development in poor countries and those improvements could only be 
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Bureaucratic debates likely hardened positions in the organization, particularly in respect 
to the CIO’s position alongside the TUC and French union leaders seemingly acting in support of 
colonialism and emphasizing the importance of private investment. Nonetheless, Schwarz’s 
report suggests that British and American trade union leaders endorsed policies within the 
WFTU that reinforced the nature of international economic relationships regardless of idealism. 
It is also significant that Schwarz noted the somewhat isolated American, British, and French 
position on the issue of economic development when he acknowledged that other countries, 
including Brazil, China, India, Australia, and Norway “ took a stand somewhere in the 




Schwarz’s note suggests that there was sympathy among many international labor leaders for 
political-economic ideas and international policies that conflicted with British and American 
aims, including in former British colonies. The expression of starkly contrasting views of 
economic development in the context of post-war debates regarding the future of industrial 
modernization and the international system reinforced American and British labor leaders’ 
proclivities toward greater international activity to stabilize the existing system and their position 
within it. 
Schwarz’s second report, which he sent Mike Ross in March 1949, was the draft of a plan 
for economic development in Latin America. Schwarz’s proposed plan is striking in the extent to 
which it deviated from the Western economic development view articulated in his WFTU report 
from the previous year. Schwarz argued that Latin America’s economic underdevelopment was a 
result of foreign exploitation that subverted regional nations’ attempts to diversify their 
economies and created financial dependencies. Regional development, he argued, could only be 
 





obtained through a progressive economic program undertaken by democratic governments in 
coordination with free labor institutions. Schwarz criticized the “colonial and semi-colonial” 
nature of Latin American economies, argued in favor of national economic planning that 
subordinated private investment to public agencies, proposed land reform, and advocated 
nationalization to develop heavy industry.
75 
ORIT’s founding members copied Schwarz’s 
analysis nearly verbatim and included in the discussions during the organization’s establishment 




Comparing the Schwarz documents suggests that rivalries and bureaucratic struggles 
 
within the WFTU polarized views and discouraged compromise on subjects about which 
delegates held similar views. Even though Schwarz’s proposals were included in discussions at 
the ORIT founding and similar ideals were expressed in ICFTU resolutions, in practice the 
Western labor internationals did not emphasize the importance of Schwarz’s development 
program. In practice, the ICFTU and ORIT primarily focused on institution building to confront 
communism and labor movements that engaged in socialist trade union practices, despite the 
importance British and American labor leaders placed on economic development. 
The uncertainty regarding ORIT’s primary purpose further illuminates the complexity of 
American labor’s international activities. ORIT was established, in part, to assist in strengthening 
trade unionism in developing Latin American nations and advance the goals of regional workers 
in collaboration with American labor. According to Rutgers professor and labor activist Robert 
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Alexander, ORIT’s role was essential because American companies owned and operated many 
of the corporations exploiting hemispheric workers. Consequently, ORIT and American labor 
unions pressured United States businesses that were harassing Latin American labor as a means 
of protecting workers in the United States and the rest of the region.
77 
Alexander’s view is 
significant because it is the clearest expression of his idealism and because he was a central 
figure in AFL activity in British Guiana in the early 1950s. Nonetheless, Alexander’s 
explanation was expressed in a public forum and as will be discussed in the next three chapters 
his activities in British Guiana were far more focused on political activity and institution building 
than economic activities. 
William Doherty acknowledged another subtlety in the AFL’s position during an address 
at the second ORIT convention in December 1952. Doherty noted that “the most compelling 
reason why organized labor in the United States is vitally concerned with preventing a recurrence 
of economic crises” was because “one nation cannot live in peace and plenty while the rest of the 
world is plagued with misery and starvation.”
78 
The AFL vice president’s speech was primarily 
an argument against dictatorship; however, in the context of articulating an aggressive vision for 
ORIT’s opposition to totalitarianism Doherty illuminated a more complicated issue facing 
international labor. Early Cold War AFL efforts to promote economic advancement abroad were 
at their core attempts to avoid the recurrence of political radicalism that could lead to military 
conflict. On their most fundamental level, AFL appeals to avert armed conflagration were 
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was occasionally limited and self-serving however sincere and laudable attempts to prevent a 
third World War. 
Doherty’s address to a group of hemispheric labor leaders called for a sound program of 
industrialization to diversify Latin American economies; however, American labor leaders did 
not consistently support measures aimed at altering the status of underdeveloped areas when in a 
position to advocate for policies that could conflict with American workers’ interests. Stanley 
Ruttenberg, director of the CIO’s Department of Education and Research, had an opportunity to 
influence American policymaking when he spoke with the Eisenhower administration’s 
Commission on Foreign Economic Policy in 1953.
79 
Ruttenberg argued for a trade policy that 
 
avoided supporting industrialization in the hemisphere’s underdeveloped areas and instead 
emphasized the significance of trade unions to the post-war economy and preservation of 
American workers’ increasing living standards. He suggested that unimpeded “tri-cornered” 
trade gave the United States access to raw materials, provided underdeveloped areas with dollars 
for development and purchase of American exports, and also gave underdeveloped areas dollars 
to spend in Europe allowing Europeans to purchase American manufactured products. 
Ruttenberg’s focus on creating jobs for American workers led to his advocating a policy that 




David McDonald, President of the United Steelworkers of America, disagreed with 
 
Ruttenberg and suggested that industrialization in underdeveloped areas might not harm 
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American workers and may even be beneficial.
81 
The difference between Ruttenberg’s and 
McDonald’s views on industrialization in undeveloped areas is significant. Certainly Ruttenberg 
was acting according to his mandate in advocating for policies in the best interest of his 
constituents. However, many colonial leaders, including the People’s Progressive Party (PPP) in 
British Guiana, saw the post-war era as an opportunity to improve their country’s place in the 
international economic system, to establish a modern industrial economy, and consequently to 
increase the quality of life for people often living in dire poverty. PPP leaders understood that 
complete incorporation into Anglo-American international institutions such as ORIT or the 
ICFTU, or close relationships with the AFL/AFL-CIO and TUC, would result in inconsistent 
support for the structural changes they sought as their territories moved toward independence. 
Boris Shishkin, an AFL economist, spoke to the Eisenhower commission on behalf of 
AFL President George Meany the same day as Ruttenberg. Meany’s statement echoed 
Ruttenberg’s argument for increased efforts at establishing minimum international labor 
standards and emphasized the importance of American economic assistance to underdeveloped 
areas for a several reasons. Meany suggested that economic aid could improve living standards 
and purchasing power in underdeveloped areas, increase American exports, and improve access 
to raw materials. He also noted that in many cases American aid was actually spent in the United 
States and sent abroad as commodities that aided domestic job creation. Meany further argued 
that economic aid and development abroad would increase trade and interconnectedness and 
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economic cooperation was not a response to communism but a sincere belief that economic 
isolationism stunted growth and created long-term economic decay on a wide scale.
82
 
Shifting focus, Ruttenberg also reminded the commission that the CIO joined 
international trade confederations to assist in building trade unions throughout the world because 
“Until the workers in various parts of the world are organized into sound, free, democratic trade 
unions, they will not be able effectively to establish and maintain adequate living standards.” 
Ruttenberg argued that the absence of trade unions depressed wages abroad and made it 
impossible for even improved mass production techniques in the United States to allow 
American businesses to compete.
83 
Similarly, McDonald suggested that United States trade 
 
policy should contribute to raising wage standards abroad to protect American workers from 
unfair competition.
84 
Ruttenberg’s statement was consistent with CIO discussions earlier in the 
year. Labor leaders at the CIO’s executive board meeting in August 1953 determined that the 
expansion of free trade unions and expanded economic assistance in underdeveloped areas could 
increase living standards and “defeat the false totalitarian promise of world Communism.” CIO 
leaders argued that objective could be achieved with expanded trade to assure access to raw 
materials and foreign markets.
85 
The CIO’s foreign policy was, at least by 1953, focused on 
expanding trade and assisting economic improvement in underdeveloped areas as a means of 
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improving the American economy and countering the conditions that led poor countries’ leaders 
to look for non-capitalist political-economic systems. 
Similarly, a UAW resolution adopted in March 1953 emphasized the need for 
international labor standards “so that exploitation of weakly organized workers in one country 
shall not undermine the wage rates and living standards of workers in other countries.” The 
resolution also argued for promoting economic and social betterment for workers abroad 
primarily because CIO leaders expressed confidence that economic improvement and social 




discussed the interdependence of labor unions in a 1949 speech and emphasized the need for 
cooperation in the economic sphere. He noted that trade union internationalism improved “living 
standards and purchasing power-especially in underdeveloped areas” and that consequently “the 
prospects for better pay and decent working conditions are enhanced even in countries with 
stronger economies like the United States.”
87
 
Ruttenberg’s and McDonald’s concerns, the UAW resolution, and Meany’s and 
 
Dubinsky’s speeches hint at economic contradictions in American labor’s post-war foreign 
policy. Idealistically, American labor leaders wanted to assist in improving workers’ standards of 
living abroad out of a sense of solidarity; however, they had an obligation to pursue policies that 
were most advantageous to American workers. In some ways, such as increased wages for 
workers in undeveloped areas, those policies seemed mutually compatible; however, other 
economic issues, such as promoting industrial development abroad, held ambiguous and possibly 
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understood as tools for combating communism and contributing to national security rather than 
as ends in themselves. 
As will be seen in subsequent chapters, AFL-CIO leaders opposed Guianese unions 
whose leaders cooperated with politicians to alter the colony’s place in the tri-cornered trade 
Ruttenberg described. AFL-CIO opposition was not solely, or even primarily a result of the 
specific challenge to Guiana’s position as a provider of raw materials in and of itself; however, 
concerns regarding the nature of trade relations were an important part of the milieu that shaped 
American and Guianese viewpoints. American labor leaders saw various challenges to the 
American-defined system through trade, domestic political-economy, trade union practices, and 
transnational relations as mutually reinforcing. American labor leaders frequently suggested that 
deviations from the United States-defined system constituted serious challenges that threatened 
American power and the prosperity and security of the American workforce. 
The Eisenhower Commission agreed with Ruttenberg, recommending that the United 
States “be party to agreements with other countries to raise standards generally” and that an 
international conference could be called to address the subject, “the focal point [of which] might 
be the formulation of a Code of Fair Labor Standards, which would include the right of workers 
to organize in free trade unions and engage in free collective bargaining.”
88 
According to 
President Eisenhower’s Committee on Foreign Economic Policy, trade unions were fundamental 
to economic development and the advancement of American workers’ standards of living. An 
International Labor Organization (ILO) resolution drawn up in 1956 was consistent with 
Eisenhower’s views. The committee, which included the AFL’s Latin American representative, 
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businesses increase production in underdeveloped areas. The ILO explained the unions’ role in 
terms similar to the AFL model and concluded that increases in production, rather than social 
expenditures, were the key to improved living conditions in the developing world.
89
 
AFL, CIO, and TUC economic policies were simultaneously idealistic and pragmatic, 
 
focused on promoting advancement for workers abroad and protecting workers’ interests at 
 
home. Idealism was discarded in favor of policies that directly benefited American workers when 
interests seemingly clashed. Furthermore, Cold War tensions polarized the nature of AFL/AFL- 
CIO and TUC transnational economic programs. As a result of AFL, CIO, and TUC economic 
policies some Guianese political and trade union leaders concluded that cooperation with 
Western labor institutions would inhibit the pursuit of far-reaching and necessary social reforms. 
Free trade unionism 
The TUC, CIO, and especially AFL responded to events in British Guiana based on an 
ideological commitment to “free trade unionism” which they argued was essential to providing a 
democratic voice for workers in capitalist-democratic systems. It is significant that the 
AFL/AFL-CIO understanding of free trade unionism was not universally accepted however 
much it dominated the American labor leaders’ worldview. Anthony Carew suggests that the 
American perspective emphasized the importance of unions’ independence from a variety of 
social institutions, including political parties, while the TUC was more flexible, accepting close 
connection between political parties and trade unions as long as union imperatives were not 
subordinated to government, employer, or foreign domination.
90 
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ideal was a rhetorical façade, or at best paradoxical. Beth Sims suggests that AFL and CIO 
accepted a role as subordinate partners in the United States and undermined independent unions 
abroad at the same time American labor leaders define free unions as independent of government 
or business control and committed to democracy and pluralism.
91 
Victor Silverman notes that 
TUC leaders frequently argued in favor of voluntaryism, which was the notion that individual 
workers retained the right to choose whether or not to join a union. Silverman suggests that 
voluntaryism was a variant of free trade unionism and that both the American and British trade 
union ideologies devolved into narrow anti-communism by 1949.
92
 
Given the wealth of scholarly discourse on the subject, it is necessary only to highlight a 
 
few aspects of the ideal that relate directly to Anglo-American labor involvement in British 
Guiana. AFL/AFL-CIO leadership’s understanding of free labor was viewed in part through the 
prism of the pre-war anti-fascist experience. David Dubinsky argued that trade unions were a 
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when unions were undermined.
93 
American labor leaders argued that unions closely connected to 
political parties were particularly vulnerable to becoming organs of state control in the same way 
government controlled unions repressed German and Italian workers in the 1930s.
94 
They further 
argued that governments assumed the role of employers in state dominated economic systems 
and as a result that unions connected to political parties could not act independently of the state 
because the party could not negotiate against itself.
95 
The TUC was more ambiguous regarding 
trade unions’ affiliations, generally arguing that they should be “free from outside control by 




Colonial political leaders, including in British Guiana, were often drawn from the ranks 
 
of organized labor as a result of long-standing colonial structures and limitations on suffrage. In 
British Guiana, property requirement restricted the vote to several thousand Guianese until to the 
1953 election.
97 
Moreover, local politicians operating within a colonial framework could be 
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opposition to employers. Consequently, British and especially American labor leaders were 
suspicious of the development of a politicized labor movement in British Guiana and the 
connections between politicians and trade unions as the colony progressed toward self- 
government. 
The Impact of International Labor Organizations on AFL, CIO, and TUC Leaders 
 
In addition to pursuing ideals and broad objectives, American and British labor leaders’ 
shaped their organizations’ foreign policies based on experiences with post-war international 
labor organizations and the nature and consequences of the WFTU-ICFTU rivalry directly 
impacted decolonization in British Guiana. The TUC and CIO helped establish the WFTU in 
1945 to promote global solidarity in the international labor movement. During the waning years 
of World War II, CIO and TUC officials argued that post-war peace and global economic 
stability required cooperation between the major national labor fronts in the post-war world 
including Communist organizations in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. CIO and TUC 
architects of the WFTU expressed a desire to stabilize the global system and advance workers’ 
rights through a worldwide labor organization that participated as members in new international 




Sidney Hillman emphasized the importance of giving labor representatives a voice at 
post-war peace settlements and conferences regarding economic reconstruction in a speech at the 
London Conference in February 1945, which served as the precursor to the establishment of the 
WFTU. Hillman argued that the emerging WFTU would hasten the end of World War II and 
assist in establishing “an enduring peace, an economy which will fully utilize the rich resources 
of the world for the benefit of its people” resulting in improved living standards and 
 
98 
Silverman, Imagining Internationalism in American and British Labor, 5; Lewis L. Lorwin, The International 
Labor Movement: History, Policies, Outlook (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1953), 205-210. 
67  
democratization after the war. However, he cautioned the conference’s delegates that “powerful 
and well organized forces of reaction” opposed the formation of a new international workers’ 
organization. Reactionary victory, Hillman argued, meant that “all we have suffered and fought 
and died for will have been in vain.” Ultimately, Hillman warned that reactionary victory over a 
unified international workers’ organization would result in “economic depression, 
unemployment and want, the impression of weaker peoples and imperialist aggressions, leading 




AFL leaders argued that the inclusion of Soviet and Communist unions in the WFTU 
threatened to subordinate the organization to dictates from the Soviet state and that inclusion of 
multiple national fronts from one country strengthened the CIO challenge to AFL predominance 
in the American labor movement. The AFL did not participate in the new international as a result 
of AFL leaders’ concerns. AFL leaders argued that their objective was the “rebuilding and 
reconstituting a new world order, the reestablishing of agencies of free government, and the 
resurrecting and resumption of free institutions of labor,” suggesting that they would act 
independently if necessary.
100 
Two tenets defined the AFL position and they resulted in two 
 
important conclusions. First, AFL leaders argued that communist ideology necessitated trade 
unions subordination to the Communist Party and threatened the independence of trade unions. 
Second, they argued that all communism was Soviet directed and that labor leaders who adhered 
to communist ideology inevitably used trade union activity to advance Soviet objectives. AFL 
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leaders accepted isolation from the international labor community and a sharpening of the anti- 
communist issue within American unions as a consequence of non-affiliation in the WFTU.
101
 
Geert van Goethem suggests that the division between the AFL and TUC regarding 
participation in the WFTU was central to postwar developments in international labor. 
According to van Goethem, the AFL’s aim of promoting freedom and democracy was 
irreconcilable with the TUC’s desire to narrowly focus on trade union representation and 
recognition to defend the interests of British workers internationally.
102 
It is important to 
consider again the importance of contradictions between AFL ideals and actions; specifically, 
three factors help illuminate the AFL’s post-war ideology and refusal to join the WFTU. 
First, the WFTU included a large number of Communist unions and AFL leaders 
referenced Soviet attempts to infiltrate and manipulate international labor organizations in the 
1920s as evidence that Communist unions could not be trusted to engage in collaborative labor 
efforts rather than political subversion. Lovestone was particularly influential in shaping AFL 
leaders’ interpretations since he was a central figure in debates between American Communists 
in the 1920s and 1930s. Ultimately, Lovestone’s challenge to Joseph Stalin’s mandates led to his 
separation from the party and his renouncing communism.
103 
Some Communist leaders thought 
 
that trade unions should be ignored as reactionary elements of capitalism while others thought 
they should be taken over from within and used as tools of the Communist Party. Both strategies 
discounted the legitimacy of using trade unions to independently pursue workers’ interests. 
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Moreover, the representative of the Communist International (Comintern) determined 
trade union strategy instead of members of the Communist Party in the United States (CPUSA). 
The Comintern also advocated the use of the Red International as a means of organizing national 
trade unions in support of international communism from the outside.
104 
During the 1940s, the 
AFL pointed to creation of a new labor international while the International Federation of Trade 
Unions (IFTU) was already in existence as evidence of the subversive nature of the World Trade 
Unions Conference in 1945. Thus, AFL leaders concluded that the WFTU’s purpose was to 
impose Soviet political philosophy on the international labor movement and “subordinate the 
American labor movement, its affiliates and membership as well as that of other lands, to the 
dictates and the will of those who themselves are not free to determine their destiny.”
105
 
Secondly, the AFL deemed unions under communist systems illegitimate since they were 
 
involuntary organizations that acted as subordinate agencies of governments.
106 
The involuntary 
nature of Soviet unions also clashed with British ideals of voluntaryism, though differences were 
briefly muted after the WFTU’s establishment.
107 
AFL leaders argued that their resistance to the 
WFTU was a continuation of long-standing opposition to government controlled trade unions 
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organizations during the 1930s and 1940s.
108 
AFL Vice President William Doherty reminded 
delegates at the second ORIT convention that his organization was dedicated to “vigorously 
oppos[ing] any kind of dictatorship-communist, fascist, military or civil, where the privileged 
few impose their ruthless edicts upon the masses,” undermining the freedoms that were the 
foundation of AFL policy.
109 
AFL leaders argued that the WFTU’s theory of unionism would 




Furthermore, AFL leaders voiced strong opposition to a WFTU resolution that they interpreted 
as accepting the inevitability of a forced labor program in the Soviet Union, suggesting it was an 
indication of broader Soviet designs to use the organization for the oppression of workers 
worldwide.
111 
More generally, American labor leaders promoted “business unionism” that aimed 
at the pursuit of increased material benefits rather than societal transformation and compromise 
with unions in the WFTU assured a degree of politicization in trade union activities. 
Finally, the AFL and CIO were engaged in an intense struggle for control of the United 
States labor movement and the WFTU’s acceptance of representatives from multiple national 
unions assured the AFL could not claim to be American workers’ sole representative in the 
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opposition to the WFTU; however, AFL leaders concluded that “In terms of domestic labor 
politics” the CIO’s increased prestige “will mean an acute sharpening of the anti-Communist 
issue within the American unions” as well as “a further widening of the breach between the CIO 
and AFL which will close the doors to labor unity for perhaps years to come.”
112 
Therefore, 
territorial struggles contributed to AFL foreign policy and hostility toward the WFTU. 
The AFL’s red-baiting as a means of delegitimizing the CIO contributed to the enflamed 
rhetoric of early Cold War domestic political discourse in the United States and increased the 
AFL’s standing as the Cold War intensified.
113 
AFL anti-communism increased the 
organization’s esteem after the CIO withdrew from the WFTU citing the Soviet-domination of 
the organization that motivated AFL non-participation. As a result, the AFL’s domestic status 
increased in the late 1940s and early 1950s as the NSC emphasized the importance of 
“destroying the structure of relationships by which leaders of the All-Union Communist Party 
have been able to exert moral and disciplinary authority” in countries not under communist 
control, specifically the WFTU.
114 
Consequently, AFL members dominated government-labor 
programs, including in British Guiana. 
The TUC, CIO, and most Western European unions withdrew from the WFTU in early 
1949, arguing that the organization was “controlled by communist organizations which 
themselves are controlled by the Kremlin and Cominform.”
115 
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the WFTU’s major policy discussions, particularly regarding the European Recovery Program, 
were poisoned with propaganda and a “stream of vilification and abuse which has been poured 
on the British T.U.C., American Labor and leaders of those national centers who are not 
prepared to become subservient to Communist doctrine and dictation.”
116 
According to the TUC, 
Soviet leaders and the Cominform used WFTU publications and meetings as a platform for 
communist political propaganda and refusal to cooperate in the pursuit of goodwill and trade 
unionism resulting in irreparable organizational schisms. 
Nigel Bolland contests TUC leaders’ public rationalization for leaving the WFTU. 
Bolland argues that British labor leaders’ motives were largely a consequence of the TUC’s 
inability to control the WFTU and the possibility that the international would support colonial 
labor unions engaged in labor politics outside of acceptable British practices.
117 
Significantly, 
British trade union leaders concluded that the WFTU was directly opposed to TUC interests 
when it continued to function after the TUC and a considerable number of national centers 
withdrew from the organization. TUC leaders justified their position on the assumption that the 
remaining members of the WFTU were aligned based on their shared Communist viewpoints and 
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Western labor leaders concluded that cooperation with Communist trade unions or 
communist labor leaders was impossible after the WFTU split. American labor leaders, 
especially in the AFL, conflated Soviet dictatorship with communist ideology and occasionally 
opposed social reformism and trade union organization closely aligned with political parties 
under an aegis of anti-communism. As a result, social revolutionary movements that connected 
trade union and political activity, especially those that were sympathetic to communist ideals, 
were considered contributors to Soviet imperialism and a direct threat to international capitalism, 
democracy, and national security. That context, reinforced through experiences in the WFTU, 
was critical in explaining American, and to a lesser degree British labor responses to trade union 
conflicts and political developments in British Guiana. Three other important developments in 
international labor during the period between 1944 and 1949 directly shaped subsequent events 
in British Guiana. 
First, the London Conference offered the initial opportunity for British colonial trade 
unionists to participate in an international labor conference and the AFL’s report on the meeting 
suggested that “sections of the final resolution gave partial expression to their demands.”
119 
George Lichtblau argues that the TUC’s suggested inviting colonial unionists to the conference; 
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working-class aspirations was limited.
120 
Nigel Bolland points out that the TUC refused to 
financially assist colonial unions’ participation in the WFTU.
121
At the same time, Arnold 
Steinbach argues that Soviet concepts of class struggle and imperialism articulated in the WFTU 
neatly conflated with nationalist movements in many areas.
122 
Steinbach’s suggestion is 
particularly relevant in examining the Jagan faction in British Guiana where labor-employer 
conflict was inherently a conflict for power between colonists and colonizers and Cheddi Jagan 
frequently sought assistance from the WFTU in confronting British imperialism. Bolland argues 
that the WFTU was an effective advocate for colonial interests and that British labor leaders’ 
expressed considerable fear that colonial unions would choose to align with the WFTU rather 
than the TUC when the British organization left the international.
123 
Finally, Lichtblau suggests 
that the WFTU assisted movements in colonial areas seeking quick detachments from colonizers 




Meanwhile, TUC resistance to anti-colonialism in the ICFTU, and TUC, AFL/AFL-CIO, 
 
and ICFTU support for affiliated unions in the 1950s alienated colonial labor leaders who wished 
to organize in a manner inconsistent from the Western model. Moreover, AFL/AFL-CIO, TUC, 
and ICFTU support for affiliated unions was inherently a political activity in the colonies given 
the political nature of colonial trade unionism. The competition between the ICFTU and WFTU 
after 1949 allowed colonial unions to appeal for external support in internal labor conflicts based 
on ideological affiliation, often by exploiting ideological fears. 
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Second, the formation of the ICFTU and the articulation of its aims led to an increased 
emphasis on anti-communism in Western labor while simultaneously increasing competition 
between the TUC and AFL/AFL-CIO.
125 
American and British labor leaders immediately 
conflicted over leadership in the ICFTU and the AFL orchestrated TUC General Secretary 
Vincent Tewson’s removal as ICFTU President in 1953. Additionally, TUC and AFL leaders 
expressed differences of opinion regarding the primary objectives of Western international labor 
activities. The Colonial Office echoed TUC perspectives in  reviewing the purpose of the newly 
formed ICFTU in 1951, noting that that the primary purpose of the organization was “the 
establishment of a powerful and effective international organization” that was “pledged to the 
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existing to counter the WFTU.
126 
Nonetheless, in examining the trajectory of its international 
programs after World War II, the TUC International Committee acknowledged in 1966 that “for 
many of its affiliates” the ICFTU’s creation was merely an attempt to “counteract the activities 
of the WFTU.”
127 
Specifically, AFL leaders interpreted the organization’s primary objective as 




Additionally, AFL influence contributed to a politically conservative ICFTU constitution 
that differed from previous international organizations most significantly in its dissociation from 
emphasizing class struggle and the overthrow of the economic system.
129 
Anglo-American 
governmental influence in the organization also contributed to the ICFTU’s minimizing 
challenges to the existing international system. Several labor leaders argued that the United 
States and British governments worked through their national trade union fronts to use the 
ICFTU as an arm of governmental foreign policy. 
Richard Deverall, a former UAW education officer and member of the AFL’s FTUC, 
noted in a report to George Meany that, “from the foundation of the ICFTU the American 
government has financed in one way or another activities of the ICFTU in order to further 
American foreign policy.” Deverall also argued that the British government financed or used 
American financing to use the ICFTU to “choke off rebellious Communist and/or vigorously 
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into activities that are non-political.” Deverall noted that the British were frank about their use of 
the international to suppress development of nationalist demands for independence.
130 
Anglo- 
American pursuit of national interests in the ICFTU undermined the organization’s efforts to 
promote international worker solidary and led to skepticism about ICFTU motives among many 
colonial and Western European labor leaders. 
The brief CIO-TUC inclusion in the WFTU exacerbated long-standing tensions between 
the AFL, CIO, and TUC and struggles for influence over the nature of the ICFTU assured that 
conflicts continued after the CIO and TUC left the WFTU. Western labor leaders in the ICFTU 
from countries other than the United States and Great Britain frequently struggled to limit 
AFL/AFL-CIO and to a lesser extent TUC influence in the organization and independent Anglo- 
American overseas labor activities. ICFTU bureaucratic struggles continued throughout the 
1950s and 1960s. AFL leaders, including George Meany, discussed leaving the organization to 
pursue independent activity almost immediately and withdrew from the ICFTU from 1969 to 
1982.
131 
AFL alienation from the international labor community reinforced its tendency to act 
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Taken together with TUC parochialism in the colonies, the five year period in 
international labor activity after World War II contributed to conditions that undermined efforts 
at coordinating institutional decolonization through the ICFTU in the 1950s. 
In sum, there were three specific outcomes that grew out of the early Cold War period in 
international labor that directly impacted the working-class struggle in British Guiana between 
1948 and 1965: a strong anti-communist trend in Western labor, a power struggle between 
American and British labor leaders that minimized cooperative action through an international 
labor body, and the establishment of two international labor organizations with different views 
on political economy and colonialism. In British Guiana, the AFL/AFL-CIO, TUC, and ICFTU 
affiliated with organizations that were strongly anti-communist and that did not associate with 
the WFTU. Most importantly, the TUC-AFL rivalry occasionally impeded the coordination of 
British and American labor programs in British Guiana and resulted in inefficient institution 




American and British labor leaders expressed a shared desire to build liberal capitalist- 
oriented trade unions connected to the Western international labor movement in British Guiana 
partially to protect their own nations’ interests. Anglo-American trade union leaders argued that 
pro-Western trade unions would contribute to establishing a non-communist government and 
improve Guianese workers’ conditions and influence based on the ideals of free labor unionism 
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unions to be political leaders who acted through the labor movement to subvert the capitalist- 
democratic system and AFL-CIO efforts aimed at address the political threat as a means of 
defending Guiana’s unions from subversion to a political party. Conversely, the TUC expressed 
the view that the threat to Western interests in British Guiana was a lack of effective democratic 
institutions that perpetuated poor conditions for workers, workers’ lack of investment in the 
political-economic system, and a consequent success for radical political leaders. 
 




British policymakers advocated granting colonies’ independence more quickly than the 
United States at times, as was the case in British Guiana. American and British trade unions and 
governments cooperated to advance liberal capitalism after World War II, especially in 
contesting the expansion of communism, which was the most direct threat to a liberal capitalist 
international system. Both nations’ political leaders argued for collaboration with trade unions to 
build capitalist institutions as a means of pursuing their foreign policies. American policymakers, 
however, expressed less confidence than the British that institutional structures could effectively 
safeguard against communism. In British Guiana, American policymakers’ determined that the 
People’s Progressive Party’s (PPP) Marxist-Leninist proclivities would overwhelm the reformist 
labor unions and establish a communist beachhead in South America if independence was 
granted too soon. Thus, American policymakers pressured British officials into delaying 
Guianese independence until the PPP was removed. At the same time, British officials 
acknowledged the importance of cooperating with U.S. policymakers in determining the future 
of British Guiana. Both countries’ policymakers and labor leaders pursued national interests in 
trying to obtain the most advantageous place within the international order. By the 1950s a 
dynamic emerged in which British and American officials cooperated diplomatically while 
engaging in institution-building projects designed to advance national interests in British 
colonies as they progressed toward self-government and independence. 
The Anglo-American alliance during World War II contributed to the emergence of 
decolonization as a means of strengthening the liberal capitalist international system in which the 
81  
United States and Great Britain exerted the greatest degree of influence.
1 
United States 
policymakers advocated the expansion of self-determination to British colonies for ideological, 
strategic, and most importantly economic reasons and began pressing Great Britain to grant 
independence to its colonial possessions during the war. British policymakers resisted American 
pressure; however, they concluded that Britain’s economic and strategic interests benefited from 
ending formal empire after the Suez Crisis in 1956, and as early as 1949 in the West Indies.
2 
At 
the same time, American policymakers’ fear that socialist or communist governments with 
Eastern-bloc-oriented foreign policies could emerge in former colonial territories weakened 
long-inconsistent American support for self-determination. United States policymakers adjusted 
their anti-colonial policy as a response to Cold War developments and frequently pressured 
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more favorably toward American interests.
3 
As a result, the American position shifted toward 
support for a British policy of slow, closely guided, decolonization.
4
 
Anglo-American leaders prioritized the preservation of their alliance during the Cold War 
and compromised on the details of decolonization to assure their partner’s as well as their own 
objectives were protected. Both nations aimed to retain colonial participation in a liberal 
capitalist-international system, to protect strategic raw materials, military bases, and ports, to 
assure stability and to preserve as much democracy as possible in emerging countries.
5 
Nonetheless, British and American leaders subtly disagreed on the future toward which the 
colonies were to be guided. The most important aspect of Anglo-American tension derived from 
the British objective of retaining connections and influence in former colonies and United States 
policies designed to expand American power in decolonizing areas.
6
 
Pragmatism guided American and British policymakers toward collaboration in British 
 
Guiana. British leaders expressed a strong concern that the imperial withdrawal occur in a 
dignified manner leaving colonies stable with viable, pro-Western economic and political 
systems.
7 
American officials acknowledged British objectives including the desire to quickly 
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leave Guiana given its drain on scarce British resources and minimal strategic significance for 
Great Britain.
8 
British economic weakness precluded protracted decolonization and limited 
Britain’s ability to financially support colonial and post-colonial Guyana’s development.
9 
Moreover, colonial officials expected British Guiana’s economy to worsen over time as the 
population increased.
10 
Nonetheless, the Colonial Office emphasized the importance of 
establishing economically stability prior to granting political independence.
11
 
As a result, colonial officials attempted to incorporate the former British Dominion of 
Canada into British Guiana’s development plans on the premise that the Canadians had 
substantial investments in Guianese bauxite, and Canadian leaders expressed an interest in 
exerting influence among former British colonies in the hemisphere.
12 
British documents, 
however, suggest that colonial officials doubted Canadian cooperation could replace the level of 
assistance available from the United States. British officials suggested that post-colonial 
development required financial and material aid from the United States particularly as the 
Caribbean colonies increasingly drained Britain’s diminishing coffers in the early 1960s and as a 
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result emphasized the importance of cooperating with American policymakers.
13 
Additionally, 
British policymakers expressed concern that failing to protect American objectives might result 
in their partner’s intervention in British Guiana after independence.
14
 
Therefore, British and American policymakers formed a cooperative diplomatic strategy 
toward British Guiana despite official assertions that the Colonial Office developed its Guiana 
policy independently of outside influence.
15 
British officials formulated plans that assumed 
disagreement with the United States; however, their broad strategy worked in conjunction with 
American interests in the region.
16 
At the same time, American policymakers acknowledged that 
political or economic programs designed to shape decolonization in the colony required 
cooperation with British officials despite the colony’s geographical proximity to the United 
13 
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States. Consequently, official American policy developed in conjunction with British interests. 
Moreover, both nations tried to obscure American involvement in British-Guianese relations to 
avoid international criticism. 
As a result of the delicate, occasionally contentious but necessarily collaborative 
relationship regarding decolonization in British Guiana, British and American policymakers 
looked for unofficial channels through which they could pursue their independent aims in the 
colony. Ultimately, British and American policymakers’ objectives merged with their nation’s 
labor leaders’ aims, resulting in Anglo-American policymakers’ determinations that institution- 
building in British Guiana was the most effective means of achieving shared, and also their 
national objectives. 
AFL-CIO and TUC Debates on Colonialism and Institution-Building 
 
British and American labor leaders agreed that colonies’ transition to increased self- 
government and eventually political independence required the development of trade unions 
acting as institutions in a capitalist democracy. Anglo-American labor leaders opposed the 
People’s Progressive Party (PPP) in British Guiana for three mutually reinforcing reasons. First, 
Anglo-American labor leaders expressed concern that party’s political objectives would lead to 
close association with international communism and that communist ideology prescribed a role 
for trade unions that subordinated them to the state. Trade unions’ inclusion in the state apparatus 
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Second, British and American labor leaders opposed the PPP’s argument for close 
collaboration between trade unions and political parties in pursuit of a social transformation. 
American Federation of Labor (AFL) leaders argued that trade unions should restrict their 
activities to industrial activity and bargaining for wages and benefits. Conversely, Congress of 
Industrial Organizations (CIO) and Trades Union Congress (TUC) leaders argued for broader 
trade union activity that included political activism in support of social reforms. However, the 
CIO and TUC did not support politically active unionism in colonial areas in the same manner as 
in the United States and Great Britain.
18 
Thus, the AFL, CIO, and TUC shared a general outlook 
 
toward trade unions’ role in colonial areas. Finally, Anglo-American trade union leaders argued 
that the PPP’s development of socialist-unionism would result in international associations that 
challenged British and American national interests. Specifically, British and American labor 
leaders expressed concern about the PPP’s relations with the World Federation of Trade Unions 
(WFTU) in the context of global competition between the International Confederation of Free 
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Despite their general agreement regarding the role of trade unions in colonial areas and 
support for capitalist democracies, the AFL, CIO, and TUC disagreed considerably on the 
political issue of colonialism. British and American labor leaders’ actions regarding European 
imperialism contributed to the context in which Guianese labor leaders formulated their 
organizational perspectives and considered international relationships. American labor leaders 
and other non-British members of the ICFTU after 1949 frequently attacked colonialism and 
emphasized challenging colonial social and economic structures as a priority for their 
organizations. Conversely, British trade union leaders generally supported official colonial 
policy.
19 
Nonetheless, the TUC and AFL/AFL-CIO engaged in inconsistent inter-organizational 
 
cooperation in the process of institution building.
20 
All three organizations tried to exert 
influence over colonial unions through shared methods, training programs, and affiliation to 
American, British, and international labor organizations, particularly with consideration to future 
independence. 
Sidney Hillman, the first Vice President of the CIO and a close adviser to Franklin 
Roosevelt, explained why his organization opposed colonialism in a February 1945 speech 
opening the World Trade Union Conference. Hillman argued that post-war imperialism, 
regardless of its economic orientation, would lead to the repression of workers’ rights as soon as 
the conflict ended.  He warned that with allied victory assured imperialist nations were jockeying 
for position in the post-war world and “should [reactionary] forces prevail, then all we have 
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fought and suffered and died for will have been in vain.” Continued imperialism, Hillman 
suggested, assured future economic crises, oppression, aggression, and inevitably a third world 
war.
21 
Ernst Schwarz, the CIO’s Latin American representative and a member of the ICFTU- 
affiliated Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers (ORIT) Executive Council, 
introduced a development plan for Latin America in 1949 that was reiterated at ORIT’s founding 
conference two years later. Schwarz criticized colonial and semi-colonial systems as being 
economically repressive and socially destabilizing.
22 
Thus, Hillman and Schwarz argued that 
peace though the expansion of democracy, economic progress, and social stability required 
decolonization. 
The debate surrounding an ICFTU resolution on non-self-governing territories provides 
the clearest example of AFL, CIO, and TUC views on colonialism and the origins of Anglo- 
American labor leaders’ support for institution-building projects in colonial territories. In 
November 1951 the ICFTU executive board adopted a resolution on dependent territories that 
established a series of measures articulating the organization’s support for self-determination and 
to pressure European governments into ending their empires. ICFTU support for political 
independence, however, was predicated on the notion that colonies establish “a democratic 
society” and “uphold the principles of free trade unionism” because free trade unions were “the 
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most important force for democratic development.”
23 
An article in the AFL News Reporter in 
1953 further underscored American labor leaders’ anti-colonialism. The article noted that AFL 
pressure to replace the TUC’s Vincent Tewson as President of the ICFTU opened the door to the 
pursuit of a policy to bring about “the end of the evils of colonialism.”
24
 
TUC leaders resented American insistence on prioritizing anti-colonialism in the ICFTU 
 
in the early 1950s and their hesitation illuminates a central argument of this dissertation. 
Specifically, the TUC followed the British government’s lead and argued for prioritizing the 
development of strong political-economic institutions in the colonies before independence. TUC 
leaders insisted that focusing on independence before institutions were firmly established was a 
course toward chaos. In British Guiana, the TUC’s prediction proved tragically accurate, though 
institutional dysfunction was largely a consequence of politically-focused Anglo-American 
institution-building. Thus, TUC representatives reserved their position on several aspects of the 
ICFTU resolution including the insistence on timetables for self-determination, membership of 
non-self-governing territories in the International Labor Organization (ILO), and support for 




Most importantly, the TUC International Committee quoted Oliver Lyttleton, the new 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, in emphasizing that “in pursuit of self-government, we are 
seeking as rapidly as possible to build up in each territory the institutions which its 
circumstances require.”  Self-government absent the appropriate institutions, they argued, was 
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emphasized the importance of their role in colonial areas because “in many territories the people 
are striving to master forms of political and social organization, knowledge and ideas in decades 
that the West took centuries to develop.” Furthermore, TUC representatives warned that a 
general policy of support for any democratic nationalist movement in colonial areas would “get 
the ICFTU into real trouble,” that it was a direct contradiction of TUC policy, and that “based on 
experience…the trade union should first be able to build up its industrial strength before 




Despite strong anti-colonial rhetoric, the AFL, CIO, and ICFTU tacitly agreed that 
political emancipation was a means of achieving social and economic improvement and not 
necessarily an end in itself. The ICFTU adjusted its resolution in response to TUC objections and 
included an emphasis on the significance of institution-building. The revised resolution noted 
that, even though the organization supported self-government as an ultimate aim “account must 
be taken of the fact that many different degrees of development exist amongst the non-self- 
governing territories” and “intermediate stages may have to be envisaged” to develop modern 
democratic institutions over time.
27 
While the organization agreed to press for self-determination 
 
in colonial areas, ICFTU leaders acknowledged that “one of the factors to bear in mind will be 
the existence in the non-self-governing territory of a free trade union movement able to 
guarantee workers’ rights.” The new resolution prescribed a role for the ICFTU in contributing 
to creating the “conditions permitting the development of political, economic and social 
institutions, and particularly a sound free trade union movement” to effectively advocate colonial 
independence. In pursuit of that objective, the ICFTU agreed to receive requests from non-self- 
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governing territories regarding their particular challenges, to study the situation, consult the 




Everett Kassalow, Director of Research for the Industrial Union Department of the AFL- 
 
CIO, concisely articulated this viewpoint when he emphasized in closing a lecture in 1961 that “a 
strong case can be made for the proposition that an effective trade union movement that gives 
workers a sense of integration and participation in the great industrial processes of their own 
society is one of the essential parts of a modern, stable, democratic industrial order.”
29 
D.I. 
Davies expressed a similar view in analyzing British encouragement of colonial labor unions. 
Davies suggested that the Colonial Office and TUC collaborated to promote trade unions in 
British territories because, as one trade union adviser explained, workers were going to “organize 
and act collectively whether Government or employers or anyone else wish to permit it or not” 
and trade unions would be “led by men more revolutionary” if British trade unions and colonial 




British policy shifted during the late 1940s and 1950s from defense of the empire to 
 
decolonization; however, British policymakers considered both possibilities—preservation of the 
empire and political independence for their colonies—a means of safeguarding strategic 
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result, the Colonial Office underscored the importance of building colonial trade unions. 
Specifically, colonial officials “endorsed the principle that a sound and responsible trade union 
movement is essential to economic and political progress” at a conference for the heads of 
Colonial Labor Departments in 1951.
32
 
The Colonial Office and TUC cooperated since the 1920s to establish close connections 
 
between British and colonial unions, to collect information about colonial trade unions for policy 
development, and to promote British trade union principles in colonial organizations. Colonial 
Office-TUC collaboration expanded throughout the late 1940s and into the early 1950s with the 
establishment of the Commonwealth Advisory Committee in 1945 and increased material 
assistance, educational training, and TUC advising after 1950. British labor leaders expected 
supplementary support from international labor through the ICFTU, particularly financially; 
however, they emphasized that the Colonial Office and TUC would play the most significant role 
in developing trade unions in British territories.
33 
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that ICFTU involvement in the colonies should focus on directly combatting communism as an 
auxiliary TUC institution-building.
34 
TUC International Committee analyses of post-war colonial 
labor programs acknowledged that the TUC and British government jointly “and consciously 
attempted to shape, within limits, both the developing trade union movements and the conditions 
under which the trade unions would operate as independence was secured.”
35
 
The Colonial Labor Advisory Committee prepared a memorandum for Secretary of State 
 
for the Colonies James Griffiths in May 1951 that evaluated the situation regarding colonial trade 
unions and proposed several recommendations. The committee criticized the failure to 
effectively establish labor principles and practices amenable to British interests as colonial trade 
union membership increased.  As a result, the committee argued that British trade unionists and 
colonial officials needed to “pass on to Colonial peoples the protection and experience gained by 
labor in this country over the past century.” Trade union development, according to the 
committee, was essential to the ultimate objective of British colonial policy, “to guide the 
colonial territories to responsible self-government within the Commonwealth in conditions that 
ensure to the people both a fair standard of living and freedom from aggression in any quarter.” 




Members of the Colonial Labor Advisory Committee met with Labor Department heads 
in the fall of 1951 and articulated a shared understanding of trade unions’ fundamental role in the 
process of establishing the institutional structures central to capitalist democracy. At the 
meetings’ opening session Griffiths insisted that the long-term success of colonial policy 
motives were not entirely altruistic and cooperation with the Colonial Office often compromised trade unionists’ 
pursuit of labor internationalism; however, cooperation was understood to be part of a process of institution-building 
that would ultimately create the structures necessary for colonies to transition to independent capitalist-democracies. 
34 
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depended on effectively managing British territories’ transition to industrialization and that trade 
union development was critical to giving colonists a “sense of belonging” as society changed. 
Speaking on behalf of the Colonial Employers’ Federation (CEF), Booker Brothers’ chairman, 
Sir Frederick Seaford, suggested that employers had a responsibility to encourage the 
development of trade unions to protect business interests. Specifically, Seaford pointed to 
Bookers’ attempts to establish negotiating machinery in British Guiana as an example of British 




The members of the TUC, the OEF, and Labor Department officials who made up the 
advisory committee determined that colonial labor officers should encourage trade union 
development and that the TUC should undertake organization and training. Participants 
suggested the TUC should directly implement colonial trade union training courses to give the 
programs the appearance of independence from the Colonial Office. More importantly, the 
committee agreed that the TUC should strengthen its connections to colonial unions and use its 
influence and educational programs to moderate potentially radical movements. The committee 
re-emphasized its expectation that international participation in colonial institution-building 





Regarding TUC activities, Griffiths emphasized that “proper liaison should be maintained 
with the Colonial Labor Departments” while warning that labor organizations had to avoid being 
too closely associated with governments. Conference members agreed that government-union 
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union as vehicle for his ambition.”
39 
Attendees noted that “time was not on our side.” They 
insisted on the critical need for immediate action since “the tide of events was moving rapidly, 
and might well not allow scope for the organizations and structures which we wished to see 
develop in Colonial societies to grow up by the slow and pure process of natural evolution.”
40 
Thus, colonial officials, labor leaders, and businessmen engaged in cooperative institution- 
building in an attempt to establish colonial trade unions that could help colonies transition 
economically and socially into capitalist democratic territories and retain connections with Great 
Britain.
41 
In November 1951, Griffiths suggested that the British policy toward its colonies 
would be to move toward granting dependent territories greater internal self-government and 
promoting economic and social development to achieve stability in the post-war system. 
Significantly, he noted: “To that end we are seeking as rapidly as possible to build up in each 
territory the institutions which its circumstances require.”
42
 
Colonial officials evaluating the effects of TUC-Colonial Office relations concluded that 
 
the partnership successfully advanced British objectives and noted that TUC activities in the 
colonies were “a great advantage” that was “the most important element in the creation of a 
stable and responsible trade union movement.” Furthermore, colonial officials offered “great 
praise for the work which has already been done,” commending TUC efforts to educate colonial 
unionists and restrained their actions. Despite officials’ praise for the collaboration, British labor 
leaders expressed skepticism regarding early institution-building efforts. TUC leaders criticized 
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“the timidity of the Colonial Office” and restrictions placed on British trade union activities in 
the colonies. Additionally, British labor leaders suggested that a lack of foresight and the 
“obstruction of Administrations and people within the territories” made their activities 
ineffective. However, British labor leaders suggested developing long-term programs to 





Despite occasional disagreements between government officials and trade unionists, TUC 
leaders agreed that their primary objective was protecting British interests, noting that “at no 
time has any serious conflict arisen between official British policy” and the policy of the TUC. 
Broadly shared international objectives facilitated close cooperation between trade union 
officials and the Colonial Office in attempting to develop colonial labor organizations and 
integrate them into the Western capitalist system once the decision to pursue decolonization was 
reached in the late 1950s. The TUC, according to Cabinet members, could “check irresponsible 





Oliver Lyttleton, who succeeded Griffiths as Secretary of State for the Colonies soon 
after the joint conference, articulated a crucial and prevalent view during the establishment of an 
informal organization involving members of the Overseas Employers’ Federation (OEF) and the 
TUC in coordination with the Colonial Office in 1954. Lyttleton explained that the tripartite 
Colonial Office-OEF-TUC approach to developing colonial trade unions held as a central aim 
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colonies, largely as a result of Soviet domination of the international. Nonetheless, Lyttleton 
argued that “communism had made the job [of developing trade unions in colonies] urgent” but 
“the problems would exist without it and communism itself could only be met by developing 
sound industrial relations.” Therefore, he suggested that material improvements for workers 
obtained through capitalist trade unions could improve industrial relations and, according to 
TUC Assistant General Secretary George Woodcock, could “be a much more effective check on 




relationship between Secretaries of State and the TUC continued under Lyttleton’s successor, 
Alan Lennox-Boyd, as institution-building and decolonization expanded in the late 1950s.
46
 
Some OEF leaders disagreed that trade unions were useful as democratic institutions; 
however, they often supported cooperating with the Colonial Office and TUC to develop 
organized labor as a tool to increase workers’ productivity. According to A.J. Wells, Chief 
Personnel Officer of Bookers Sugar Estates in British Guiana, industrial and political democracy 
should be limited and trade union training should be focused on teaching workers their individual 
responsibilities rather than allowing representation in the decision-making process. Nonetheless, 
he argued that cultivating trade unions was the “only possible course open to industrial 
management” and that welcoming employees as associates was beneficial because “If you can 
influence, control or direct men’s thoughts into the right channels…then the action you desire 
will happen as a matter of course.”
47 
Thus, Bookers cooperated in British institution-building 
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perpetuating the dependence of Guianese workers and improving living conditions to improve 
productivity.
48 
At the same time, historian Clem Seecharan argues that Booker Brothers’ 
Chairman Jock Campbell strongly advocated social reform and expanded industrial democracy 
as an end in itself.
49
 
Moreover, TUC and OEF leaders acknowledged that the weak Guianese economy limited 
the extent of wage increases and government assistance to the poor, and they expressed fear that 
continued poverty would renew WFTU influence in the colony. As a result, British labor leaders, 
colonial officials, and employer representatives in the OEF concluded that the only way to avoid 
challenges to the political-economic system from disillusioned workers was to train Guianese 




officials, British trade union leaders, and British businessmen invested in the colonies hoped to 
improve workers’ conditions as a means of alleviating unrest and stabilizing colonial societies 
while avoiding the possibility of mass support for socialism, communism, or radical political 
measures. Colonial Officials, British and colonial employers, and British and colonial labor 
leaders argued that cooperation was essential; however, they emphasized that collaboration 
needed to be covert and that the TUC was obliged to play the most important role in organizing 
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In other words, British labor leaders, colonial officials, and employers articulated a clear 
and firm position that colonies’ political independence could only be considered if it was coupled 
with the establishment of structural mechanisms designed to alleviate poverty and social unrest. 
The British institution-building project aimed at perpetuating capitalist-democratic social and 
political-economic systems in former territories, protecting British investments, and preserving 
connections between former colonies and Great Britain. 
Many of the principles articulated in TUC and Colonial Office records are echoed in the 
constitution for the Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers (ORIT), the regional arm 
of the ICFTU in the Western Hemisphere. American labor leaders in the American Federation of 
Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) wielded the greatest influence in ORIT 
and operated through the organization to advance American labor’s regional objectives. ORIT’s 
constitution defined its objective as promoting “economic development and social progress” 
because “economic distress will aid Communist aggressors as much as military weakness.” 
ORIT leaders emphasized that support for democratic government was only possible when 
“people feel they have something worth fighting for.” To achieve those objectives, the 
constitution recommended a complementary program that facilitated full support from regional 
labor organizations to strengthen the Western Hemisphere’s economy.
52 
The ORIT constitution 
 
vaguely echoed some of the ideas emphasized in the ICFTU resolution on non-self-governing 
territories, particularly in regards to supporting institution building. However, the AFL’s 
influence over the organization is evidenced in the emphasis on anti-communism. 
Like British policymakers, American government officials pursued policies after World 
War II designed to establish an integrated and stable international system based on 
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modernization through liberal capitalism and democracy, to avoid war and depression, and to 
preserve national interests.
53 
As a result, American government officials consistently argued that 
the AFL and CIO had an increased and crucial role in play in post-war foreign relations. 
However the American labor-government relationship in international affairs differed from that 
between the Colonial Office and TUC since the United States did not have colonial 
possessions.
54 
Nonetheless, American policymakers, like colonial officials, viewed trade unions 
as institutional mechanisms designed to reinforce a liberal capitalist-democratic system while 
safeguarding national interests. The State Department established a relationship with American 
labor leaders based on developing effective inter-American economic cooperation and opposing 
dictatorships through regional labor unions almost immediately after World War II.
55 
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labor leaders so that they could explain “how free, independent trade unions operate in a 
democracy” based on American labor practices.
56
 
An article in the October 1950 State Department Bulletin echoed several of the colonial 
labor advisors’ conclusions. The article, authored by labor official Bernard Weisman, noted that 
organized labor developed over a long period in industrialized countries and established itself as 
one of the most important institutions in facilitating liberal capitalist democracy. However, the 
article warned that “in newer countries, there is an almost frantic haste to bridge within months 
or years the experience of many centuries.” Workers in emerging areas, Weisman suggested, 
often took on responsibilities for which they were unprepared out of necessity. Furthermore, 
Weisman argued that the desirability of the situation was irrelevant, asserting that: “it is a fact, 
and we must try as a nation to face facts and to build upon them the structure which…will be in 
the best interest of all concerned.”
57 
The State Department, much like the Colonial Office, 
 
accepted as inevitable the progression toward some form of modernity in colonial and 
undeveloped areas and sought to direct that trajectory through the implementation of specific 
institutional structures designed to guide development toward capitalism and democracy. 
Weisman maintained that cooperation between government and labor in international 
relations was crucial in the post-war world; however, the American view differed from that of 
the Colonial Office in important ways. The State Department emphasized advancing a nationalist 
agenda and especially the importance of confronting the Kremlin’s “foremost objective:” taking 
control of the organized labor movement. According to Weisman, American labor’s dynamic 
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in shaping American diplomacy.” Moreover, Weisman argued that American labor constituted 
one of the most potent influences constituting American activity in world affairs. Weisman noted 
that “the Department of State has no desire to dictate to labor what it should do or try to control 
what labor does,” emphasizing the importance of organized labor’s independence in determining 
the course of action it thought best in international relations. However, Weisman concluded 
American labor leaders needed to “carry America’s message abroad” and discussed the various 
ways American organized labor representatives advised policymaking and contributed to and 
supported American foreign policy.
58 
Thus, the State Department formulated a clear expectation 
 
of government-labor cooperation in international relations that closely resembled the relationship 
between the Colonial Office and the TUC. 
At the highest level of the United States government, foreign policymakers argued that 
organized labor was an important part of American foreign policy. President Dwight 
Eisenhower’s reorganization plan establishing the Foreign Operations Administration (FOA) in 
1953 further emphasized the need for organized labor to support official policy and was designed 
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the State Department’s expressed expectations for government-labor programs did not emphasize 
the importance of creating specific institutional structures, which was a key concern for the 
Colonial Office. Therefore, British and American policymakers held similar but not identical 
expectations regarding the restructuring of colonial territories as they transitioned to 
independence. Specifically, the Colonial Office articulated views emphasizing the importance of 
institutions and American officials expressed a desire to use existing structures to achieve 
political objectives.
60 
The difference in emphasis between British and American objectives 
 
influenced the nature of Anglo-American labor programs in British Guiana, especially as the 
AFL-CIO supplanted the TUC as the most active external labor organization in the colony. 
Consecutive American Secretaries of State discussed the importance of State Department 
cooperation with labor leaders as an important component of post-war diplomacy. Dean 
Acheson, under Secretary of State from 1945 to 1949, assured Jacob Potofsky, President of the 
Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, that the State Department would continue to 
regularly meet with American trade unionists to discuss foreign developments.
61 
As Secretary of 
State from 1949 to 1953, Acheson criticized what the nation’s lack of commitment to the early 
Cold War, a struggle that he stated was “just as crucial from the point of view of the continued 
existence of our way of life” as the Second World War. Acheson argued that successful 
confrontation with the Soviet Union in the post-war world necessitated “total diplomacy,” which 
included military preparedness and a foreign policy that created “economic, political, social, and 
psychological conditions that strengthen and create confidence in the democratic way of life.” 
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John Foster Dulles, Acheson’s successor, shared his predecessor’s interest in cooperation 
with non-state actors while emphasizing the need for American involvement in colonial areas.
63 
In a November 1953 speech to the CIO, Dulles echoed the view that the success of American 
foreign policy depended on concurrent action by private citizens and groups; in particular, non- 
governmental organizations shared a responsibility to advance the nation’s foreign policy. 
Moreover, his speech emphasized the rapidly increasing importance of the third world to 
American foreign relations. Dulles argued that “the colonial and dependent areas are the field of 
most dramatic contest” in international relations. There, Dulles argued, “the policies of the West 
and those of Soviet imperialism come into headlong collision.” The Secretary of State expressed 
concern at the possibility that Soviet leaders had a strategic plan to exploit nationalist movements 
with the objective of advancing global communist revolution. Specifically, Dulles quoted from a 
lecture by Joseph Stalin on Leninism which argued that “the road to victory of the revolution in 
the West lies through the revolutionary alliance with the liberation movement of the colonies and 
dependent countries.” Dulles’ speech, given less than a month after the British alleged a 
communist conspiracy as the justification for suspending self-government in British Guiana, 











Dean Acheson, “The Task of Today’s Diplomacy,” Department of State Publication 3806, March 20, 1950, 
Marjorie Nicholson Files, Box 45, TUCLC. 
63 
For more on the shift in United States foreign policy during the Eisenhower administration that emphasized the 
developing world, see: Kathryn C. Statler and Andrew L. Johns, eds., The Eisenhower Administration, the Third 
World, and the Globalization of the Cold War (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2006). 
105  
programs that combined the efforts of American trade unionists and government officials in the 
colony beginning in 1954.
64
 
Dulles’s relations with labor leaders, based on a shared pursuit of institution building, 
included personal meetings with AFL President George Meany and CIO President Walter 
Reuther. Dulles commended Meany for the ICFTU’s role in promoting democratic institutions 
throughout the world and met with Meany and Reuther to discuss the continuing success of the 
ICFTU in 1953.
65 
The Secretary also met with Meany, Reuther, and FOA officials to assure 
smooth operation of government-labor programs in the mid-1950s.
66 
Additionally, the Dulles-led 
 
State Department worked with the AFL-CIO to resolve labor disagreements between American 
companies and foreign workers, cooperated in public relations efforts to improve perceptions of 
the United States abroad, and requested advice on labor appointees to international diplomatic 
conferences during the 1950s.
67
 
The Eisenhower administration’s National Security Council (NSC) advocated 
 
government-labor institution-building in pursuit of American foreign policy as well. The NSC 
developed broad regional objectives based on hemispheric solidarity in support of United States 
world policies, orderly development so that states in the region would be effective members of 
the hemispheric system, reduction of internal Communist or anti-American subversion, and the 
retention of access to raw materials. To advance those aims, the NSC highlighted the need to 
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“assist and encourage the formation and development of responsible organized labor movements 
and leadership in Latin American countries” and the importance of strengthening programs for 
specialized training in the United States of Latin American labor leaders.
68
 
Dulles’s stated objectives and United States hemispheric policy are best understood 
 
within the context of the broader American Cold War policy aimed at countering Soviet power 
and containing the expansion of communist influence. Eisenhower’s “New Look” national 
security policy outlined in NSC Document 162/2 noted that underdeveloped and colonial areas 
contained vast manpower, crucial resources, and significant potential for growth that “would 
greatly, perhaps decisively, alter the world balance of power to our detriment” if incorporated 
into the Soviet system. As a result the NSC advocated the orderly development of stable, 




Eisenhower’s foreign policy depended largely on preserving confidence in the free world’s 
institutions, keeping colonial areas within the Western capitalist system, and defending 
American national security. 
AFL-CIO leaders also influenced United States foreign policy through information- 
sharing and correspondence with some of the most influential American policymakers in the late 
1950s. Meany and Jay Lovestone of the AFL International Affairs Department in particular 
maintained a broad correspondence with high-ranking United States officials including Secretary 
of the Navy Arleigh Burke and Senators Thomas Dodd and John F. Kennedy. Meany also 
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Representatives Committee on Un-American Activities in June 1956.
70 
American labor leaders 
helped train Foreign Service workers during the late 1950s and 1960s on international labor 
issues as well.
71 
Additionally, Eisenhower named Meany and AFL-CIO Vice President George 
M. Harrison as members of the United States Delegation to the UN General Assembly from 1957 
to 1959.
72 
Thus, American labor leaders and government officials developed a consistent and 
cooperative relationship to advance United States foreign policy. 
The Eisenhower administration, like the Colonial Office, expressed appreciation trade 
unions’ cooperation in foreign relations.
73 
George C. Lodge, Assistant Secretary of Labor for 
International Affairs from 1958 to 1962, wrote an article for Foreign Affairs in July 1959 
warning of communists’ concentration on union leaders in their subversive efforts, that many 
foreign unionists were indoctrinated in Moscow, and that American labor’s overseas activities 
were critical in impeding communist efforts. Lodge suggested that American labor leaders’ 
understanding of developing world problems made their training programs and efforts abroad 
essential to preserving American-style capitalism internationally.
74 
Additionally, a January 1961 
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White House press release commended the efforts of American labor organizations in countering 
the spread of Communism in labor organizations abroad.
75
 
Eisenhower’s and Dulles’s successors strengthened the association between the executive 
office and American labor leaders. Dean Rusk, Secretary of State for President John F. Kennedy, 
regularly invited several AFL-CIO leaders to conferences to discuss nongovernmental 
organizations’ role in foreign policy, suggesting at times that Kennedy himself would attend the 
meetings.
76 
Kennedy’s connection to American labor leaders engaged in AFL-CIO international 
relations originated well before his time as President. Jay Lovestone provided Kennedy with 
information regarding labor developments while Kennedy was a Senator from Massachusetts and 
Kennedy assured Lovestone that he would carefully consider AFL-CIO resolutions.
77 
Arthur 
Schlesinger, Special Assistant to President Kennedy, assured the AFL-CIO’s Latin American 
representative, Serafino Romualdi, that American labor leaders’ reports on Latin America 
provided important background information for presidential speeches.
78 
Moreover, one of 
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Despite State Department support, AFL-CIO leaders in the early 1950s argued that the 
United States government failed to adequately utilize American labor’s international capabilities 
and that, as a result, American foreign policy suffered. In a statement before the TUC, Richard 
Walsh of the AFL argued that his organization was “convinced that foreign policy is no longer to 
be entrusted solely to the professional diplomats” and that ensuring a democratic foreign policy 
necessitated labor participation in execution and particularly at the constructive stage.  Rather 
than “wait[ing] for our government to evolve and formulate foreign policy,” he argued, “quite 




Thus, American labor leaders acted aggressively, cooperating with the State Department and 
other agencies to advance United States foreign policy; however, the AFL-CIO frequently 
became involved in overseas activities in advance of governmental agencies. 
Juxtaposing the views of the Colonial Office and the State Department regarding the role 
of national trade unions in international relations illuminates two important aspects of British and 
American policy pertaining to British Guiana between 1946 and 1961. Both governments agreed 
that their national trade unions contributed a great deal to the implementation of effective foreign 
policy that building effective unions in developing countries was important to national interests 
and global stability, and that anti-communism was crucial in the post-war world. The State 
Department emphasized trade union diplomacy as a way to directly confront communism, which 
was assumed to be Soviet-influenced, through politically shaped activities. Conversely, the 
Colonial Office generally argued that unions should focus their efforts toward building strong 
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ideological appeal. Their perspectives were similar and flexible, but the subtle differences were 
important in determining the nature of their programs in British Guiana.
81
 
Most importantly, British influence over institutional structures was an inherent 
consequence of the colonial relationship and their objective was to guide development in a 
manner that preserved British influence. Conversely, American attempts to influence post- 
colonial structures required increased influence in British colonies. Cabinet officials expressed 
apprehension that American policy directly contradicted British objectives and was designed to 
“replace their influence and interests by direct US penetration” in some areas of the world. 
Cabinet members specifically noted that Vice President Richard Nixon, the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, and State Department officials publically expressed the view that colonial 
retreat should be coupled with American economic and political expansion, particularly through 
the trade union movement.
82 
Thus, by the end of the 1950s British officials argued that American 
 
actions, at times at the cost of Cold War imperatives, were inherently expansionist in the sense 
that they sought to introduce and impose new ideas on former colonial institutional structures. 
In other words, American labor leaders and governmental officials, especially in the 
AFL, articulated a clear and firm position that colonial trade unions should be supported in a 
process of institution-building. Their objective was to establishment fervently anti-communist 
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mechanisms designed to perpetuate capitalist-democratic social and political-economic systems 




British and American trade union leaders also acted to advance their nations’ economic, 
 
strategic, and geo-political interests when developing and implementing programs to influence 
the future of British colonies. The TUC and American labor, particularly the AFL, maneuvered 
for predominance within the Western international labor movement throughout the late 1940s 
and early 1950s. Officials in the British Foreign Office noted that Phillip Pearl of the AFL wrote 
an article in the AFL News Reporter regarding TUC General Secretary Vincent Tewson’s 
resignation as head of the ICFTU that “caused the utmost indignation in the TUC” and that a 
confrontation was imminent for dominance of the organization.
84 
An informal meeting between 
 
TUC and AFL-CIO leaders in 1957 suggested that considerable tension remained between the 
two organizations throughout the 1950s.
85 
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the other was trying to dominate the ICFTU. American labor leaders expressed concern that the 
TUC was trying to “carve out a sphere of influence” in British territories while the TUC justified 
their special connection to colonial unions as the result of a long standing cooperative 
relationship.
86 
Here again, the different motives of British and American labor leaders in colonial 
territories is evident, with the TUC trying to retain aspects of an existing institutional connection 
and American labor leaders trying to replace British influence. 
Regarding the ICFTU resolution on non-self-governing territories, the TUC most 
fervently opposed the ICFTU’s suggestion that colonies be placed under United Nations 
supervision. The TUC argued that such a move would shift control away from Whitehall while 
failing to put it in the hands of colonists, reinforcing their sense of inferiority and undermining 
“enlightened colonial policy.”
87 
The TUC and Colonial Office expected that trade union work in 
the colonies was a responsibility reserved for the British trade unionists despite the creation of 
the ICFTU to advance an international labor program.
88 
There were mild nationalist undertones 
in the TUC’s argument that illuminate the challenges facing national-front trade unions in 
international institutions, a subtext that contributed to the predominance of independent AFL- 
CIO and TUC actions rather than the prevalence of ICFTU programs in British Guiana. 
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Nonetheless, the TUC’s argument illuminates the significance colonial officials and British labor 
leaders placed on achieving their version of institution-building prior to granting political 
independence to colonial territories. British institution-building efforts intended to use trade 
unions to integrate the Guianese political economy within a British-led liberal capitalist system 
as formal political control of colonies diminished. Even though reformist Guianese labor leaders 
eagerly participated in these programs, British institution-building programs inevitably clashed 
with the objectives of revolutionary Guianese. Thus, institution-building fueled the conflicts at 
the center of institutional decolonization. 
The importance British and American government officials placed on trade unions’ role 
in international relations in the late 1940s and early 1950s went beyond rhetoric. When 
differences between the AFL and TUC threatened to undermine the nascent ICFTU in 1952, 
British and American foreign officers met with their respective nation’s labor leaders to discuss 
ways to compromise and preserve the organization. British officials thought it “a pity if the 
impression remained that the TUC had entered into the Washington talks reluctantly or under 
government pressure” and that they should “dispel the impression that this had been the case,” 
though it is evident that government officials encouraged TUC leaders to find ways to 
compromise and collaborate with the AFL.
89 
It is also noteworthy that AFL president George 
 
Meany met with members of the British Foreign Office and that the British officials thought the 
incident important enough to forward details through the chain of command to Foreign Secretary 
Anthony Eden.
90 
Finally, the incident is illuminating in that the most significant point of 
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Anglo-American labor cooperation in British Guiana remained 
limited, in part, as a result of disagreements about the nature of and means to confront the 
potential communist threat in the colony. Moreover, British officials occasionally used 
connections in the American labor movement to try and influence State Department policy and 
encouraged West Indian colonial leaders to do the same.
92 
Thus, British Foreign Office relations 
with American labor leaders were not solely a matter of conflict resolution; rather, a consistent 
dialogue existed between American labor leaders and British officials.
93
 
It is important to consider that some colonial labor leaders looked forward to 
 
strengthening their trade unions on British or American principles and increasing formal 
connections to those organizations while others expected international labor organizations to act 
as a forum to advance the cause of political, economic, and social autonomy. The tension 
between the expectations of the latter group of colonists and those of the TUC became evident as 
soon as post-war international labor institutions were established. Walter Citrine, the TUC’s 
representative to the WFTU conference in October 1945, criticized an unnamed colonial unionist 
for suggesting that “his organization was going to join the international because his country 
wanted their national Independence and he wished to establish Socialism.” Citrine emphasized 
that attempts to use the WFTU as a political international rather than an organization to address 
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Citrine’s articulation of the British viewpoint regarding anti-colonialism in the WFTU, 
and CIO representative Ernst Schwarz’s acknowledgment that British and American unionists 
were isolated within the organization in their support for private development initiatives, 
illuminate an important aspect of international trade unionism and its relationship to 
decolonization.
95 
When the TUC and CIO left the WFTU and joined with the AFL in forming 
the ICFTU they created an institution in which the most conservative elements of the 
international labor movement played the most significant role. AFL leaders exercised the most 
influence in the ICFTU and argued that trade unions should act independently of politics and 
focus on narrow questions of wages and working conditions. Conversely, TUC, CIO, and most 
Western European trade union leaders argued that trade unions should act as a progressive force 
for broad social reform while retaining independence from politics. Thus, ICFTU efforts to assist 
trade unions abroad balanced the trade union ideologies expressed in the leading members’ 
unions but often leaned toward a version of trade unionism closer to the AFL’s ideals. Tensions 
between the viewpoints were consistent and the AFL withdrew from the ICFTU in 1968, in part 
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smaller unions; a “fight between rival trade union imperialisms.”
97 
Regardless of the political 
motives of the communist-dominated unions the WFTU advocated anti-colonialism and 
economic development programs designed to alter colonial economic structures far more 
aggressively than the ICFTU.
98 
The ICFTU constitution defended the freedom of all peoples, 
“including those in colonial or semi-dependent status to determine or change their own political, 
social, or economic institutions by democratic means.”
99 
Nonetheless, AFL, CIO, TUC, ICFTU, 
and ORIT leaders all supported the decision to suspend the Guianese constitution in 1953 
making clear the limitations of Anglo-American labor’s support for colonial autonomy.
100 
Moreover, British socialists acknowledged that the ICFTU tried to assist colonial workers resist 
oppression; however, they noted that the OEF often impeded ICFTU activities as they were 
implemented in the colonies. Thus, some British socialists and a number of colonial labor leaders 
argued that effective pursuit of political independence and socio-economic reform required 
continued association with the WFTU.
101
 
Thus, British, American, and colonial leaders engaged in a struggle for influence over 
 
what they determined to be one of the most crucial institutions in determining the nature of post- 
colonial societies. British and American leaders sought to use trade unions and the labor 
movement to decolonize Britain’s colonies in a manner conducive to their national objectives 
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while strengthening the liberal-capitalist international system. However, the pursuit of national 
objectives undermined consistent cooperation in institution building between the AFL/AFL-CIO 
and TUC, and British and American policymakers viewed the conflict over Guiana’s institutions 
as an area where they could pursue national interests while collaborating on a diplomatic level. 
Most importantly, Guianese leaders disagreed about the meaning of decolonization and some 
pursued institutional changes irreconcilably opposed to both the British or American models, a 
conflict that was central to the struggle that shaped Guianese decolonization. 
 
Chapter 4: Economic Emancipation: The Ideological Origins of the People’s Progressive 




The fundamental issue that shaped Guianese decolonization was the debate over the 
nature of the institutions that would provide the foundation for post-colonial society. Guianese 
labor leaders’ political ideologies influenced but also grew out of their experiences seeking 
improvements for the colony’s impoverished workers through the labor movement. Two general 
perspectives of labor organization materialized in the colony. One argued for reform through the 
preservation of existing labor relations, and a second argued for a break with the Western model 
of trade unionism. Transnational relationships derived from political and trade union ideologies 
and increased the connection between the Cold War and decolonization in British Guiana. 
Ultimately, Guianese, British, and American leaders viewed the establishment of specific types 
of institutionalized labor relations in British Guiana as an opportunity to achieve broader 
objectives regarding the nature of post-colonial society and Guiana’s place within the 
decolonized post-war international system. After 1946 a conflict arose between Guianese labor 
leaders who supported the idea of decolonization within the existing system and those who 
interpreted decolonization as a fundamental break from British and American control, objectives 




There is considerable debate regarding the People’s Progressive Party’s (PPP) political 
orientation, especially the ideologies of Cheddi and Janet Jagan, the party’s leaders from 1950 to 
1999. Several important Guianese involved in the colony’s transition to independence wrote 
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important insights; however, these works disagree considerably on the PPP’s ideology and the 
reasons for the colony’s violent process of decolonization. Cheddi Jagan’s autobiography, The 
West on Trial, published in 1967, argues that the PPP became a victim of American Cold War 
aggression despite pursuing a socialist-reformist—but non-communist—program.
2 
The West on 
Trial provides crucial insight into Jagan’s background, the context in which Jagan developed his 
political ideals, and the origins of the PPP’s philosophy. Nonetheless, the Jagans were 
experienced politicians and as a source The West on Trial needs to be understood in perspective. 
The memoir’s publication in the immediate aftermath of Anglo-American intervention reinforced 
Cheddi Jagan’s long-standing assurances to British and American officials that depicted the PPP 
as a non-communist party. Close examination of Jagan’s rhetoric and writings intended for a 
Guianese audience, however, suggests that the PPP leader connected his country’s destiny with 
that of the international communist movement even if the party was not a disciplined communist 
organization. 
In a Legislative Council debate in 1953 Cheddi Jagan argued that socialism was merely a 
step on the process toward communism. He criticized as “fools” and “ignoramuses” peers who 
argued that “socialism is a respectable thing but that communism is the thing which would take 
away their liberties and freedom.”
3 
Three years after the publication of The West on Trial Jagan 
explained PPP policies as an adaptation of Leninist principles applied with the objective of 
communist development. Moreover, Jagan placed the Guyanese struggle within the context of a 
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broader international movement to which he suggested the party was “accountable” in 1970.
4 
Even between 1957 and 1961, when the PPP moderated its rhetoric and governing policies, 
Jagan explained in the party journal that PPP’s national liberation struggle was “part and parcel” 
of the “titanic battle between two systems, capitalism—imperialism on the one hand and 
socialism—communism on the other.”
5 
He also criticized Forbes Burnham’s sacrifice of “our 




explained the party’s purpose as pursuing socialism with the objective of progressing to the 
“second stage” wherein society would be based on the principle “to each according to his need, 
from each according to his ability” once the colony achieved independence.
7 
Thus, The West on 
Trial provides a critical background into the political ideas of British Guiana’s working-class 
movement; however, it is necessary to evaluate other sources to comprehend the PPP’s ideology. 
Several of Jagan’s contemporaries challenged the non-communist depiction of PPP 
objectives Jagan intimated to British and American officials. They describe the Jagan-led party 
as doctrinaire in its Marxism and committed to international communism. In editing a volume of 
Forbes Burnham’s speeches, C.A. Nascimento and R.A. Burrowes argue that Cheddi Jagan 
subordinated nationalist interests to advancing global communism.
8 
Their depiction, however, 
suffers from a problematic bias since the authors served as public relations officials for the 
Burnham government, which was in the process of establishing a fraudulent and politically 
repressive dictatorship in1970.
9 
Jai Narine Singh, a vice president for the Manpower Citizens 
Association (MPCA) in the 1940s and early member of the PPP executive committee also 
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describes the Jagan-led party as subordinate to Soviet, and later Cuban mandates in his 
autobiography which was published in 1996. While Singh played a central role in facilitating 
Burnham’s break from the PPP in 1955, he later split with Burnham in 1958.
10 
Singh, however, 
remained opposed to the Jagan-led PPP for decades after the division. Thus, the Jagans’ 
Guyanese critics challenge the depiction of the PPP as a non-communist, socialist-nationalist 
party while suffering from inherent biases. 
Two more objective first-hand accounts published in the early 2000s disagree with 
Jagan’s depiction of the PPP in The West on Trial. Wynter Crawford, the radical journalist and 
politician from Barbados, claims that the Jagans “almost single handedly spread communism 
throughout the West Indies.” However, Crawford provides few specifics and acknowledges that 
he never personally discussed communism with the Jagans in any of their meetings.
11 
Most 
significantly, Frank Birbalsingh’s oral history of the PPP includes interviews with almost all of 
the PPP’s influential early leaders. Birbalsingh’s work hints that the PPP began as a left-coalition 
with a core of communist-inspired leaders and that ideological disagreement played a significant 
role in the party split and subsequent local conflicts. However, Birbalsingh’s work does not 
suggest a particularly internationalist commitment on the part of PPP leaders.
12
 
The earliest scholarship evaluating Guianese political ideology drew primarily on 
 
American and British archival material with minimal access to Guianese sources, and Jagan’s 
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machinations against the Jagan-led PPP earlier in the decade. At the same time, Burnham 
solidified his hold on an increasingly repressive regime that nationalized major sectors of the 
economy and pursued an Eastern-bloc oriented foreign policy.
13 
Consequently, contemporary 
scholars emphasized the external factors destabilizing British Guiana and Burnham’s duplicity in 
diplomatic relations. Rather than criticize intervention’s use as a tool of foreign policy, 
regardless of the Jagans’ political ideals, scholars often downplayed the impact of Marxist 
ideology on the PPP.
14 
The cultural anthropologist Leo Despres is exceptional in emphasizing 
the importance of the PPP’s left-wing Marxism and the party’s international connections. He 
suggests that there existed a “hard core” of extreme Marxists within the Political Affairs 
Committee (PAC) including the Jagans, Martin Carter, Rory Westmaas, Sidney King, and 
Brindley Benn, who chose to continue relations with international communists rather than try to 
advance a nationalist agenda through the conservative labor movement in British Guiana. 
Nonetheless, Despres concludes that external forces and cultural factionalism were most 
significant in splitting the Guianese nationalist movement.
15
 
Jagan returned to office as a democratic socialist in 1992 after twenty-seven years 
 
opposing Burnham’s People’s National Congress (PNC) autocracy. The disastrous consequences 
of American intervention and the Burnham dictatorship for the Guianese people, along with a 
continued lack of access to PPP material, contributed to the perpetuation of the existing 
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interpretation of the party’s ideology after the Cold War. Stephen Rabe and Cary Fraser 
produced groundbreaking studies of American involvement in Guianese decolonization in the 
early 2000s and their work remains the most influential scholarship shaping the subject. Their 
focus on Anglo-American actions in the colony and limited access to Guianese sources resulted 
in an uncritical treatment of PPP ideology that is consistent with earlier works on the subject. 
Rabe and Fraser agree that American policymakers understood events in British Guiana through 




Fraser has since argued for a closer examination of PPP ideology during the period and 
suggested that the PPP’s radical Marxist ideology differed from the social democratic ideas 
which influenced the rest of the British Caribbean.
17
 
The Guianese historian Clem Seecharan introduced the first scholarly counter-narrative in 
 
2005 suggesting that Cheddi Jagan was a doctrinaire Marxist and that party leaders’ ideological 
dogmatism impeded reform efforts in British Guiana. Methodologically, Seecharan’s work 
represents an important advancement in the scholarship since he based much of his analysis on 
close examination of the PAC Bulletin, the earliest platform in which the eventual PPP leaders 
explained their political agenda. Consequently, Seecharan is the first scholar to use primary 
source material to explain PAC/PPP ideology.
18 
Colin Palmer’s Cheddi Jagan and the Politics of 
 
Power describes the ideological foundations of PPP leadership as a fusion of Marxism and 
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Guianese nationalism adapted to circumstances in Guiana in the most focused study of PPP 
philosophy. Palmer emphasizes that Jagan and other party leaders acted independently of 
international communists despite the similarities in their political ideology.
19 
Robert Waters 
introduced the most direct challenge to the traditional narrative after gaining access to previously 
unexamined archives in former communist countries and considering the PPP’s international 
policies. Waters suggests that the Jagans sought increased economic, political, and social 
relations with Eastern bloc nations consistently beginning at least by 1951, and that they were 
willing to engage in political subversion toward that objective.
20 
Recently declassified British 
intelligence files confirm that the Jagans established contact with Soviet representatives in 




The most recently available archival material corroborates much of the new research in 
 
suggesting that the PPP was a left-coalition before 1955 that included a core of self-described 
Marxist-Leninist leaders.
22 
PPP leaders explained their movement as part of an international 
struggle and sought increased association with what they described as socialist countries and 
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international organizations to advance their liberation movement in British Guiana, several of 
which were communist fronts. Crucially, the Jagan-led left-wing, the ideologically Marxist- 
Leninist members of the PPP, remained unaffiliated with and acted independently of 
international communist organizations during the period discussed in this dissertation.
23 
Nonetheless, it is clear from thorough examination of party materials that Cheddi Jagan did not 
differentiate between socialism and communism, arguing that they were theoretically the same 
and that communism was merely the advanced stage of socialism.
24 
As a result, the PPP’s left- 
wing pursued connections with the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) and Eastern-bloc 
nations for the purpose of transitioning the colony to socialism and expecting an evolution 
toward communism while generally governing pragmatically and remaining committed to 
parliamentary democracy. Ultimately, close examination of the objectives and consequent 
transnational connections Guianese leaders pursued in attempting to establish Guianese socialism 
suggests that the Jagan-led PPP sought institutional transformation and increased connections to 
the Eastern-bloc as a means of achieving economic autonomy. 
The Clash of Trade Union Philosophies in British Guiana 
 
Guianese interpretations of institutional decolonization varied; however, two general 
views prevailed and labor leaders acted domestically and internationally to establish trade unions 
that would facilitate their supported style of labor organization. The first most consistently 
manifested in the policies of the Manpower Citizens’ Association (MPCA), a sugar workers’ 
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MPCA leadership tried to address stifling poverty and oppression of workers through 
negotiations with British companies and reform within the existing political-economic system.
25
 
MPCA leaders pursued for a form of trade unionism independent of political control that 
loosely resembled British and American models of labor organization. MPCA founder Ayude 
Edun favored the establishment of a socialist system that permitted a degree of latitude for 
private enterprise with unions acting independently of political parties. Importantly, Edun 
appealed to Secretary of State for the Colonies James Griffiths to reconfigure Anglo-Guianese 
connections as a partnership as the Empire adjusted to the post-1945 world while vehemently 
rejecting “Communism and Americanism.”
26 
Most MPCA leaders in the 1950s, however, 
 
expressed support for a free-market economic ideal and suggested that unions should work to 
exact benefits for workers within that system. Rutgers University Economics professor and labor 
activist Robert Alexander conducted several hemispheric fact-finding missions for the Free 
Trade Union Committee (FTUC), a covert anti-communist branch of the American Federation of 
Labor (AFL).
27 
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the MPCA Vice President and a member of the National Democratic Party (NDP). Tello, who 
worked with American and British trade union leaders throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, 
took care to note that he supported “importation of capital for the development of the country” 
and free enterprise. Tello emphasized that he opposed nationalization with the possible exception 
of public utilities and then “only if necessary and wanted.”
28
 
Similarly, Justin Yee, President of the Demerara Electric Company branch of the MPCA, 
 
told Alexander that his union hoped to overcome considerable agitation for nationalization 
through strengthening the union and increasing workers’ wages.
29 
Thus, MPCA leaders sought to 
advocate on workers’ behalf while using their organization as a bulwark against party-dominated 
unionism and left-wing economics in British Guiana. A Legislative Council debate between 
MPCA President Lionel Luckhoo and PPP leader Cheddi Jagan over the role of trade unions in 
1952 illuminates the leaders’ contrasting viewpoints. Luckhoo insisted that trade unions should 
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Alternately then, a second view of Guianese labor organization emerged after World War 
II in part as reaction to increased poverty and the MPCA’s perceived ineffectiveness throughout 
the 1940s. This idea was to establish a working-class movement which subordinated trade unions 
to a political party and that pursued political independence as a precursor to structural 
transformation and the establishment of a socialist society.
31 
Seecharan suggests that Cheddi 
Jagan consistently supported the view that trades unions’ primary purpose was to act as an 
instrument to destroy the capitalist state.
32 
The movement congealed into the left-coalition PAC 
in 1946 after Cheddi Jagan resigned from his position as treasurer of the MPCA.
33 
The PAC laid 
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The PAC/PPP’s labor activism grew out of an effort to negotiate against employers who 
were overwhelmingly foreign with direct consequences on leaders’ view of trade union 
organization. The Guianese people experienced 150 years of British colonial exploitation and the 
PAC argued that meaningfully improving the lives of Guianese workers necessitated 
empowering them in a manner beyond legally protecting the right to negotiate with employers. 
The largest employers in the colony, especially Booker Brothers, effectively controlled the 
economy, leaving Guianese workers with little effective negotiating power. The MPCA obtained 
concessions from Booker Brothers in the late 1930s and 1940s; however, PAC/PPP leaders 
argued that the Guianese would never be able to benefit from their own resources or develop in a 
manner that benefited the Guianese people rather than foreign employers unless the Guianese 
themselves controlled the economy.
35 
The only means of decolonizing the colonial economy in 
 
the view of many Guianese political activists was to nationalize foreign investment and take 
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Consequently Nigel Bolland notes that the PAC stated as its purpose the “abolition of the 
existing economic system” and its replacement with scientific socialism.
36 
H.J.M. Hubbard, one 
of the PAC’s founders, specifically argued that trade unions needed to engage in political activity 
to aid in the establishment of a socialist society.
37 
Cheddi Jagan insisted that the social and 
political-economic reforms necessary to improve the lives of Guiana’s workers “must be joined 
at the industrial and political level outside the legislature.”
38 
Ashton Chase was a Trades Union 
Congress (TUC)-trained labor leader, lawyer, and high-ranking member of the PPP who served 
as Minister of Labor under the short-lived PPP government in 1953. According to Chase, the 
PPP’s prioritized strengthening and operating in conjunction with Guianese trade unions. As a 
result, Chase suggested that “the PPP and the trade unions worked together, planned together and 
struggled together to uproot privilege and a decadent political and economic system.”
39
 
Janet Jagan, Cheddi Jagan’s wife and confidant, and a leading member of the PPP, took 
 
care to note the lessons she learned from trade unionists during a visit to Rumania in 1953. She 
specifically noted the “difference in the functions of trade unions existing in capitalist countries 
and those in the socialist countries.”
40 
Janet Jagan’s report does not show that the PPP copied 
communist trade union practices; however, it suggests that the party worked toward the 
development of labor relations that would promote a fundamentally different economic system in 
Guiana than that which the MPCA supported. Several years later Cheddi Jagan explained to the 
British Guiana Trades Union Congress (BGTUC) that the PPP expected to assume ownership of 
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Jagan suggested that a PPP-headed socialist government would coordinate its activities with 
“subsidiary agencies of a democratic character, such as trade unions” that would help manage 
industries in addition to arguing with employers.
41
 
Colin Palmer argues that PPP ministers “challenged the institutional structures of the 
 
imperial regime most sharply with the rhetorical weapons at their command.”
42 
Palmer’s 
penetrating analysis provides a key insight into the PPP’s challenge to institutional structures that 
is critical to understanding the broader Left-coalition’s efforts in British Guiana. However, the 
PPP program was part of broad, active, and consistent efforts to decolonize the labor movement 
that went far beyond rhetoric and the most important PPP leaders were also active trade 
unionists. While the party itself was never of singular mind, particularly before 1955 when it 
acted as a coalition of Left-nationalists, it nonetheless consistently advocated empowering the 
Guianese and as much as possible breaking the institutional mechanisms through which British 
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Beyond ideology, it is important to consider that the PPP’s practical needs resulted in 
close relations with trade unions that became especially important after 1956, when Cary Fraser 
suggests the Party was confronted a “schizophrenic predicament.” Fraser suggests that the PPP 
“refashioned itself as a moderate political force” to court support from the fundamentally 
conservative and capitalist East Indian community while simultaneously trying to retain its 




complexity of Guianese politics and the practical realities of governing after 1957 placed the PPP 
in a position where its most effective means of pushing for radical change was often through 
associated trade unions rather than political action that could undermine the Party’s base of 
support, create disorder in government, or result in the suspension of self-government. 
The contrast between Jagan’s vision and the views of American and British labor leaders 
is stark. David Dubinsky argued that “organized labor has something to say only about the 
conditions of work and their standards of pay. Organized labor has nothing to say about 
management of industry, the distribution and price of its products at home, and the disposition of 
its goods abroad.”
45 
Similarly, Walter Hood, responsible for the colonial section of the TUC’s 
International Department, noted in a 1957 list of frequently asked questions prepared for colonial 
unions that “the primary function of a trade union is to give workers a say in the determination of 
their wages and conditions of work.”
46 
TUC leaders’ insistence that trade unions limit their 
activities was less rigid within Great Britain; however, they generally dismissed the notion of 
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In opposing the MPCA’s leader, Luckhoo, Cheddi and Janet Jagan articulated views that 
directly contradicted Dubinsky’s and Hood’s ideas. Cheddi Jagan argued that “One does not stop 
at wages and working conditions. We need laws that can put profits and other benefits into the 
pockets of workers.”
47 
Janet Jagan, who later became Minister of Labor, Health, and Housing in 
the PPP government, explained strikes and trade union activity as legitimate forms of civil 
protest in a manner that conflicted with American and British expectations for industrial colonial 
unionism.
48 
Even when the PPP moderated its rhetoric while holding office under a restricted 
constitution in 1958 Janet Jagan argued for close collaboration between politics and unionism, 
suggesting that the British Labor Party was a viable model for the Guianese.
49 
Importantly, the 
Jagans most cautious public statements demanded a political role for trade unions greater than 
what the British were willing to allow in the colony.
50 
Thus, Guianese labor and political leaders 
found a ready ideological ally in American and British organized labor, and American labor 
leaders opposed the PAC/PPP on trade union grounds well before the United States government 
determined the Jagans’ PPP was a strategic Cold War threat. Conversely, PAC/PPP leaders 
sought connections with the WFTU and communist parties who shared their views on the role of 
trade unions as social institutions. 
The PAC and PPP were not communist organizations; however, leaders’ Marxist ideals 
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hoped to design their post-colonial political institutions.
51 
The evolution of the trade union 
struggle helps illuminate Cheddi Jagan’s conclusion in the 1950s that British and American 
economic power was the most significant threat to Guianese unions’ effectiveness. Sara 
Abraham argues that the Jagan faction of the PPP expected the resolution of their powerlessness 
through winning leadership of key national labor unions as did most nationalist parties in the 
decolonizing Caribbean.
52 
The left-wing of the PAC/PPP viewed the establishment of 
coordinated trade union-party activity as central to their objective of restructuring Guianese 
society. However, the PAC and PPP differed from most Caribbean nationalist parties in 
emphasizing the prioritization of party over union and rejecting the notion of integration into 
Western international labor organizations.
53 
Given the core PPP leaders’ Marxists-Leninist 
ideology, their conceptualization of the role of trade unions is most effectively understood as 
simultaneously anti-colonial and consistent with Lenin’s argument that the fundamental task of 
revolutionary movements was to pursue “a gigantic replacement of certain institutions by other 
institutions of a fundamentally different type.”
54 
The PPP’s efforts to alter the structure of labor 
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Labor leaders’ competing trade union ideologies shaped their pursuit of transnational 
relationships and Guianese involvement in international labor organizations internationalized the 
conflict. Colonial Office-TUC efforts to help build Guianese trade unions began on a small scale 
in 1929 as a result of policies designed to train Guianese labor leaders and institutionalize the 
labor movement.
56 
However, World War II impeded British officials’ plans to expand the 
programs in response to labor unrest in the late 1930s.
57   
Meanwhile, PAC co-founder H.J.M. 
 
Hubbard attended the first conference of the WFTU when international labor leaders formed the 
organization in 1945 in an attempt to facilitate universal workers’ solidarity and establish a 
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between communist and non-communist labor leaders, disagreement over the future of European 
colonialism, and debates about the Marshall Plan divided the WFTU. As a result, the TUC and 
CIO led the non-communist unions out of the organization in 1949 and they established the 
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) as an alternative to the WFTU.
59
 
PAC/PPP leaders individually and in conjunction with the Guiana Industrial Workers 
 
Union (GIWU) retained connections to the WFTU and its loosely affiliated regional 
organization, the Caribbean Labor Congress (CLC).
60   
The WFTU’s anti-colonialism and 
advocacy for the PPP increased Guianese leaders’ support for the communist-led international.
61 
Moreover, a report by Ernst Schwarz, the CIO’s representative to the WFTU prior to the split, 
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revolved around the type of development to support in underdeveloped areas. Schwarz noted that 
British and American representatives were alienated within the organization in their support for 
agricultural development and private foreign investment rather than the industrialization and 
pursuit of self-sufficiency that Eastern European representatives demanded for poor countries.
62
 




Meanwhile, MPCA leaders increased their pursuit of institutional connections to the 
British and American-led international economic system. As the Guianese labor conflict 
increased in the late 1940s, the TUC increased its support for the MPCA. At the same time, the 
sugar workers’ union affiliated to ICFTU and its regional arm, the Inter-American Regional 
Organization of Workers (ORIT).
64 
MPCA General Secretary Sheik Shakoor traveled to the 
United States to meet with American labor leaders to discuss the organization and purpose of 
ORIT just after its founding.
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Shakoor also played an important role in expanding ORIT with 
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in CLC arguing that it disrupted Caribbean labor unity.
66   
Colonial officials and TUC leaders 
supported the MPCA’s integration into the Western labor organizations and occasionally 
provided assistance to ease the financial burden on Guianese trade unionists’ travels to ICFTU, 
ORIT, or CADORIT conferences.
67   
Nonetheless, MPCA efforts to resist structural changes to 
the nature of trade unionism were not directed from the outside and Shakoor and other leaders 
aggressively opposed the PAC/PPP and GIWU despite a general lack of external international 
assistance before 1954.
68 
Richard Ishmael, who became MPCA president in 1953, insisted on 
increasing his organization’s integration into ORIT as a result of shared opposition to 
communism and mutual support for “free trade unionism.”
69 
Ishmael’s appeal to the American 
concept of free trade unionism in particular underscores MPCA leaders’ opposition to PAC/PPP 
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transnational organizations as a way to strengthen their movements based on the type of post- 
colonial society they hoped to establish. 
The People’s Progressive Party’s Political Objectives 
 
The juxtaposition of Jagan’s depiction of PPP ideas with contemporaries’ accounts and 
newly available primary sources suggests that the party acted independently of external forces 
while using institutional challenges to pursue Soviet-modeled socialist development and 
integration into the Eastern-bloc. Crucially, most of the core PPP leaders defined themselves as 
Marxist-Leninists who, though not subordinate to the Soviet Union, interpreted their anti- 
colonial struggle as part of a broader socialist revolution and who hoped to increase affiliation 
with other socialist or communist countries as a means of achieving economic independence, 
development, and modernization. As Colin Palmer argues, describing PPP leaders as “‘Russian 
puppets’ constitutes a gross misunderstanding of their nationalist aspirations” and a “failure to 
accord independence of thought and will to colonial subjects;” however, dismissing the extent to 
which as nationalists they consciously hoped to participate in and integrate with an international 




PPP leaders explained their central objective as improving the lives of Guiana’s 
impoverished population through socialist development and a subsequent change from the 
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argued that the transition toward political independence was a means of achieving economic 
autonomy and the ability to marshal capital toward development and industrialization in the 
interest of Guianese workers rather than as an end in itself.
72 
In addition to giving the Guianese 
greater control over their own resources, Jagan argued that local investment in industry and 
diversification of the economy would help the Guianese avoid repercussions emanating from the 
negative effects of economic cycles in North America.
73 
The PPP’s explanation of economic 
autonomy conflicted with Colonial Office analyses regarding the extension of self-government in 
the West Indies. A Colonial Office committee debating the possible federation of Caribbean 
territories in 1949 noted that colonies’ dependence on private assistance restricted autonomy as 
much as governmental loans. However, the report emphasized the usefulness of private 
investment and concluded that “the way to political independence [was], in short through 
economic stability and solvency” but not “economic self-sufficiency.”
74
 
Cheddi Jagan acknowledged that industrializing and diversifying the Guianese economy 
 
required significant foreign capital investments; however, he feared that Anglo-American 
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on loans would accrue to the extent that incoming assistance only served to pay off older debts.
75 
In a speech before the Legislative Council in 1952 he argued that external investors sought to use 
the colonies as sources of cheap labor while draining them of raw materials. Jagan insisted that 
the WFTU opposed the perpetuation of indirect forms of exploitation and should be considered a 
possible ally in Guiana’s struggle to end colonial exploitation, suggesting one of the reasons left- 
wing PPP leaders pursued relations with the communist-dominated international labor 
organization.
76 
J.P. Lachmansingh, the GIWU President and member of the PPP executive 
committee, agreed that his union sympathized with the Eastern-bloc international as a result of 
the WFTU’s activities supporting agricultural workers.
77 
Furthermore, Jagan argued that private 
foreign control of disbursement would direct funds in the interest of investors’ profits rather than 
leaving the Guianese “free to put it, after we have been scientifically advised how to spend it, on 
the sectors which will generate wealth more rapidly” and end dependence on external funding.
78 
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that political independence without structural reorientation to strengthen working-class influence 
on political-economic issues would lead to dependence on the British and American economies. 
Jagan’s ultimate objective, then, was political independence as a means of achieving the 
economic autonomy and diversification that he expected would break sugar’s hold on the 
economy and allow resources to be used for the benefit of the Guianese people through a 
program of socialization.
79 
Despite internal disagreements on ideological and foreign policy 
issues, PPP leaders agreed on the importance of ending foreign domination of the Guianese 
economy. Even Jai Narine Singh, who along with Lachmansingh and Burnham was most 
responsible for dividing the PPP in 1955 over ideological disagreements, suggested in his 
autobiography that he viewed independence as a means of achieving a program of 
nationalization.
80 
In speaking with Alexander in 1953, Lachmansingh discussed the need for 
nationalization of some industries as a necessary precursor to development. He argued that the 
PPP government elected in 1953 would eventually take over public utilities, which would put 
them in a position to “push electricity out into the countryside, where there is none now” because 
private companies would lose money in providing services to rural areas.
81 
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Lachmansingh joined with PAC’s left wing in the late 1940s giving the PPP a strong trade union 
association when the party formed in 1950. 
However, Lachmansingh and Singh’s political philosophies fell in between the reformist 
elements in the MPCA and the left-wing of the PPP. Those leaders sought a form of 
independence that included significant reforms in Guianese society and a degree of socialism 
that stopped short of social revolution and preserved rather than reoriented the colony’s external 
connections. Lachmansingh founded the GIWU and, along with Singh, was an early member of 
the PPP and minister in the PPP government in 1953. Their split from the PPP, seemingly based 
on disagreements over the structure of post-colonial Guyanese society and the PPP’s foreign 




Similarly, Richard Ishmael briefly joined the left-coalition in the early 1950s as member of the 
PPP but left the party and joined MPCA when he thought the colony was in danger of too 
significant a break from traditional British political-economic institutions and of falling into too 
close an association with Eastern Bloc nations.
83
 
Moreover, the PAC/PPP philosophy starkly conflicted with the AFL/AFL-CIO and 
 
ICFTU policy that “government participates in improving the standard of living and 
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Thus, Anglo-American trade union leaders opposed the political 
objectives of nationalist leaders who bridged political and industrial activity in addition to 
objecting to the relationship between the PPP’s trade union ideas. 
Though Marxist-inspired, much of the PAC’s and PPP’s economic nationalism resembled 
that of numerous regional political leaders during the era. Historian Michael Adamson argues 
that most Latin American countries pursued policies designed “to restructure their economies 
away from commodity production and mineral extraction that exposed them to external corporate 
decision making and global financial shocks” after 1945.
85 
United States policymakers and 
businessmen inconsistently responded to appeals for industrial development in the Third World 
during President Dwight Eisenhower’s administration when American and British development 
assistance to British Guiana peaked. Eisenhower generally continued the policies outlined in the 
Truman administration’s Hoover Commission Report, for example, which argued against 
promoting industrial development in the developing world, despite disagreement from Secretary 
of State John Foster Dulles.
86 
The American National Association of Manufacturers and CIO 
also opposed promoting industrialization in underdeveloped countries in hearings before the 








“International Confederation of Free Trade Unions: Its Organization, Objectives, Ideology and Structure,” May 2, 
1950, Office of the President-Meany (1948-1960), Box 49, Formation, 1949-1950, GMMA. 
85 
Michael R. Adamson, “‘The Most Important Single Aspect of Our Foreign Policy’?: The Eisenhower 
Administration, Foreign Aid, and the Third World,” in Kathryn C. Statler and Andrew L. Johns, eds., The 
Eisenhower Administration, the Third World, and the Globalization of the Cold War (Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2006), 55. 
86 
John Foster Dulles Memorandum of Conversation with Mr. Stassen, June 7, 1955, Memos of Conversation- 
General-S (3), John Foster Dulles Papers, 1951-59, General Correspondence and Memoranda Series, Box 1, DDEL. 
87 
Statement by Henning W. Prentis, Jr., Past President of the National Association of Manufacturers and Chairman 
of its International Relations Committee, Before the Commission on Foreign Economic Policy, October 29, 1953, 
Hearings, Nat’l Assn. of Manufacturers 10/29/53; Statement Before the Commission on Foreign Economic Policy, 
Presented on Behalf of the Congress of Industrial Organizations, by Stanley H. Ruttenberg, Director, Department of 
Education and Research, CIO, October 28, 1953, Hearings-Cong. Of Indus. Org. Stanley H. Ruttenberg, Dir. Dept. 
of Edu. & Research-10/28/53; Commission on Foreign Economic Policy: Records, 1953-1954 (Randall 
Commission), Transcript of Hearings-11/19/53 (copy 2), Box 10, DDEL. 
145  
American lack of support for industrial development in the underdeveloped world 
reinforced Jagan’s preconceptions about Anglo-American economic imperatives. William 
Maddox, the United States Consul in Trinidad, held responsibility for British Guiana after the 
State Department controversially closed the American consulate in Guiana in early 1953 as a 
cost-saving measure. Maddox reported to the State Department on Jagan’s criticism of a British 
development plan for British Guiana in 1954. Jagan argued that the plan attempted to “facilitate 
imperialist ‘looting of our raw materials.’” Most importantly, Jagan argued that the proposal did 
not discuss industrialization and the repayment of interest necessitated the expenditure of funds 
that diverted financing from development.  Ultimately, Jagan argued that political independence 
was a “mirage” unless coupled with economic emancipation. Reiterating that autonomy required 
economic independence that went beyond self-government, Jagan suggested that “Colonial 
leaders like myself are now increasingly aware that it is possible for an imperialist power to carry 
on the imperialist control and exploitation of an underdeveloped country without appearing to 





Broadly then, the PPP’s left- wing pursued a policy designed to limit integration into the 
global capitalist system and to integrate with socialist countries as a means of increasing their 
relative economic power.
89 
As early as 1952 Jagan criticized British economic planners for 
“thinking only in one direction” and failing to consider the possibilities of trade while “markets 
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economy of this Colony and unless we can disturb consciously its present economic fabric, we 
will never be able to control and make the progress we want.”
90 
Over time the PPP’s left- wing 
leaders aimed for integration into what Cheddi Jagan referred to as a socialist world system that 
he suggested in early 1961 “is today challenging capitalism on a world front surpassing it in 
certain fields.”
91 
Expanded trade with the socialist world, however, directly conflicted with 
American objectives articulated in National Security Council (NSC) document 162/2, which 
formed the basis of the Eisenhower administration’s national security strategy. The NSC argued 
that limited integration into the American-led capitalist system on the part of colonial or 
underdeveloped areas directly threatened the system itself and undermined United States national 
security.
92 
Moreover, the NSC expressed considerable concern at the possibility of expanded 
trade of strategic materials, such as bauxite, with the Soviet-bloc.
93 
The PPP’s access to free 
 
trade would have included increased economic arrangements with the Soviet-bloc and as a result 
directly conflicted with United States national security objectives. 
Beyond trading with Eastern-bloc countries, the PPP’s left- wing expressed a desire to 
incorporate aspects of Soviet development plans in British Guiana. In an interview with Robert 
Alexander, Jagan quoted from a United Nations study suggesting that planned economies, such 
as in the Soviet Union, were developing faster than undeveloped societies or capitalist 
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Jagan explained that he opposed foreign exploitation of the country’s resources 
and wished to grow the Guianese economy with internally generated capital.
95 
Consequently, the 
PPP established closer relations with the WFTU and pursued connections with the Eastern-bloc 
to assist in the pursuit of socialist development.
96 
On this issue as well, Jagan found the WFTU a 
strong ideological ally. Perry Mars notes in his essay “Ethno-Politics and the Caribbean 
Working-Class Project” that the Caribbean movement in which Jagan was a central figure 
assumed that “successful power struggles are facilitated by international class solidarity through 
the development of close links with like-minded trade union and political movements abroad.”
97
 
Everett Kassalow, Deputy Director of the Office of Labor Affairs for the Foreign 
 
Operations Administration (FOA) and a historian, argues that in European territories colonial 
capital tended to “predominate in [the] major industrial and agricultural ventures,” resulting in 
“the union movement tak[ing] on a kind of anti-foreign, political character as well as an 
economic one.” Kassalow noted that “even ‘routine’ economic action against a corporation 
which is controlled by foreign or colonial capital inevitably has political overtones.”
98 
The PAC 
and PPP formed as a result of labor struggles becoming politicized when the groups’ leaders 
concluded that industrial action alone insufficiently addressed Guianese poverty. The inability to 
effectively engage in routine economic action increased Guianese support for the politicization 
 
94 
Jagan reiterated his interest in learning how Soviet development might benefit British Guiana and his opposition  
to free enterprise on Meet the Press in 1961. See: Transcript of Meet the Press, October 15, 1961, CJRC. Wilfried 
Loth notes that Soviet Union’s rapid industrialization and reconstruction stood in contrast to less effective responses 
to the Great Depression in Western liberal democracies and impressed many observers. In that sense, Jagan’s . See: 
Wilfried Loth, “The Cold War and the social and economic history of the twentieth century,” in Melvyn P. Leffler 
and Odd Arne Westad, eds., The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Volume II: Crises and Détente (Cambridge, 
MA: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 514. 
95 
Robert Alexander interview with Cheddi Jagan, June 5, 1953, RG 18-003, International Affairs Department, Jay 
Lovestone Files, 1944-1973, Box 2, Alexander, Robert, 1953, GMMA. 
96 
The pursuit of financial assistance for development projects also led to close ties with Eastern Bloc nations. 
History of the PPP,” January 1963, CJRC. 
97 
Perry Mars, “Ethno-Politics and the Caribbean Working-Class Project: Contributions of Cheddi Jagan and 
Michael Manley,” in Perry Mars and Alma H. Young, eds., Caribbean Labor and Politics, 145. 
98 
Everett M. Kassalow, ed., National Labor Movements in the Postwar World (Evanston, IL: Northwestern 
University Press, 1963), 233. 
148  
of labor struggles, particularly when the PAC took the lead in organizing workers in the wake of 
the violent British response to sugar workers strikes in 1948. Similarly, historian Arnold 
Steinbach notes that many colonial unionists appealed to the WFTU in part because the affiliated 
countries, including Communists in the Soviet Union, seemed to appreciate the complex 
agricultural problems facing their societies more so than unionists in the United States and Great 
Britain.
99 
Along those lines Jagan noted in an interview with Robert Alexander that British 
 
Guiana’s first economic priority was agricultural development and the need to break the 
stranglehold sugar held over the colony.
100 
Therefore, Jagan’s appeal to socialism and Soviet- 
style development was typical of a wide variety of postcolonial leaders who noted that the Soviet 
Union industrialized within a generation.
101
 
Cheddi Jagan’s political-economic ideas were most concisely articulated during a visit to 
the United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico in 1961. In recounting the trip, Jagan noted that he 
“stated frankly everywhere that my Government was dedicated to the carrying out of a socialist 
policy.” Clarifying, Jagan stated that he favored “the workers reaping the full fruits of their labor 
through public ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange” and that only 
planning on that basis could rapidly modernize the economy and provide the Guianese people 
with higher standards of living. Despite temporary circumstances, Jagan noted that, “I believe 
ideally in the nationalization of all the important means of production, distribution and 
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exchange.” He directly acknowledged that “we differed from the nations of North America in the 
way we propose to organize our economic life” while noting that given the colony’s dire 




In British Guiana a lack of local capital made external financing for diversification of the 
 
economy and industrialization necessary precursors to development. At the same time, 
institutional development required training and external financial assistance. Jagan consistently 
stated that he would “seek aid from all possible sources;” however, he was adamant that he 
would “not accept any aid upon conditions which limit the sovereignty of my people.”
103 
Therefore, the activists who sought to restructure Guianese society and modernize their economy 
in a manner inconsistent with Anglo-American aims could only do so by developing connections 
outside the capitalist world.
104 
Still, PPP leaders argued that they did not want to sever political 
relations with Great Britain after independence and would cooperate with the United States. 
They argued that their objective was a reorientation of political and economic power that 
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Nations and the Organization of American States (OAS) while allowing state-to-state relations to 
be based on equality and, as Janet Jagan put it: “to our mutual advantage and benefit.”
105
 
Nonetheless, the argument for continued political association with capitalist countries did 
not suggest integration into the capitalist economic system. PPP leaders also aimed to increase 
their economic, political, and social connections with communist nations abroad to assist in their 
objective of non-violent, democratically driven social revolution.
106 
Cheddi Jagan hinted that the 
PPP thought social revolution and integration with the Eastern-bloc could allow for continued 
relations with Great Britain and the United States. In a 1952 Legislative Council debate Jagan 
suggested that it was possible to support “the peaceful coexistence of the capitalist and socialist 
systems of economy.” He argued that his Guianese opponents misunderstood revolution, 
suggesting that “there are such things as social revolution as people’s ideas change.” His 
opponents in the Legislature, he argued, did “not want the people of this Colony to change their 
ideas at all.” Conservatives wanted to “keep the millstone of capitalist ideas tied around their 
necks as long as they live.”
107 
Ultimately, a political and international reorientation required 
redefining the role of trade unions and other social institutions in British Guiana so that they 
could act in support of a socialist system rather than as a moderating influence in an Anglo- 
American capitalist system.
108 
In British Guiana, the Cold War and decolonization merged in a 
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direct way. Combining socialist nationalization of the economy’s commanding heights with 




Left-wing PAC and PPP leaders consistently advocated a peaceful progression toward 
social revolution and a commitment to political democracy between 1946 and 1964 while 
retaining more popular support than domestic opposition. It is critical to note that PPP leaders 
did not attempt to subvert the Parliamentary Constitutional process or undermine political 
democracy when in office in 1953 or between 1957 and 1964. For several months in 1964 the 
PPP acted outside of democratic institutions and used political violence in an attempt to stay in 
power after Anglo-American intervention combined with domestic opposition to remove the 
party from office.
109 
Excepting 1964, however, and despite evidence that the party prepared for a 
 
campaign of subversion, PPP leaders generally did not act to undermine democratic principles in 
Guiana. At the same time, Cheddi Jagan advocated leaving avenues open to private investment if 
government did not have enough capital to effectively pursue development as long as the 
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salaries, pensions and everything else including profits in the long run.”
110 
Thus, there is 
evidence that the PPP intended to pursue peaceful co-existence with the Western-bloc. 
Nonetheless, the left-wing of the PAC and PPP consistently suggested that compromise on the 
nature of Guianese society was temporary and they articulated a belief in Marxist-Leninist theory 
and support for communist development.
111
 
Jagan’s frank connection of socialism to communism in the 1953 Legislative Council 
 
debate is significant. His position does not suggest that he intended to impose communism on 
British Guiana but that he expected a form of it to evolve from the PPP’s establishment of 
socialism.
112 
As a result, left-wing PAC and PPP leaders attempted to institutionally reorganize 
the colony to lay the foundations of socialism and a progression toward communist development. 
Even though PPP leaders constantly sought economic aid from the United States and Great 
Britain it is far more telling that the party did not pursue institutional connections with the 
Western-bloc. Despite suggestions from moderate party members that they would accept aid 
from both the ICFTU and WFTU, for example, there is no evidence that PPP leaders attempted 
to associate with Western labor institutions at any point.
113 
Cheddi Jagan specifically dismissed 
the idea of cooperation with “the pro-imperialist” ICFTU or CADORIT in a 1956 speech even as 
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for development, even aid that included specific stipulations, did not hold the key to shaping the 
nature of Guianese society in the same way as institutional structures. 
Crucially, United States national security estimates suggested using “all feasible 
diplomatic, political, economic, and covert measures to counter any threat of a party or 
individuals directly or indirectly responsive to Soviet control” to inhibit “Soviet capabilities for 
extending control and influence.”
115   
Thus, the PPP’s consideration of increased trade with the 
Eastern-bloc and Soviet-influenced development qualified as a threat to United States national 
security and to American policymakers offered a justification for intervention in the early 1960s. 
American policymakers argued that communist ideas could potentially offer an opportunity for 
expanded Soviet influence regardless of the relationship between the PPP and Eastern-bloc 
communists. Moreover, the PPP’s pursuit institutional ties to Eastern-bloc international 
organizations such as the WFTU and efforts to restructure Guianese society complemented party 
leaders’ attempt to expand economic relations into the socialist world. Despite the ultimate 
decisiveness of Anglo-American intervention, the conflict over British Guiana’s institutional 
structures and political orientation first emerged internally. 
The PAC-GIWU challenge to the MPCA and the British-imposed system of labor 
relations in British Guiana congealed into a left-coalition after the violence at Plantation Enmore 
in 1948. Available sources limit the extent to which the ideological evolution of left-coalition 
leaders can be traced; however, some general conclusions emerge from close examination of the 
existing materials. Most importantly, some of the coalition’s leaders argued that challenging the 
colonial system’s structural poverty required a fundamental change to the nature of the Guianese 
political-economic system and increased connections to the Eastern-bloc. The Guianese left, 
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however, disagreed on the extent to which the movement should seek a break with the Western 
capitalist system. Moreover, conservative labor leaders advocating reform within the existing 
colonial structure resisted the left-coalition and acted with the advantage of preferential 
placement within the colonial system. As a result, an ideological, legal, and physical conflict 
grounded in disagreements regarding the institutional framework for Guiana began and evolved 
into what the first Guianese Labor Commissioner, James Ramphal, referred to as a “persistent 
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Chapter 5: The First Phase of Institutional Decolonization in British Guiana 
 
Cheddi Jagan’s break with the Manpower Citizens’ Association (MPCA) and the 
subsequent formation of the Political Affairs Committee (PAC) marked the beginning of a 
distinct period of labor conflict in British Guiana in which debates about labor relations became 
struggles to shape the nature of post-colonial society through institution-building. The first phase 
of institutional decolonization was grounded in conflicts between Guianese unionists who 
differed on their expectations for the structure of an autonomous society. British efforts to 
institutionalize capitalist labor relations exacerbated the internal struggle, as did the slow 
internationalization of the debate as American and international labor organizations entered the 
fray. The first phase of institutional decolonization in British Guiana peaked when the People’s 
Progressive Party (PPP) sought to use its electoral victory to alter Guianese institutions and the 
British government forcibly removed the PPP. The British action exacerbated ideological 
conflicts within the PPP and initiated the disintegration of the left-coalition and the emergence of 
racialized politics. Guianese leaders consistently fought over influence within the labor 




The process of negotiation and conflict centered on establishing post-colonial political 
and social structures in British Guiana, what I term institutional decolonization, began in 1946 
when the left-coalition PAC organized to replace the existing political-economic system in 
British Guiana with a Marxist state.
2   
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labor and political leaders who proposed improving workers’ wages and conditions within the 
existing system. PAC leaders used a three-pronged approach to alter the structure of 
institutionalized labor relations as a precursor to broader structural transformation of Guianese 
society. They engaged in legislative debates, undertook strike actions, and pursued international 
connections to the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) and communist parties to 
generate support for their program. Reformist Guianese labor leaders, colonial officials, and 
British, American, and Western international trade unionists opposed the left-coalition between 
1946 and 1953. 
The PAC evolved into the PPP, a multi-racial left-coalition that won a resounding victory 
in the 1953 elections, which allowed for full internal self-government in the colony for the first 
time.
3 
The seven-year-long labor conflict erupted as the PPP used its position to alter 
institutionalized labor relations and met fierce resistance from colonial employers, reformist 
unionists, and eventually the British military. Ultimately, the period between 1946 and 1953 is 
best understood as the onset of a twenty-year period of conflict to determine the nature of labor 
relations in the colony and the institutional structure of post-colonial society. 
The PPP’s success resulted from its ability to forge a multiracial, left-coalition that 
brought the most effective Guianese leaders into a single organization designed to advance the 
interests of Guianese workers. The brief experiment in self-government illuminated the popular 
support for the PPP and the core PPP leaders’ commitment to revolutionary changes in Guianese 
society. At the same time, the MPCA’s resistance to PPP labor policies shed light on the depth of 
reformist opposition to social revolution. The first phase of institutional decolonization in British 
Guiana convinced British and American policymakers and labor leaders of the need to pursue 
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institution-building as a counter to the PPP. Ultimately, British officials’ swift reaction to the 
PPP in the summer of 1953 disillusioned Guianese leaders and exacerbated ideological schisms, 
racial tensions, and personal feuds within the left-coalition. 
The existing scholarship on the period between 1946 and 1953 focuses primarily on the 
political dimensions of British intervention to re-impose direct rule in British Guiana after a brief 
experiment allowing the Guianese full internal self-government and universal suffrage under the 
Waddington Constitution from April to October 1953. Scholars agree that the PAC/PPP-led 
militant labor movement emerged as a political force that won support of Guianese people as a 
result of demands for improved wages and conditions for deeply impoverished workers. The 
earliest studies on the subject note the radical nature of the left-coalition’s leadership and argue 
that the PPP’s challenge to British control created a dilemma for colonial officials only willing to 
permit self-determination that accepted existing economic relationships. 
Leo Despres points out that disagreement between Guianese leaders preceded the PPP’s 
time in government and he suggests that the left-coalition PAC started to fracture as soon as 
colonial officials proposed constitutional changes in 1949. Despres argues that ideological 
disagreements between Marxist and non-Marxist members of the coalition struggled to maintain 
a unified nationalist program while differing on the nature of post-colonial Guiana.
4 
Basil Ince 
suggests that the constitution’s suspension was a reaction to four pieces of legislation designed to 
collectively alter the nature of labor relations in the colony. Ince suggests that the PPP’s 
challenge to British control forced colonial officials to question the bounds of expanded colonial 
autonomy even though three of the four bills did not pass in the legislature. Ultimately, he argues 
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pursue a political-economic system that administrators considered a betrayal of the interests of 
the people they were charged to govern.
5
 
Post-Cold War scholarship emphasizes the destructive consequences of British 
intervention, specifically the fracturing of the nationalist movement, the rise of the authoritarian 
Forbes Burnham, and the long-term racial discord that continues to plague Guyana. These works 
are crucial in highlighting the important failures of interventionist policies; however, they 
disagree on the motives behind British action. Stephen Rabe argues that British policymakers in 
London dismissed contrary reports from colonial officials in British Guiana and intervened in 
response to a perceived communist threat.
6 
Colin Palmer, like Rabe, suggests that colonial 
 
officials overreacted to the PPP’s rhetoric and the challenge to certain aspects of British control, 




Conversely, Clem Seecharan argues that the PPP’s left- wing governed with the intention 
 
of undermining the Waddington Constitution because party leaders considered it a retrograde 
attempt to perpetuate capitalist exploitation in the colony. He specifically suggests that the PPP 
attempted to use the Labor Relations Bill to give the party-supported Guiana Industrial Workers 
Union (GIWU) the opportunity to act as the vanguard for the advancement of “scientific 
socialism” in the colony.
8 
Similarly, Robert Waters argues that British officials suspended the 
Waddington Constitution in response to a wide variety of circumstantial evidence and 
intelligence reports which together presented a strong case that the PPP intended to move toward 
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the establishment of a communist government.
9 
Gerald Horne argues that British opposition to 
the PPP government revolved around the Guianese attempt to exercise a degree of democracy 
beyond what British officials accepted in colonial areas. Specifically, Horne suggests that 
colonial officials reacted in response to the Labor Relations Bill and introduced the defense of 
the intervention as necessary to counter communism in the colony after the fact.
10 
Spencer 
Mawby suggests that British officials’ response was primarily aimed at the perceived radicalism 
of Sydney King and Janet Jagan and simultaneous fears in London of colonial anarchy rather 
than of communist subversion.
11 
While scholars disagree on the specifics of the intervention, 
they agree that the debate centered on labor relations. 
Thorough examination of the labor struggle suggests that British institution-building 
before 1953 institutionalized reformist trade unions, but did not significantly improve day-to-day 
life for Guianese workers. In addition to Mawby’s and Seecharan’s studies, Nigel Bolland’s 
work is most illuminating in placing the era in the context of a broader labor struggle in which 
colonial officials confronted challenges to existing labor relations through force, “limited 
concessions, and finally by trying to institutionalize and control the labor movement.”
12 
However, Bolland notes that wartime price and cost-of-living increases offset minor wage gains. 
Moreover, he suggests that raw material extraction and cheap labor formed the basis of colonial 
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As a result, core PPP leaders would have democratically replaced the 
Manpower Citizens’ Association (MPCA) and begun the transition toward peaceful social 
revolution absent British intervention. Moreover, the transnational trade union relationships 
established between 1946 and 1953 provided the basis for Anglo-American institution-building 
and opposition to the PPP after the Waddington Constitution’s suspension. 
The Emergence of a left-coalition opposition 
 
In 1953 the left-wing of the PPP challenged the institutions that defined Guianese society, 
most importantly the colony’s labor movement, and established connections to the socialist 
world in pursuit of social revolution and a reorientation of British Guiana’s position in the 
international economic system. Specifically, the core members of the PPP wanted to use the 
labor movement to challenge the colony’s exploitative economic relations and to establish a 
framework in which trade unions acted as “subsidiary agencies of a democratic character” within 
the PPP.
14 
The Jagan-led left-wing of the PPP held the strongest support of the Guianese 
 
population from the party’s founding in 1950 until after independence; however, a diverse 
opposition to the PPP emerged based on disagreement with various aspects of the Jagans’ 
program. 
Some of the PPP’s conservative detractors opposed the party’s pursuit of socialism in 
British Guiana; however, Guianese political leaders were widely sympathetic to socialist 
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relationship between the PPP and trade unions and the party’s international orientation, was most 
significant in shaping internal conflicts in British Guiana during decolonization. Specifically, 
some members of the Guianese Left pursued social reform through activist unionism to exact 
benefits for impoverished Guianese workers while refusing to challenge the political-economic 
system. The PPP’s moderate and conservative opponents established relationships with British, 
American, and Western international labor organizations to support their trade unions in British 
Guiana. 
The Jagan-led movement used a three-pronged approach to challenge the nature of 
institutionalized labor in British Guiana between 1946 and 1953 and domestic opposition to 
PAC/PPP pressure ignited the conflicts central to the process of institutional decolonization. 
First, PAC/PPP leaders worked with the GIWU to challenge the MPCA for the right to represent 
sugar workers. Colonial officials and employers in the Sugar Producers’ Association (SPA) 
recognized the MPCA as the bargaining agent for sugar workers since 1937 and sought to 




poverty persisted in the colony and the GIWU rapidly won grassroots support between 1946 and 
1948. Second, Cheddi Jagan advocated for political changes to support the GIWU and 
undermine the MPCA and other British-supported trade unions after his election to the 
Legislative Council in 1947. Finally, the PPP’s left-wing pursued international relationships with 
the WFTU and Eastern-bloc labor organizations to obtain support and training for their 
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The PAC/PPP pursuit of Marxist modernization and development necessitated a break 
from or loosening of British Guianese ties to the capitalist world system, a separation that Jagan 
thought was possible if the PPP could take control of economy through legislative action and 
especially through party-led trade union activity.  Since the MPCA and existing unions 
simultaneously resisted and appealed to the external capitalist system for assistance, Jagan and 
the PPP pushed for the establishment of new trade unions and a closer relationship between the 
unions and the party that could be used to reorient the economic system and establish a Guianese 
form of communism once the PPP attained power. 
Jagan initially pursued political change as a member of the MPCA; however, he left the 
union in 1946 after a year as treasurer and helped establish the PAC.
17 
The MPCA, the largest 
union in British Guiana, initially lost the confidence of many sugar workers when evidence 
emerged in 1939 that the organization’s treasurer accepted a bribe from Booker Brothers’ 
McConnell & Co., the privately owned British sugar company that dominated the Guianese 
economy.
18 
Most Guianese sugar workers remained skeptical of the union thereafter even though 
there were no proven subsequent instances of corruption. Additionally, the MPCA’s 
collaborative bargaining techniques and cooperation with sugar employers led to charges of 
being a corrupt company union that ignored the workers’ needs.
19 
Sugar producers acceded to 
small negotiated benefits for Guianese workers in the 1940s; however, a decline in sugar prices 
17 
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and employers’ considerable power limited material improvements for workers living in dire 
poverty. At the same time, the part-time and seasonal nature of plantation work exacerbated the 
MPCA’s weakness since laborers were unable to pay union dues in the offseason. Consequently, 
alternate sugar workers’ unions were established throughout the 1940s to pursue a more militant 
platform; however, most of them were short-lived and financially insolvent.
20
 
The Colonial Office Commissioner of Labor in British Guiana, William Bissell, 
 
responded to ongoing labor unrest in the 1940s with the support of the British Guiana Trades 
Union Council (BGTUC). Bissell advocated a policy that encouraged the growth of two craft- 
based sugar workers’ unions that inherently contained a great degree of racial segregation 
strongly opposed from the Guianese Left.
21 
Bissell argued that the MPCA should represent the 
overwhelmingly East Indian plantation workers and that the British Guiana Workers League 
(BGWL) should bargain for the predominantly Afro-Guianese factory workers. Additionally, 
Bissell attempted to restrict the number of trade unions and limit their activities to industrial 
matters. Bissell’s actions reinforced colonial officials’ argument that Guianese workers could 
effectively negotiate with employers if they developed the necessary institutional structures. 
However, workers’ conditions remained poor throughout the decade and competing unions 
proliferated. In the late 1940s at least twenty-seven trade unions claimed legitimacy, nine in the 
sugar industry alone, despite the colony’s population reaching only about 400,000. Thus, the 
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movement; however, the GIWU was unique in its influence and connection to the left- wing of 
the PAC and PPP.
22
 
Dr. Joseph Prayal (J.P.) Lachmansingh, Amos A. Rangela, and Jane Phillips-Gay 
founded the GIWU in 1946, establishing a militant union that promoted itself as an alternative to 
the MPCA.
23 
Cheddi Jagan’s election to the Legislative Council in 1947 corresponded with the 
emergence of the GIWU, and he backed the union through his seat in government. Jagan 
exercised considerable influence within the union despite not officially holding a position in the 
organization.
24 
In February 1948 Jagan pressed the Legislative Council to adopt a policy 
compelling recognition of unions with the greatest membership on plantations where multiple 
unions existed rather than permitting the Sugar Estates Authorities to choose the union with 
which they preferred to negotiate.
25 
His efforts directly challenged the SPA’s preference of the 
MPCA over the GIWU on the sugar plantations. 
Jagan clarified his criticism of the Labor Department’s trade union policy in British 
Guiana in February 1948. He suggested that both employers and employees would benefit from 
the development of strong trade unions; however, he criticized the Labor Department’s methods 
of supporting organized labor in British Guiana, specifically on sugar estates. Jagan argued that 
Bissell was “merely importing [trade union] principles from the United Kingdom and other 
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countries without at first trying to fathom the psychology and amenity background of the people 
of British Guiana.” Jagan argued that merely adopting British trade union principles was useless 
in British Guiana because workers on sugar plantations were held in “a condition which is 
tantamount to forced labor.” Furthermore, Jagan noted that sugar workers’ dependence on 
plantation housing and persistent victimization made it impossible for Guianese workers to 




needs of sugar workers, Jagan concluded, required trade unions engaged in practices different 




Jagan articulated a similar view in 1951 while serving as President of the Sawmill 
 
Workers’ Union (SWU), a position he held in addition to his seat in the Legislative Council. 
Jagan argued in the council that an agreement between the SWU and employers in September 
1949 guaranteed workers a right to renegotiate wage rates no later than March 1950; however, 
discussions had still not taken place by early 1951. Jagan accused Bissell of enabling employers’ 
delaying tactics, such as rejecting union proposals while offering no counterproposals as a way 
to end negotiations. Employer intransigence, Jagan argued, led discontented workers to engage 
in civil disobedience. Jagan further suggested that the resulting social unrest was a result of 
failed democratic institutions since trade unions were unable to effectively protect workers in the 
face of powerful foreign employers.
28 
Ultimately, Jagan argued that the Guianese labor 
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colony. Jagan did not explain exactly what adjustment needed to be made; however, Jagan 
argued in a 1948 PAC Bulletin that strikes and worker unrest were inevitable in Guiana until the 
government took control of production and distribution. At that point, the Bulletin argued, 
capitalism and strikes could be simultaneously eliminated.
29
 
The GIWU’s founding and Jagan’s early political career occurred within the context of 
 
significant labor resistance against the colony’s two most influential companies, the Demerara 
Bauxite Company (Demba) and Booker Brothers. Strikes against Demba lasted from April to 
June 1947 and sugar workers’ unrest climaxed in the fatal Enmore strike the following year.
30 
Ashton Chase, a Guianese lawyer whose career began as a trade unionist trained at Oxford 
through a TUC exchange program most effectively chronicled Guianese labor unrest in the 
1940s. Chase also played a significant role in Guianese decolonization struggles as a minister in 
PPP governments.
31 
Chase suggests that tension between sugar workers and employers increased 
throughout the 1940s and created the conditions for GIWU inspired strikes in 1948. 
The 1948 sugar strikes began in April and occurred on a number of estates in Demerara 
before culminating on June 16, 1948 when police shot fourteen workers, killing five, on the 
Enmore Plantation. Striking plantation workers protested an assortment of deep-seated 
grievances regarding industrial and political issues. Specifically, workers objected to working 
and housing conditions, changes to the cut-and-load system on sugar estates, inaccurate scales, 
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suggests that the fundamental issue at stake was recognition of the GIWU rather than the SPA- 
backed MPCA as sugar workers’ representative.
32 
In addition to general suspicion that the 
MPCA was a company union, sugar workers objected to a recently negotiated MPCA agreement 
with the SPA. The MPCA-SPA compromise allowed for increased wage rates of 7- cents per ton 
rather than the 40- cents per ton the workers demanded, and workers doubted MPCA leaders’ 
promise that the settlement was temporary. Furthermore, Nigel Bolland argues that the strike 
evolved into a broader political action critiquing the colonial administration and the capitalist 
economy when workers passed a resolution requesting Bissell’s removal as labor 
commissioner.
33 
Colonial officials, however, concluded that the strike was primarily a 
consequence of “Dr. Jagan, a local communist, and other political malcontents” using the GIWU 
to exploit workers’ grievances for political gain.
34
 
Workers refused MPCA requests to return to work, continuing the strike with 
 
encouragement and material assistance from the Jagans, Lachmansingh, Phillips-Gay, and 
Rangela. Throughout the strike, the PAC distributed propaganda bulletins at GIWU meetings to 
encourage workers to continue their efforts against the sugar companies. Jai Narine Singh, who 
was a Vice President in both the BGLU and MPCA in the early 1940s, joined the Jagans in 
leading a funeral procession to Georgetown after the strike to protest the use of force. Singh 
criticized officials and walked out of the official hearings investigating the strike in protest of the 
committee’s impartiality. He also represented some of the victims’ families in court and won 
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The Jagans, Lachmansingh, Singh, and Phillips-Gay gained considerable support 
among sugar workers as a result of their efforts during and after the strike which in turn 
strengthened the emerging left-coalition between the GIWU and PAC.
36
 
The wave of labor unrest in the late 1940s is most completely understood as 
simultaneously a form of worker resistance to external employers’ exploitation and the onset of 
conflict between Guianese labor leaders pursuing different notions of trade unionism for an 
autonomous British Guiana. Evidence supports GIWU claims that employers leveraged their 
influence over the MPCA to limit aggressive negotiations. MPCA General Secretary Sheik 
Shakoor and President Richard Ishmael noted in an interview with Robert Alexander in 1954 that 
the SPA censored the union’s periodical, Labour Advocate, pointing out that the SPA even ran 
advertisements criticizing the union’s militancy. Ishmael also noted that SPA advertisements in 
the Labour Advocate financed MPCA leaders’ salaries.
37 
At the same time, Clem Seecharan 
 
notes that Booker Brothers Chairman Jock Campbell worked from within his company to 
advocate gradual reforms throughout the late 1940s and early 1950s
38 
Nonetheless, PAC and 
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political party that could finance a party-trade union relationship independent of employers to 
provide leverage for workers unavailable within the existing economic framework. 
GIWU leaders argued that their organization could aggressively confront the SPA since it 
was not under employer control and the union’s militancy encouraged Bookers’ officials and 
colonial administrators to push for reforms to counter more aggressive demands. Nonetheless, 
colonial officials and sugar producers refused to recognize the GIWU limiting its effectiveness. 
The labor struggle continued to move toward the political sphere where the left-coalition leaders 
hoped to use legislation to allow for changes to union representation that would supplant the 
MPCA since the SPA declined to recognize the GIWU. At the same time the plantation structure 
reinforced the mutual dependency between political and trade union leaders when some 
companies restricted Jagan’s access to plantations where sugar workers lived several miles from 
public roads.
39 
Companies’ assertion that private property laws allowed them to inhibit access to 
 
individuals effectively isolated sugar workers from their elected representatives and contributed 
to Jagan’s conclusion that effective democratic representation for workers could only be attained 
through cooperation with a recognized trade union. Sugar workers interpreted the ban as 
corroboration of Jagan’s claim to challenge sugar producers’ authority on their behalf and his 
base of support strengthened.
40
 
In an address to the Legislative Council in February 1949, Cheddi Jagan bitterly 
 
criticized the British response to the previous year’s labor violence and his attack illuminates his 
increasingly strong conclusion that Guianese unions needed to be free from external control to be 
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failed and that the only alternative was determining recognized bargaining agents based on union 
membership. However, Jagan accused Bissell of refusing to accept popular recognition because 
doing so would empower Guianese leaders who opposed his policies. Furthermore, Jagan 
criticized Bissell’s insistence that trade unions and politics should be clearly separated, arguing 
that such a policy was inconsistent with trade union politics in Great Britain. Finally, Jagan noted 
that he proposed meeting with Bissell and Daniel Debidin, the legislative representatives of 
striking workers in Demerara, the previous year but that Bissell refused. Jagan concluded that 
Guianese political and labor leaders needed to cooperate to leverage their influence against 
British control since Bissell ignored struggling workers. Conversely, Bissell argued that 
preserving institutional machinery was paramount in maintaining effective labor relations. 
Bissell argued that workers needed to work through their union representatives if the system was 




Jagan’s speech and his legislative proposal echoing the sugar workers’ resolution calling 
for Bissell’s replacement as Commissioner of Labor hint at the difficulty of early British 
attempts at institution-building particularly on Guianese sugar plantations. Bissell argued that 
colonial policy should focus on developing effective institutional mechanisms as the foundation 
of an increasingly politically autonomous colony and that doing so was more important than 
addressing immediate economic concerns. However, sugar workers were disinclined to delay 
alleviation of intense poverty in the hope that a future organization colonizers developed would 
address their needs particularly since existing trade union mechanisms failed to substantially 
improve workers’ conditions. Instead, workers turned to Lachmansingh’s GIWU which insisted 
on immediately resolving workers’ poverty. 
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Simultaneously, sugar workers appealed to Jagan who advocated for social change 
designed to fundamentally alter Guianese society and eliminate the potential for perpetuation of 
external exploitation in Guiana. In reflecting on the evolution of Guianese politics in 1953, Jagan 
explained his 1949 legislative proposal as an action in support of the GIWU. He described his 
movement’s broad plan as an attempt to gradually build “a strong and united party and effective 




complemented his legislative actions with trade union activity, becoming president of the SWU 
in 1949 and aligning politically with Forbes Burnham, head of the BGLU.
43 
In the short term, 
Jagan tried to use his political position to legislate improvements Guianese unions were unable to 
negotiate, such as a two-dollar a day minimum wage for sugar workers. He argued that his 
proposal was necessary because existing mechanisms for collective bargaining were inefficient 
and the lack of pro-labor legislation left unions impotent in the face of powerful sugar interests.
44 
Thus, the PAC and GIWU formed a left-coalition between 1946 and 1949 that focused on using 
legislative action and strikes to improve workers’ conditions.  Most importantly, the Jagan-led 
left- wing of the PAC-GIWU coalition aimed to lay the foundations of a party-union relationship 
that would alter the nature of Guianese institutions and bring about a socialist transformation of 
the colony. 
Early Institution-Building in the Wake of the PAC Challenge 
 
The Colonial Office established the Venn Commission to determine the causes and 
possible solutions to economic and social unrest in British Guiana in the wake of the violent 
conclusion to sugar strikes in 1948. In August 1949 strikes broke out as a result of the rivalry 
 
42 
“Excerpt from ‘What Happened in British Guiana’ by Cheddi Jagan,” British Guiana 972.8 (520), Box 44, 
Marjorie Nicholson Files, TUCLC. 
43 
Horne, Cold War in a Hot Zone, 116-117. 
44 
Cheddi Jagan, “Motion-Minimum Wage: Thursday, October, 13, 1949,” Dabydeen and Macedo, eds., Dr. Cheddi 
Jagan National Assembly Speeches, Volume 1, 116-123. 
Commission Recommendation: Trade Union Organizations, CO 111/797/5, BNA. 
172 
 
between the MPCA and GIWU and Bissell requested the Venn Commission publish its report 
arguing that the commission’s conclusions would strengthen the government’s ability to enforce 
order and reinforce orthodox labor relations in the wake of the renewed unrest.
45 
The 
commission released the report in November and outlined several conclusions regarding the 
development of trade unions in British Guiana. The commission’s conclusions illuminate the 
official British perspective on organized labor’s role in the post-war world and the contradictions 
within their view that reinforced the PAC’s left-wing Marxist opposition.
46 
British objectives 
were two-fold, each objective containing within it humanitarian concerns and practical benefits 
for the British. First, the commission argued for alleviation of the extreme poverty that caused 
Guianese discontent. Second, the commission emphasized the need to build stronger mechanisms 




The Venn Commission concluded that poverty drove the colonial crisis; however, it 
 
suggested that trade unions’ inability to effectively advocate for improvements and political and 
labor leaders’ exploitation of conditions for political advantage directly contributed to social 
unrest. In assessing the turmoil, the commission drew the critical conclusion that self-interested 
political leaders’ abuse of the union movement led to competition between unions rather than the 
effective organization of workers necessary to establish a stable labor movement capable of 
advocating for improvement to wages and working conditions. Despite Bissell’s efforts, the 
commission determined that trade unionism “developed with an emphasis on the political rather 
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and exploited by individuals more for selfish political advantage (and cheap publicity) than for 
the real benefit of the worker.” British officials argued that “the GIWU was mainly responsible 
for provoking the strike on the Plantation Enmore in April, 1948” and that Lachmansingh’s 
“purpose in exploiting this trade union is almost entirely political and personal.” Furthermore, 
the commission noted the possibility that Cheddi Jagan, “the Communist member of the 
Legislative Council,” had been “worming his way into” the BGWL and might win its presidency 
in the union’s upcoming election.
48 
Thus, the Venn Commission concluded that the solution to 
 
Guianese unrest and poverty lay in reinforcing the institutional structure of trade unionism in the 
colony through programs aimed at strengthening the MPCA and guiding its development toward 
narrowly industrial ends. 
The TUC’s 1949 annual report suggests that some British labor leaders interpreted the 
violence in British Guiana differently than the Colonial Office; however, opponents of the 
official view agreed that Guianese workers needed assistance from the British labor movement. 
A.L. Cohen of the Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers challenged the Colonial 
Advisory Committee’s (CAC) interpretation and suggested that sugar workers’ protests resulted 
from a desire for increased wages. Cohen noted sugar workers’ low pay--25 shillings per week 
for men and 14 for women--and contrasted their meager wages with reports of considerable 
profit for Tate & Lyle, the combine that controlled the sugar plantation at Enmore. Tate & Lyle, 
he argued, recorded significant revenues in 1948 followed by record profits of close to five 
million shillings in 1949. Cohen referred to other presentations at the meeting that confirmed his 
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combatting the company’s anti-nationalization campaign, and assisting workers in defeating “the 
machination of this sugar combine.”
49
 
Cohen seems not to have appreciated that the fundamental question of recognition for the 
GIWU underlay the strike; however, his conclusion is significant for three reasons. First, it 
suggests that some British unionists sympathized with colonial unions and encouraged assistance 
based on ideals of workers’ solidarity. Second, it suggests that some British unionists suspected 
sugar companies of intentionally spreading disinformation about labor unrest in the colonies as a 
means of discrediting Guianese political and labor leaders in a manner that distorted official 
perceptions of the nationalist resistance.
50 
Finally, Cohen’s recommendation suggests that British 
 
unionists’ participation in institution-building efforts were based on an oversimplified 
understanding of colonial issues that encouraged attempts to implement a form of organized 
labor based narrowly on promoting trade union organization and collective bargaining divorced 
from political activism. Despite differences of opinion on the sources of conflict, the TUC and 
Colonial Office cooperated to try and bolster reformist Guianese unions and increase their 
negotiating effectiveness. 
In addition to suggesting a program of institution-building, the Venn Commission 
recommended introducing emergency restrictions in British Guiana. Specifically, the 
commission suggested delaying implementation of the International Labor Convention’s 
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standards concerning Freedom of Association and the Right to Organize that had already been 
adopted in the United Kingdom. Additionally, the Commission proposed restricting trade union 
leadership positions to full-time employees in the industry whose workers the union purported to 
represent.
51 
Commissioners expected the decision to aggravate Guianese workers and provoke 
resistance in other Caribbean territories and among regional labor organizations since the policy 
restricted trade union rights. Regardless, the commission determined that allowing registrars to 
refuse recognition to certain unions, including some those workers preferred benefited workers. 
The conclusion suggests that the commission prioritized undermining the GIWU and 
strengthening the MPCA in the short-term as part of a process of long-term institution-building.
52
 
Cheddi Jagan criticized the Venn Commission’s ruling regarding trade unions and the 
 
Legislative Council’s inattention to what he deemed the cause of a great deal of labor strife, 
workers’ inability to collectively bargain through the union of their choosing.
53 
He further 
criticized the Commission’s suggestion to recognize several different craft unions within the 
sugar industry, rather than support an industrial union to represent the entirety of sugar workers, 
a criticism consistent with the Colonial Office’s previous recommendation of minimizing the 
proliferation of unions.
54 
Finally, the Commission advocated a rule limiting leadership positions 
in trade unions to workers who had three continuous years working within the industry they 
proposed to represent. Theoretically the policy aimed at limiting the connections between 
industrial and political organizing to minimize the corruption of labor organization for political 
advancement; however, it created a barrier between the workers and the people they most trusted 
51 
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as representatives, impeding meaningful democracy in colonial society.
55 
It was also a policy 
clearly aimed at undermining the PAC’s influence since colonial officials accepted close 




Jagan argued that the Commission’s proposal was based on conditions in Great Britain, 
 
where the trade union movement grew out of centuries of struggle. In British Guiana, he argued, 
workers did not have the same level of experience and needed to be led; a rare point about which 
the Legislative Council agreed with Jagan.
57 
Moreover, the proposal of restricting union 
leadership to consistently employed full-time workers limited leadership positions to sugar 
workers vulnerable to company victimization if their negotiations pressed for changes sugar 
producers deemed too substantial and overlooked the fact that many sugar workers were seasonal 
employees. 
The Venn Commission’s recommendation of Colonial Office-TUC collaboration 
reinforced a broader, longer-term effort at institution-building. The Commission’s 
recommendations expanded on more than a decade of cooperative union work for developing 
colonial areas. The TUC first established relationships with colonial unions before World War II 
for the purpose of advising, educating, and collecting information to assist colonial workers in 
pursuing labor organization.
58 
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and Welfare Act, which was updated in 1945, based on the notion that newly established colonial 
trade unions required the assistance of experienced British trade union advisors.
59 
TUC 
cooperation with the Colonial Office included training staff members in Colonial Labor 
Departments since at least 1942 and sending British trade unionists to guide colonial trade 
unions; however, the war limited the effectiveness of their programs. After 1945 the TUC 
collaborated with Ruskin College, Oxford, in bringing colonial unionists to England for 
education and circulating correspondence courses in the colonies.
60
 
TUC records indicate that the Colonial Office encouraged British trade unionists to 
 
increase their involvement in the Caribbean after the violence at Enmore and offered some 
governmental financing to advance the programs. A grant from the Colonial Development and 
Welfare Act financed West Indian courses conducted between August and December 1948 that 
included the participation of eighteen trade union leaders in the Caribbean.
61 
Colonial officials 
and British unionists expected that their participation in institution-building activities would 
assist in the construction of structural mechanisms to alleviate colonial poverty and promote the 
development of social and political-economic institutions based on British practices and 
contribute to capitalist-democratic development.
62 
However, as D.I. Davies argues, British 
efforts at trade union development promoted the diffusion of some TUC practices while guiding 
organized labor along a moderate path in the colonies. Davies and Spencer Mawby argue that 
numbers obscured the significant lack of organization among the rank-and-file, which was the focus of post-war 
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TUC programs focused more on moderating potentially challenging colonial movements than 
assuring political voice and material benefits to colonial workers.
63 
Furthermore, historian Bob 
Reinalda argues that in “colonies and former colonies trade union policies were often modeled 
according to the national interests of the mother countries, and as such these top-down policies 
tended to frustrate local models.”
64 
Thus, scholarship suggests that the Venn Commission 
recommendation for countering the GIWU-PAC alliance in British Guiana through institution- 
building fell into a broader pattern employed throughout the Empire. British institution-building 
efforts, however, unfolded in an increasingly complex international environment in which 
international organizations and non-state actors outside of the United Kingdom played an 
increasing role in colonial affairs. 
The Internationalization of Institutional Decolonization 
 
Cold War conflicts between international labor organizations influenced institutional 
decolonization in British Guiana as early as 1945 when H.J.M. Hubbard, a founding member of 
the PAC, attended the first conference of the WFTU. In response to PAC association with the 
WFTU and its financially independent regionally arm, the Caribbean Labor Congress (CLC), the 
Colonial Office and TUC encouraged Guianese unions to associate with the International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and Inter-American Regional Organization of 
Workers (ORIT). Nigel Bolland explains the Colonial Office’s provision of funds for Guianese 
unions’ participation at the ICFTU Conferences as a means to bolster support for the anti- 
communist crusade through affiliation with the newly-formed anti-communist international 
organization. He suggests that the TUC previously refused funds to colonial unions for 
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participation in the WFTU even though the TUC helped found the organization.
65 
Moreover, 
Bolland argues that TUC pressure on colonial unions to join the ICFTU in response to Cold War 
politics resulted in a greater politicization of colonial trade unions. Bolland suggests that TUC 
pressure was largely a reaction against WFTU efforts to support colonial trade unions and the 
TUC’s realization that failure to offer an alternative to the WFTU would result in greater 
colonial involvement with Eastern bloc and communist unions at the international level.
66 
Colin 
Palmer also suggests that the WFTU, particularly communists and Eastern bloc representatives, 
provided the strongest support for colonial nationalists.
67
 
The establishment of the ICFTU and debates surrounding whether or not, and how, 
 
Guianese unions should align internationally fueled tensions between Guianese unionists and 
politicians, as well as between the PAC/PPP and the colonial establishment.
68 
Some Guianese 
labor leaders embraced the new organizations. Hubert Critchlow of the BGLU attended the first 
congress of the ICFTU in 1949 and the BGLU and MPCA formally joined the ICFTU in July 
1952. However, the BGLU did not disaffiliate with the WFTU and according to Critchlow did 
not pay dues to the ICFTU.
69 
The MPCA also integrated into the Western internationals as one 
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of the founding members of ORIT.
70 
Conversely, Cheddi Jagan criticized the Colonial 
Legislature’s decision to contribute funding to send a trade union delegate to the ICFTU 
Conference in 1949 arguing that the Council’s recent decision to reject increased funds for 
education made the trade union expense extraneous. Jagan’s opposition to using legislative funds 
to support unions’ integration into the ICFTU was largely a consequence of ideological support 
for the WFTU. Jagan’s speech to the Council attacked support for the ICFTU’s establishment on 
the grounds that it split the international labor movement in two to further British and American 




Jagan then shifted tactics, using the debate over the international conference as a means 
 
of advocating for the GIWU. In a November legislative session, Jagan acknowledged Critchlow 
as the “father of Trade Unionism” in British Guiana; however, he continued to disagree with the 
principle that the council should support his attendance at the conference.
72 
Jagan suggested that 
if the government was to fund a trade unionist to attend the conference despite his objections 
then the unionist chosen should be a representative from the GIWU. He pointed to a United 
Nations (UN) resolution demanding freedom of association and noted that the SPA still refused 
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to acknowledge the GIWU even though the union gained recognition from the Guianese 
government. The GIWU, he argued, had a legitimate case that it required international assistance 
to obtain practical recognition denied in the colony. Jagan clearly understood that his motion 
stood no chance of passing in the council since he referred to the debate as a joke; however, he 
insisted that he was sincere and wanted his position on the record.
73
 
The legislative debate over funding the BGLU shows the importance British officials’ 
 
placed on cultivating relations between colonial unions and the ICFTU as well as colonial 
unionists’ use of the ICFTU and ORIT to integrate into the Western capitalist system. Official 
British objectives regarding colonial trade unions included the retention of control as a central 
objective. In discussing trade unionism in the colonies the Colonial Office concluded in October 
1951 that recent legislative proposals regarding colonial union regulations “might in themselves 
seem to suggest a legalistic and restrictive spirit that was alien to proclaimed liberal ideas about 
freedom of association;” however, “these proposals implied no shift of policy: they must be 
viewed simply as a reappraisement [sic] of the measure of guidance and control which might be 
desirable to promote the growth of an independent, responsible, and effective trade union 
movement.”
74 
Thus, in the face of British promotion of ICFTU relations and a general program 
 
aimed at controlling colonial trade unions, the PAC increased its efforts to work with the WFTU. 
 
The conflicts shaping institutional decolonization in British Guiana increased after 1950 
as Cold War tensions heightened with the onset of the war in Korea and the intense anti- 
communism of McCarthyism in the United States. In February 1950 colonial officials 
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agreement between the SPA, MPCA, and BGWL to increase wages and paid leave for sugar 
workers. The negotiations revolved around a general view that improved conditions would, 
according to American Consul Eugene Johnson, “provide an incentive to secure more regular 
and continuous working of factories, thus increasing the productivity of the industry.”
75 
Despite 
Johnson’s optimistic outlook, production did not increase significantly and employment for sugar 
 
workers stagnated and possibly decreased throughout the year.
76 
Moreover, Jagan suggested that 
sugar producers offset wage increases with increased prices for local consumption and he 
continued his push for recognition for the GIWU in the Legislative Council in March. During a 
debate, Jagan criticized Bissell and the Labor Department for alleging to uphold International 
Labor Organization (ILO) principles assuring workers the right to organize and have unions 
recognized while not enforcing that recognition in practice. He warned that encouraging workers 
to organize and having government recognition of their unions while permitting employers to 
deal only with unions of their choosing would inevitably lead to continued labor conflict.
77 
In 
early November the Jagan-backed GIWU instigated a colony-wide strike that resulted in a partial 
work stoppage that threatened waning production.
78
 
In response to the Venn Commission Report and continued division in the Guianese labor 
 
movement, the TUC agreed to increase assistance for trade unions in British Guiana at its annual 
congress in September 1950. British trade unionists sent “a typewriter, duplicating machinery, 
stencils, ink, duplicating paper, stencil pens and other accessories, stapling machine, [and] filing 
cabinet” to the BGTUC by January 1951, along with books on “trade union and associated 
75 
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subjects,” pamphlets, and regular publications to allow the BGTUC to start a trade union library. 
Finally, the TUC worked with Ruskin College to design an updated course in trade union 
principles for colonial students.
79 
TUC efforts at educational training continued to expand slowly 




The TUC program for British Guiana fit within a broader restatement of purpose 
 
articulated in a May 1951 memorandum from the Colonial Labor Advisory Committee to the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies. The committee argued that the “central purpose of British 
colonial policy is to guide the colonial territories to responsible self-government,” including 
assisting colonies to establish trade unions and overcome the reality that their growth was “not 
matched in understanding of principles and practice.” Furthermore, the committee argued that “if 
a situation arises in which two strong trade unions compete for recognition” it would create 
“serious difficulties for the territory concerned.” Thus, the committee recommended giving 
colonial officials the authority to reject registration of unions if they determined that existing 
organizations offered sufficient representation. Such a proposal was anathema to British trade 
union practices but was deemed necessary in colonies where a multiplicity of unions could 
render the movement itself useless and was particularly significant in Guiana where the GIWU- 
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“revolution that would parallel in some degree the Industrial Revolution of this country” and that 
the success of British policy depended on how colonial authorities managed those changes to 
encourage colonists to develop a “sense of belonging” in new societies. Sir Frederick Seaford of 
Booker Brothers suggested that direct TUC involvement was crucial to preparing colonies for 
development. While not wanting to “seem to be forcing itself and British methods on colonial 
unions,” attendees recommended “trying to prompt requests for help” and increasing TUC 




At the same time the TUC began sending supplies to the MPCA and BGTUC, American 
labor leaders and the American-dominated ORIT became increasingly involved in the colony. In 
January 1951 ORIT released its inaugural publication, which began with a report on British 
Guiana edited by the organization’s Assistant Secretary, Ernst Schwarz of the American 
Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). The report noted that 75% of the Guianese 
population was “wage-earners of lower income,” and another 10% were independent peasant 
farmers or civil service and public workers, and that a rapidly developing American-owned 
bauxite mining industry offered employment possibilities for the future. The report criticized 
appalling workplace conditions and suggested that “squalor, poverty, and the frequently 
abominable surroundings no doubt account to a large extent for the low productivity in the 
industries.” The report argued that conditions were unacceptable, particularly since “bauxite is 
largely used by the United Nations and the United States in the manufacture of war materials” 
and therefore represented an important aspect of American military preparedness toward the 
year-old conflict in East Asia. Schwarz concluded that strengthening the trade union movement 
was the key to improving conditions and he suggested that ORIT particularly support the 
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democratically principled MPCA, which had “collective labor agreements with the employers of 
the sugar, rice, bauxite, and electric power industries of the colony.”
83 
The ORIT report suggests 
that American labor leaders considered British Guiana important as early as 1951 at least in part 
as a result of its production of strategic materials. American opposition to poor labor conditions 
derived at least partially from the impact of the workplace environment on effective production 
of bauxite. Most importantly, American Federation of Labor (AFL) and CIO leaders determined 
that American labor and ORIT needed to increase their involvement in the colony and support 
for the MPCA to help build a pro-American trade union movement to secure their interests. 
Serafino Romualdi, the AFL’s long-time Latin American representative, Assistant 
Secretary of ORIT, and possible CIA operative, visited British Guiana in 1951 and concluded 
that Cheddi Jagan was subservient to the international Communist movement.
84 
In an article 
published in the Inter-American Labor News in January 1951 Romualdi criticized PPP-backed 
wildcat strikes in British Guiana and accused the party of being Communist. In May 1952 
Romualdi published a second article in ORIT’s Inter-American Labor News accusing the PPP of 
trying to destroy the MPCA, ORIT’s affiliate in British Guiana.
85 
Romualdi resolved to work 
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discussing the establishment of the Caribbean Area Division of ORIT (CADORIT) to further the 
organization’s activities in the Caribbean.
86
 
Leo Eliazer, Surinam’s representative to ORIT and the organization’s regional organizer 
in the Caribbean, visited British Guiana in October and November 1951, met with Sheik 
Shakoor, General Secretary of the MPCA, and drew up a detailed report on the colony. 
Importantly, Eliazer noted that American labor activist and Rutgers professor Robert Alexander 
held Shakoor in high regard suggesting that the MPCA leader used international connections to 
advance the sugar workers’ cause in British Guiana and giving the union an influential 
connection within the American labor movement.
87 
The ORIT report praised the MPCA’s 
 
persistent support for sugar workers and attainment of marked improvement for laborers in after 
World War II warning that “the unrecognized pirate union,” Dr. Lachmansingh’s GIWU, 
represented the greatest obstacle in the way of trade union progress. 
Eliazer criticized the “communist” GIWU’s relationship with the BGTUC and accused 
Lachmansingh of exploiting conditions on the sugar estates for political advantage.
88 
Moreover, 
Eliazer noted that the Lachmansingh “depends on the communist PPP Party with whom his 
union has an alliance for support to continue mischief-making in the sugar industry until he gets 
recognition.” He also reported that the GIWU “openly applied for affiliation with the London 
Branch of the Communist Caribbean Labor Congress.” As a result of its connections, Eliazer 
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to 45% of MPCA contributions-- inhibited the MPCA’s ability to maintain regular contact with 
sugar workers spread out across a wide area on Guiana’s coast. Eliazer concluded that the 
financial burden of transportation contributed to the MPCA’s failure to effectively confront 
communist propaganda spread through GIWU organizing.
89 
In addition to indirectly 
acknowledging the GIWU’s superior rank-and-file support, Eliazer offered recommendations for 
addressing the MCPA-GIWU conflict. 
Eliazer emphasized that several steps were undertaken to stabilize the trade union 
movement and after reiterating that democracy in the economically and geographically important 
territory depended on ORIT assistance, he offered several suggestions to increase the 
connections between the Guianese labor movement and ORIT. He noted that the MPCA was 
expanding to include negotiating rights for bauxite workers to confront what he deemed 
communist organizing in that industry and that the Federation of Government Unions (FUGE) 
planned to apply for affiliation to ORIT and the ICFTU. The BGTUC, which applied to affiliate 
with ORIT and the ICFTU in 1950 but declined when the GIWU joined the BGTUC in 1951, 
reapplied for affiliation after a meeting with Eliazer. Eliazer further “pledged [his] service at the 
disposal of the democratic trade union leaders against the communist PPP men.” In addition to 
his own services, Eliazer recommended ORIT provide “two full-time paid organizers of the 
workers in the democratic trade unions, for a period of five years with all equipments [sic] 
necessary to undertake the planning and execution of propaganda calculated to improve the 
standard of living of the masses of workers in addition to the intensification of the 
organizational, economical, [sic] political and educational activities in the trade unions affiliated 
to ORIT.” He further recommended the provision of two cars and a loud-speaker for organizing, 
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scholarships for unionists to study for eight months in the United States or Puerto Rico, six to 
eight tons of newsprint for two years to supply the MPCA for the publication of its journal, and 
the placement of responsibility for the provisions in the hands of Shakoor who would report to 
ORIT and the ICFTU regularly.
90 
Thus, ORIT’s most important Caribbean leader used the 
regional arm of the ICFTU to encourage American labor leaders to join the trade union conflict 
in British Guiana against the left-coalition in the PAC-GIWU within months of the Western 
international’s founding. 
Shakoor strengthened the MPCA’s connections to American labor when the ORIT 
executive board invited him to attend its meeting in late 1951 and early 1952 as an observer. The 
list of high-ranking American labor leaders participating included the soon-to-be AFL President 
George Meany, Romualdi, and Ernst Schwarz. Board members discussed the expansion of 
ORIT’s influence into the British West Indies through a regional organization, a process already 
underway as a result decisions made at a conference in Trinidad in 1951 attended by Assistant 
General Secretary of the TUC, George Woodcock. Attendees also praised the cooperation 
between ORIT, the AFL and CIO, and the State Department in collaborating to strengthen 
miners’ movements in British Guiana through negotiations with American industrialists. The 
negotiations “represented a great deal of money for all of [those] countries” but “did not bring 
comparable social and economic benefits to the workers.” The report notes that increased profits 
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TUC, ORIT, ICFTU, and State Department involvement in the colony; however, their 
participation in industrial disputes failed to effectively addressing the needs of Guianese 
workers. 
Eliazer and Romualdi’s visits to British Guiana, Shakoor’s attendance at the ORIT 
meeting, and the connections established and conclusions drawn from those experiences is 
considerable. First, the entrance of American trade union leaders into the labor struggle in British 
Guiana provided a small financial base for the MPCA that, in addition to TUC assistance, 
allowed the organization to engage the more widely supported and financially sound GIWU 
despite a lack of support among sugar workers for the MPCA.
92 
Second, the ORIT program 
 
directly contradicted at least one aspect of TUC assistance; specifically, ORIT refused to 
contribute to a trade union library “until the unions themselves indicate their willingness to make 
use of local books and periodicals." The disagreement between ORIT and the TUC on a 
seemingly insignificant matter foreshadowed a larger lack of coordination between international 
trade unionists’ activities in British Guiana throughout the 1950s. Third, the connections 
American labor leaders’ established in British Guiana through ORIT beginning in 1951 formed 




At the same time ORIT leaders engaged the Guianese trade union movement, the WFTU 
offered an alternative for Guianese trade unionists disinclined to affiliate with the ICFTU and 
ORIT. Cheddi Jagan expressed a firm conviction that the WFTU was “ready to fight for colonial 




It is unclear where the GIWU obtained its funding. J.P. Lachmansingh was financially well-off and association 
with the PPP contributed to GIWU funds; however, it is possible money was obtained elsewhere, including from the 
WFTU or Eastern-bloc countries. 
93 
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rejection of the organization’s “going too far in the sense that it was beginning to investigate 
conditions” that “carried to their logical conclusion they would have exposed the rottenness” of 
British imperialism. As a result, the Jagan-led PPP continued cooperation with the organization 
after the TUC and CIO withdrew in 1949.
94 
Jagan also traveled to East Germany in 1951 where 
he toured factories and trade union resorts to learn “how workers were building socialism, the 
constructive role they played, the social and economic benefits they secured and the direct 
participation of workers in management and control of factories and production.”
95 
Jagan’s 
appeal to Eastern European trade unions and the WFTU as a guide for Guianese institution- 
building aimed at breaking the colony’s economy from foreign capitalist control. However, the 
PPP’s attempt to establish labor relations on an Eastern-bloc model conflicted with British and 
American conceptions of institutional development for the colony while Guianese association 
with communist organizations directly challenged Cold War imperatives. 
J.Y. Mackenzie of the Foreign Office contacted the Colonial Office to express his 
department’s concern that in November 1951 a Guianese delegate to the WFTU conference in 
Berlin suggested the organization set up a new colonial department.
96 
The delegate, Cheddi 
Jagan, had his proposal seconded by a delegate from Trinidad before WFTU members agreed to 
the plan.
97 
Foreign Office records also noted that leading speakers at the conference advised the 
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the WFTU provide unions in colonial and dependent territories more support.
98 
An AFL-CIO 
report on the conference claimed that the WFTU platform was part of Soviet policy designed to 
undermine the Truman administration’s Point Four program. American labor leaders suggested 
that WFTU members inaccurately interpreted Point Four as an attempt to insert American 
technicians into key positions in developing economies to protect American investments and 
profits and secure access to raw materials. The American report suggests that WFTU delegates 
agreed to the organization of trade union conferences in Latin America in addition to the creation 
of a Colonial Department.
99 
Thus, British policymakers interpreted the WFTU conference as a 
threat to their control of colonial unions and American labor leaders explained WFTU programs 
as a direct threat to American foreign policy objectives. 
Juxtaposing Shakoor’s and Jagan’s international activities in late-1951 offers an 
important reflection on the emerging conflict within the Guianese trade union movement. 
Guianese labor leaders advocated two irreconcilably opposed objectives and aggressively 
courted international support for their positions. Shakoor and the MPCA represented a reformist 
labor movement that sought to improve workers’ conditions through negotiations within a 
capitalist system and his organization pursued integration into Western labor institutions to 
achieve that aim. Conversely, the Jagan-led left-coalition that made up the PPP advocated 
replacing the capitalist system and appealed for closer relations with the Eastern-bloc to advance 
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important force behind the WFTU’s increased involvement in colonial areas and Shakoor also 
requesting Western assistance. 
The discussion between Mackenzie and S.E.V. Luke of the Colonial Office illuminated 
the British debate about the role the United States should play in the process. Mackenzie 
suggested to Luke that cooperation with the State Department and possibly Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) would be advisable to help confront perceived communist infiltration into 
colonial territories though the WFTU.
100 
Luke disagreed, suggesting that Mackenzie avoid 
consulting with the State Department in lieu of a meeting with John Shaw of the British Security 
Service. In Luke’s analysis, there were a remarkably small number of local politicians who had 
communist contacts and sympathies given the economic condition of the region; however, even 




Christopher Andrew’s authorized history of MI5, Defend the Realm, confirms the 
 
Colonial Office analysis of communism in British Guiana. Andrew notes that British intelligence 
agencies knew that Cheddi Jagan made contact with Soviet representatives in Washington D.C. 
in 1947 and maintained contact with the British Communist Party since 1948, but they carefully 
noted that no evidence suggested that Jagan’s movement was directed from the outside.
102 
Two 
generally consistent themes throughout the 1950s and early 1960 are evident in this early 
exchange of views between the Foreign Office and Colonial Office regarding the WFTU in 
1951. First, the Foreign Office encouraged greater collaboration with the United States to the 
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Guianese communism as a uniquely interpreted ideology pursued by local leaders and adapted to 
local conditions rather than an infiltration directed from the Soviet Union. 
International maneuvering for control of labor relations in British Guiana continued in 
1952 as discussions regarding the future of the colony continued to shift toward increased self- 
government and eventual political independence. TUC reports show that British trade unionists’ 
completed an initial program to supply equipment to the MPCA during the year. In June ORIT 
formed a Caribbean Division (CADORIT) discussed the previous year, with representation from 
the MPCA.
103 
MPCA General Secretary Sheik Shakoor served on CADORIT’s administrative 
 
committee giving the reformist sugar workers’ union a position of influence within the regional 
labor movement. At the same time Cheddi Jagan joined the Jamaican Marxist politician and 
labor leader Richard Hart in leading protests against the new organization. Jagan and Hart argued 




Guianese businessmen entered the fray when the Georgetown Chamber of Commerce 
 
President E.J. Haywood requested the establishment of an Employers Federation and Labor 
Relations Committee to serve as negotiating machinery under the premise that it would ensure 
industrial peace. Oliver Littleton, Secretary of State for the Colonies, denied the request on the 
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On July 31 Jagan introduced a bill to the Legislative Council that called for new 
regulations to reduce jurisdictional disputes between competing unions based on United States 
and Canadian laws ensuring recognition to the organization with the majority membership. The 
motion aimed at giving the GIWU legislative backing to displace the MPCA and even though it 
failed, the proposal served as a template for PPP proposals in 1953.
106
 
Jagan continued his efforts at facilitating connections between the Guianese labor 
 
movement and the Eastern-bloc in October when he engaged in a two-day debate in the 
Legislative Council regarding a Colonial Office ban on entrance into the colony of Billy  
Strachan and Ferdinand Smith, two communist Jamaican labor leaders.
107 
Colonial officials 
argued that Smith and Strachan’s attempt to visit British Guiana proved that the WFTU 
implemented Jagan’s proposal to increase regional activities since Smith was appointed to the 
World Secretariat of the WFTU and was chief of the organization’s Colonial Bureau.
108 
The 
Colonial Office defended the ban on Smith and Strachan’s as a response to attempted communist 
infiltration; however, it also served as a reaction against the emergence of inter-colonial labor 
organizing in the West Indies that fell outside of what British officials deemed acceptable trade 
unionism. The mutually pursued relationship between the WFTU and West Indian trade union 
leaders fueled colonial officials’ fears of militant organizing and its connection to international 
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increased WFTU activity in the region while criticizing trade union organizing between three 
West Indian labor leaders as a form of external infiltration.
109
 
Jagan’s objection to the ban is significant because his defense of the men refuted the 
British claim that the WFTU was merely a communist-front organization and criticized the 
Legislative Council’s financial support for Guianese unionists attending ICFTU meetings. Jagan 
contrasted the Council’s treatment of Serafino Romualdi, an American citizen who traveled 
freely around British Guiana the previous year while representing ORIT, with the ban on WFTU 
representatives Strachan and Smith who were both British subjects. Jagan argued that the 
Legislative Council inhibited Guianese unionists’ ability to develop their own institutions and 
join with the international organization they determined most directly acted in their interests 
while forcing an cooperation with organization that he claimed was controlled by the State 
Department. Moreover, he criticized the Legislature’s refusal to overturn sugar estate bans on 





Thus, throughout 1952 Guianese employers and trade unionists introduced legislation to 
increase their ability to influence negotiating machinery when a new Constitution allowing for 
full internal self-government went into effect the following April. Meanwhile, reformist trade 
unionists continued their cooperation with the TUC, ICFTU, ORIT, and CADORIT. TUC 
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methods; however, the supplies and educational literature the TUC sent to the MPCA did not 
address the practical problems facing sugar workers. 
At the same time, sugar companies continued to victimize workers organizing for the 
GIWU. Sugar companies evicted GIWU branch secretaries from company-owned housing 
during a 1952 strike for recognition, a practice that Sydney King, one of the PPP’s early leaders, 
suggested was regularity during union protests.
111 
In summarizing his supporters’ “fight for trade 
unionism” in 1953, Jagan argued that sugar companies continued to victimize workers hoping to 
align with the GIWU and GIWU activists between 1950 and 1953. He suggested that the GIWU 
lost members after 1950 despite popularity with sugar workers as a result of union leaders 
restriction from company property and workers’ fear of being removed from company housing 
for supporting the union.
112 
TUC efforts to strengthen preferred Guianese unions complemented 
sugar companies’ heavy-handed tactics which included exerting official influence to utilize 
police action against strikers. Together, British efforts aimed at strengthening trade unions 
willing to confine their activities to industrial matters, accept limited improvements to wages and 
conditions through collective bargaining, minimize agitation, and associate with the ICFTU 
rather than the WFTU. 
Institutional Decolonization during the PPP government 
 
The first phase of the struggle for institutional decolonization in British Guiana 
culminated in the period between April 27, 1953 when the PPP won eighteen of twenty-four 
seats in the House of Assembly in the colony’s first election under the new Waddington 
Constitution, and October 8, 1953 when the British suspended the Constitution and re-imposed 
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direct rule in British Guiana. The Waddington Constitution granted universal suffrage to 
Guianese over the age of twenty-one and allowed internal self-government to the elected 
Guianese in a lower House of Assembly while reserving veto powers for the newly appointed 
governor, Alfred Savage.
113 
The constitution also created an upper house comprised of appointed 
as well as elected representatives designed to act as a check on the elected lower house. 
Secretary of State for the Colonies Oliver Lyttleton warned that the composition of the Executive 
Council gave both ministers and unofficial members “styled as ministers” a great deal of 
influence over government business. At times, he suggested, situations could arise in which “a 
member’s private business activities, his financial interest in particular companies or schemes, 
and his activities and interests as an official of a trade union” could conflict with public duties.
114
 
Thus, despite the considerable progress toward self-government, PPP leaders noted the 
 
limits on democracy and the subtle ways the new constitution preserved colonial economic 
relationships. Sydney King and Cheddi Jagan criticized the document as “a changed form of 
oppression” that refused to countenance economic changes to the structure of Guianese society. 
King argued that the constitution was a “British lie” written “to fool the people into thinking that 
their elected representatives could now control the country.”
115 
Jagan agreed with King because 
“a representative of Bookers sitting on the Executive Council with me, a representative of the 
people,” will not “be framing a similar type of legislation.” He further criticized the constitution 
for allowing the Colonial Secretary to oversee foreign trade, which he suggested gave colonial 
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attack on the constitution in the Legislative Council revolved around his determination to wrest 
economic control of the colony as a means of directing development away from sending profits 
abroad and toward improving the lives of Guianese people through establishing a socialism in 
British Guiana. The Waddington Constitution reinforced to PPP leaders the need for institutional 
changes to shift the balance of power over Guianese economics. 
At the same time, Colin Palmer notes that investors’ fear of the PPP government 
weakened the colonial economy as depositors withdrew their holdings from the Government’s 
Savings Bank.
117 
In response to the financial crisis, Savage explained to the PPP ministers that 
external economic assistance would be withheld if investors or international lending agencies 
thought the government was communist.
118 
Thus, while communism was the superficial threat, 
the subtext was that external financing of development was predicated on a degree of control 
over British Guiana’s fiscal policies and political-economic structure. Investors would not invest 
in projects likely to lose money and businesses did not want to allocate resources likely to be 
nationalized. Left-wing PPP leaders argued that such concerns structurally constricted the 
freedom of action necessary for development in the interests of the Guianese people. Colonial 
Officials, tasked with establishing a stable, capitalist-oriented, and reasonably democratic society 
that would transition to independence as early as the mid-1950s interpreted the PPP’s plans as a 
direct threat to each of their objectives. Jagan and King’s criticisms of the constitution as an 
impediment to Guianese acquisition of economic power is the backdrop in which the left- 
coalition sought to gain influence over the colony’s economic structure through coordinated 
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The PPP won an overwhelming majority of seats in the April election despite the 
MPCA’s aggressive anti-PPP campaign and several months of tangible gains negotiated for 
sugar workers through MPCA collective bargaining. Throughout early 1953 the MPCA issued 
election guides warning Guianese not to vote for PPP candidates while arguing that the left- 
coalition party was acting out orders directed from the Soviet Union. The MPCA used Cheddi 
Jagan’s participation in WFTU conferences as evidence to support the claim of PPP 
subordination to “Russian imperialist masters.” MPCA election guides included crass personal 
slanders but directed most of their vitriol at the alleged devotion of PPP candidates subordinate 
to international Communists or naiveté that allowed them to be manipulated as part of an 
international conspiracy.
119 
After the PPP assumed office the GIWU applied for affiliation to the 
 
WFTU; however, the application was withdrawn as a result of political developments in Guiana 
in October.
120 
Importantly, MPCA campaign material and the public discourse surrounding the 
election influenced British and especially American interpretations of Guianese politics for the 
rest of the 1950s. 
Political developments, however, comprised only a part of the broader struggle to shape 
the institutional nature of Guianese society and labor struggles centered on the debate continued 
throughout and after the campaign. MPCA leaders negotiated what Robert Alexander referred to 
as “some real gains” including $3 million for sugar workers in late 1952 and an agreement that 
assured laborers most of the added profits from increased sugar prices in the United Kingdom in 
early 1953. MPCA President Lionel Luckhoo also participated in the first ICFTU World 
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the position in early 1953.
121 
Nonetheless, inflation offset the benefits of small advances in wage 
rates and the oppressive conditions under which workers labored in the colony remained 
unchanged.
122 
Shakoor and MPCA Vice-President Rupert Tello continued negotiations with the 
rice board arguing for modifications to the wage scale in June 1953 but eventually conceded that 
foul weather undermined crop production and precluded immediate changes to workers’ pay.
123 
Minor work stoppages occurred in June and July before they were settled through government 
intervention.
124 
Thus, despite some gains, the colony’s dire poverty left many workers 
discontented with the MPCA. 
MPCA-negotiated improvements expanded beyond the agricultural sector as well. In 
June 1953 Justin Yee and Claude Archer of the Electrical Workers Branch of the MPCA noted 
negotiated improvements in their industry since 1950, including overtime pay; however, they 
explained to Alexander that they continued to face difficulties in organizing since employers 
refused to support a closed shop. Yee and Archer also hinted at future employer-MPCA 
collaboration to counter the PPP. The unionists suspected that employers regretted their 
dismissal of MPCA demands since workers responded with support for the PPP. Yee and Archer 
expected PPP agitation to increase with the introduction of legislation to demand recognition of 
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Yee and Archers’ opposition to the PPP’s anticipated legislation is important. The 
MPCA’s electrical union leaders suggested a bill recognizing new unions would lead to 
perpetual changing of bargaining agents and workers shifting union loyalties as new leaders 
made promises to encourage desertion from existing trade unions. Yee and Archer’s fears 
mirrored TUC criticisms that Guianese labor unrest and the introduction of new unions 
weakened the institutional stability necessary for effective trade union negotiation with 
employers. MPCA-TUC reproaches discounted the possibility that a new union could effectively 
bargain and retain worker loyalty while highlighting the difficulty of retaining workers’ support 
in a colony with deep poverty and little leverage with which to negotiate.
125   
Moreover, as Yee 
 
noted in an interview with Alexander the following year, many workers left the MPCA and 
joined the BGLU after the PPP won office. They hoped that affiliation with a union led by 
Ashton Chase, the PPP Minister of Labor would prove effective at obtaining the check-off where 
MPCA efforts had failed.
126 
Thus, as the PPP established itself in office, it became clear that the 
primary issue facing Guianese society was addressing the question of worker representation, 
especially on the sugar estates. 
Beyond domestic issues, the PPP’s election gave pro-WFTU trade unionists an 
opportunity to increase overt connections to the Eastern-bloc international and in early 1953 the 
PPP sent delegates to the Vienna Convention of the WFTU.
127 
The Legislative Council passed a 
subversive literature ban on February 27, 1953, two months before the elections to block WFTU 
literature from entering British Guiana; however, Cheddi Jagan arranged for materials to 
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continue to be sent secretly into the colony through early 1953.
128 
It is unclear the extent to 
which the bill inhibited PPP-WFTU correspondence; however, British intelligence concluded 
that the PPP was no longer receiving WFTU material in mid-May. Nonetheless, British 
intelligence sources expected that the WFTU was preparing to send new supplies in the wake of 
the PPP’s electoral victory and the PPP government moved to repeal the ban on subversive 
literature once in office.
129
 
WFTU involvement in British Guiana went beyond the distribution of literature. Colonial 
 
officials accused Eric Huntley, a member of the PPP General Council and postal worker with 
connections to the WFTU, of authoring a controversial memorandum on British Guiana farm 
workers in the United States and distributing “communist literature.” Huntley’s political 
organizing and his participation in a protest during Princess Mary’s visit to British Guiana 
resulted in the decision to remove him from his civil service position. Governor Savage 
orchestrated Huntley’s firing after he was absent without leave for two days to participate in PPP 
organizing on sugar estates.
130 
In response, WFTU General Secretary Willi Baumgart wrote a 
 
letter of protest to the Guianese Postmaster General in April 1953 criticizing the decision to 
cause Huntley to “lose his base of existence” for engaging in “a primary democratic right of 
freely asserting his opinion.”
131 
The WFTU affiliated Trades Union International of the Postal, 
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Director General of the ILO in August.
132 
Huntley’s case is further evidence of the developing 
relationship between the left-coalition and the WFTU. 
American labor leaders sent Alexander to British Guiana in the wake of the PPP’s victory 
fearing the possibility that communists where in the process of taking control of a British colony. 
Alexander’s studies and AFL analyses played an important role in shaping American views on 
British Guiana after the State Department closed the United States consulate in Georgetown in 
early 1953 content to save money. Thereafter, Washington officials obtained information on 
British Guiana from the consul in Trinidad.
133 
Alexander’s letter to Jay Lovestone summarizing 
 
his findings drew several important conclusions. Alexander informed Lovestone that the MPCA 
was “our organization” in contrast to the BGLU and FUGE which associated with the WFTU 
and the PPP. The Jagans, Alexander suggested, were communists but the PPP was not a 
disciplined Communist Party.  Alexander concluded that the State Department’s decision to 
remove the Consulate was “suicidal” given the dire situation in a key area of the Caribbean and 
that Lovestone should discuss the situation with the State Department, which Stephen Rabe notes 
Lovestone apparently did. Alexander also noted that he hoped to see the Assistant Secretary of 




The closing of the consulate directly impacted the MPCA since Guianese labor leaders 
opposed to the PPP used the office of the Vice Consul to obtain information about Janet Jagan’s 
past in the United States and to obtain educational films for the MPCA library. The lost 
connection likely contributed to Alexander’s suggestion that the ICFTU should increase financial 
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support for the MPCA.
135 
Alexander reinforced Eliazer’s conclusion from 1951 that the MPCA’s 
organizational difficulties derived from financial weakness. He suggested that MPCA leaders 
risked losing their recently purchased car due to the ICFTU’s failure to provide promised funds 
to pay for it. Without the automobile, Alexander noted, MPCA leaders organizational efforts 
would be severely restricted.
136 
Alexander’s final conclusion is significant since it suggests 
ORIT and ICFTU assistance to affiliated Guianese unions was limited in the early 1950s and 
MPCA leaders viewed American labor representatives as a conduit through which they could 
obtain material resources. 
Alexander compiled a series of interviews in June 1953, and an examination of several of 
those conversations helps explain the prism through which American labor leaders understood 
British Guiana’s trade union conflict and its relationship to political development in the colony 
throughout the 1950s and early 1960s. Rupert Tello, Vice President of the MCPA, emphasized 
his commitment to free enterprise and an opposition to the GIWU, which he suggested was able 
to call frequent walk-off strikes because it did not pay strike benefits. If Tello’s criticism is 
accurate it belies the fact that the GIWU compelled sugar workers cooperation without always 
being able to offer financial incentives and therefore that the GIWU was, as it claimed, supported 
more than the MPCA among sugar workers.
137 
Moreover, Tello’s statement confirmed to 
 
Alexander that the MPCA was committed to perpetuating the free market capitalism that 
American labor leaders were hoping to spread as part of their version of institutional 
decolonization in British Guiana. 
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Conversely, Cheddi Jagan expressed to Alexander a hesitation to foreign development 
projects and argued that the Guianese should consider the possibility of establishing a planned 
economy similar to the Soviet Union. Jagan referenced a recent UN report to suggest that the 
Soviet Union’s development outpaced that of capitalist democracies. Jagan noted that the PPP 
did not plan immediate nationalization but suggested that the party would consider 
nationalization of sugar and bauxite if such a policy seemed beneficial in the future. He further 
criticized the ICFTU’s attempts to remove WFTU affiliated organizations from the CLC, to 
which the PPP belonged.
138 
Jagan did not claim to be a communist; however, his articulation of 
 
an economic development plan and international labor relations suggested that the direction in 
which the PPP planned to take the colony conflicted with American labor leaders’ regional 
objectives 
GIWU President J.P. Lachmansingh told Alexander that the PPP government, in which 
he was a minister, had an international position best understood in trade union terms. The 
government, he suggested, “sympathized more with the WFTU than with the ICFTU” though it 
received no funding from either organization and had loyalties only to British Guiana. 
Lachmansingh further noted that the GIWU was not opposed to working with the ICFTU; 
however, he suggested that when the ICFTU had come to British Guiana, they never met with 
him.
139 
Ashton Chase’s work on Guianese unionism supports Lachmansingh’s position and 
 
suggests that PPP leaders “supported the point of view that in the interest of unity the unions 
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and “willing to accept aid from both.”
140 
The possibility of GIWU cooperation with the ICFTU is 
unclear. Eliazer claimed to have met with Lachmansingh for four hours during his ORIT visit in 
1951 contrary to Lachmansingh’s suggestion that ORIT and ICFTU officials ignored his 
organization. More importantly, it is uncertain whether Lachmansingh and the GIWU would or 
could have cooperated with the ICFTU and ORIT given their connection to the PPP, whose goals 
were incompatible with the purpose of the Western labor organizations. Chase and 
Lachmansingh represented the center-left part of the PPP’s left-coalition and evidence suggests 
that the party’s left-wing wielded considerably more influence in 1953. 
In Alexander’s interview with Hubert Critchlow, Critchlow suggested that the PPP 
refused to pay his pension if he spoke against the Party.
141 
The conflict between Critchlow and 
the Jagans ran deeper than mere ideological positions and reached back to a 1945 debate on 
universal suffrage which political scientist David Hinds suggests was undermined by ethnic 
rivalries. Critchlow opposed universal suffrage which would have given the East Indian 
population an electoral majority since and altered political influence in the colony since most 
East Indians remained disenfranchised in the mid-1940s.
142 
The extent to which Alexander 
understood the complexities of Guianese politics is unclear; however, his conclusions were 
confident and carried considerable weight among American labor leaders assessing policy 
toward British Guiana. Critchlow’s assertion in particular convinced American labor leaders that 
the PPP sought to subvert trade unions’ independence to pave the way for authoritarian forms of 
government. Thus, Alexander’s interview with the founder of British Guiana’s first trade union 
reinforced American labor leaders’ views that the PPP sought to destroy free labor. 
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Finally Alexander turned to Commissioner of Labor William Bissell for an evaluation of 
Guianese labor relations. Bissell suggested that workers failed to appreciate the usefulness of 
organized labor unconnected to the Legislative Assembly and that as a result pro-government 
unions undermined the MPCA. He emphasized the need to build unions and the machinery for 
collective bargaining and also suggested, in what is a revealing expression of colonial thought, 
that Guianese workers had a tendency for dependence on government in the same way masters 
had previous cared for slaves or indentured servants.
143 
Bissell, the colonial authority on 
 
Guianese organized labor, confirmed to American labor leaders that establishing an institutional 
framework for post-colonial Guiana depended on active efforts to support the MPCA against 
more popular unions acting in collaboration with the PPP. 
Labor Conflict and the Suspension of the Waddington Constitution 
 
The PPP continued advocating the introduction of trade union methods designed to aid 
Guiana’s transition to socialism throughout the summer of 1953 while the TUC prepared to 
further its assistance to affiliated unions in the colony. In a speech to the World Congress of 
Women in Copenhagen in June, excerpted in the PPP’s periodical Thunder, Janet Jagan took care 
to note the lessons she learned from trade unionists during a visit to Rumania, specifically the 
“difference in the functions of trade unions existing in capitalist countries and those in the 
socialist countries.”
144   
The following month she further explained the benefits of Rumanian 
 
socialism and contrasted the shocking differences between workers’ standard of living in the 
socialist republic with that of workers in British Guiana.
145 
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writing the TUC allocated $3,000 toward an organizing campaign in British Guiana in July, 
though the money seems not to have been disseminated in the colony.
146
 
Colin Palmer’s Cheddi Jagan and the Politics of Power provides the most detailed 
explanation of negotiations and conflict between the SPA, GIWU, and PPP between June and 
October 1953. Palmer notes that on June 13, Aston Chase, the PPP Minister of Labor, met with 
W.A. Macnie, managing director for the SPA and recommended that the SPA recognize the 
GIWU, claiming that his office was overwhelmed with complaints from sugar workers who 
distrusted MPCA leadership. J.P. Lachmansingh, GIWU President and PPP Minister of Health, 
met informally with Macnie on July 13, warning him that some PPP and GIWU leaders hoped to 
gain recognition through industrial action rather than negotiation even though Lachmansingh 
opposed that strategy. On July 20 the SPA’s board of directors agreed that recognition of a PPP 
sponsored union was inevitable, though they preferred an “amalgamation” of the MPCA and 
GIWU similar to the policy Bissell suggested consistently since 1945. On July 21, Chase 
formally requested recognition of the GIWU apparently disregarding the suggestion of 
combining the MPCA and GIWU, a request the SPA responded to on August 20. Palmer 




Clem Seecharan argues that the SPA proposal agreed to recognize the GIWU the field workers 
who made up the majority of the plantation workforce with the understanding that the MPCA 
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While the SPA, PPP, and GIWU discussed the representation of sugar workers 
throughout the summer, British officials monitored developments in the colony. In July 1953 
W.H. Ingrams, Advisor on Overseas Information sent a top secret report to J.H. Peck in which he 
described the political situation in British Guiana. Ingrams argued that the PPP program was 
extremely left-wing in a manner that would be “acceptable to Communist tactics and ideology,” 
but that the Party did not openly advocate communism, unity with the Soviet Union to progress 
toward socialism, or even secession from the Commonwealth. However, based on Jagan’s 
Legislative Council speeches Ingrams expected the PPP to advocate for immediate self- 
government, secession from the Commonwealth, and close relations with the Soviet Union as 
time passed and the Party failed to achieve its objectives. While commending the achievements 
of institution-building in British Guiana, Ingrams suggested that the Jagans and the PPP exerted 
considerable influence over a number of important unions, including the colonial trade union 
center BGTUC, giving the communist voice “fairly effective control in the major trade unions.” 
He concluded that covert activities were “inevitable in the interests of the people themselves 
quite as much as in ours” and that “if we believe in the necessity and rightness of guiding people 
to self-government, we must also believe in the rightness of establishing as firmly as we can the 
way of life which we consider valuable as offering in the long run the best sort of life to the 
individual.” Ingrams’s recommendations included assisting trade unions and developing a covert 




British intelligence reports disagreed on the extent of communism in British Guiana, 
though the Special Branch (MI5) emphasized that the PPP’s international communist contacts 
suggested a communist core at the center of the PPP. MI5 reports noted foreign newspaper 
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articles suggesting that Janet Jagan was a Moscow-trained agent and intercepted letters from 
Caribbean Communists, such as Desmond Buckle, congratulating the Jagans on establishing a 
communist government in 1953.
150 
British intelligence reports determined that the PPP was 
divided into communist and non-communist leadership severely strained along ideological lines. 
A May 1953 report from the Security Liaison Office in Jamaica to the Director General of MI5 
divided the PPP into “Communist” and “Moderate ‘self-government’” sections that hinted at the 
possibility of manipulating ideological differences within the Guianese leadership to establish a 
government amenable to British objectives.
151 
The contents of the report drew from information 
from the commissioner of police in British Guiana. The account formed the basis of the Colonial 
Office interpretation of Guianese leaders until the late 1950s, and Foreign Office and American 
views into the 1960s.
152 
On July 7 the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) informed Governor 
Savage that a message from Sydney King to the WFTU confirmed his collaboration with 




In a report titled “Propaganda and Special Operations in British Guiana,” Ingrams 
 
acknowledged that Soviet communist connections were incidental and that anti-communist 
programs needed to be designed to meet domestic challenges. He suggested that the most 
effective program of “political warfare” against domestic “political extremism” would be to find 
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and exploit the ideological line that divided the members of the PPP and launch a propaganda 
campaign designed to “meet the threat of British Guiana falling under Communist influence or 
control.”
154 
Ingrams suggested that the program “might be used for advising and guiding any 
non-governmental operations.” Since the MPCA did not conform to PPP policy, Ingrams 
advocated increased support for the MPCA, which he noted was affiliated to ORIT and the 
ICFTU “with no practical advantage to be gained” from the relationship. He argued that “what is 
really necessary is that the British TUC itself should take a much more direct interest in the 
Caribbean Trade Unions.” Ingrams’s emphasized that “If there is scope for organizing trade 
unions or for guiding existing unions it seems highly desirable to try to interest TUC direct (and 
not via ICFTU) from inside the colony.”
155 
Thus, in July 1953 British intelligence officials began 
planning to use the MPCA as a weapon in a program of political warfare against the GIWU and 
PPP. 
Colonial governor Alfred Savage agreed with Ingrams’s “penetrating analysis of the 
background situation” in British Guiana, though he suggested that Ingrams underestimated the 
PPP’s efforts to subvert the Constitution and some specific leaders use of their position to 
“further the Communist cause in every way possible.”
156 
R.H. Young, an Assistant Public 
Relations Adviser in the Colonial Office, wrote to Savage on August 27 emphasizing that the 
most effective way to counter communist infiltration was a program designed to convince 
colonists of the benefits of affiliation with Great Britain rather than to attack Communism since 
few Guianese leaders admitted to being communists.
157 
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possibility of building political opposition within British Guiana, though the most direct means 
of offering political resistance to the PPP and simultaneously convincing the Guianese of the 
practical benefits of maintaining relations with Great Britain was through the pro-British trade 
unions. Labor unrest erupted two days after Young’s telegram before Savage could implement a 
program to counter the PPP. Meanwhile, William Maddox, the American Consul in Port-of- 
Spain, Trinidad, reported to the State Department on July 30 that exploitation of differences of 
ideological viewpoints within the PPP was a development that “will be watched closely,” 




Maddox’s assessment confirmed Robert Alexander’s conclusion that the disagreement 
between Burnham and Jagan may be “the rock upon which the bark of the PPP splits.”
159 
Maddox’s report was an evaluation of PPP efforts to reform the secondary educational system 
that is outside the scope of this dissertation; nonetheless, brief attention to his criticism of the 
program is illuminating. Maddox discussed the “well-known” communist tendencies of leading 
Party members, specifically Brindley Benn, as well as the incorporation of Eastern European 
publications in Guianese schools. More telling, however, is Maddox’s conclusion that “the 
prescription of a Government-approved text-book for a course in Civics will ensure that young 
students receive inculcation in P.P.P. doctrines—nationalist, anti-imperialist, and socialist, even 
when not communist.”
160 
Alfred Savage expressed a similar fear that “the foundations of society 
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a Pioneer Youth Movement as a PPP alternative to the Boy Scouts, Girl Guides, and YMCA.
161 
Thus, a great deal of Anglo-American opposition to the PPP derived from a general hesitation 
toward the decolonization of Guianese institutions in a manner that challenged Anglo-American 
objectives with potential economic socialization and international communist associations the 
most aggressive forms of institutional reorganization. PPP leaders noted this dynamic in a 
pamphlet entitled “History of the PPP” which suggested that the labor bill and educational 
reforms were the two issues that most angered “the former ruling clique.”
162
 
Thus by late-August 1953 the PPP increasingly pressured for the establishment of a 
 
reorganized system of labor relations based on party-led trade unions that could assist in moving 
toward the establishment of socialism in the colony. British officials from several agencies 
watched uneasily considering how they might act to strengthen the institutions designed to 
counter social revolution in British Guiana. In this context of labor unrest and conflict between 
the colonial administration, British economic interests, and Guianese nationalists for control of 
the institutions of organized labor, the left-coalition of Guianese leaders began an aggressive 
push in August 1953 that coordinated industrial protest and legislative action in an attempt to 
break the labor movement from external control. 
On August 31, the GIWU called a strike, the goals of which were initially unclear and not 
negotiated prior to the walk-off. Participants and scholars struggled to explain the GIWU’s 
motives; however, they generally agree that Sydney King, the PPP Minister for Communications 
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King occupied an important position within the PPP as one of the most left-leaning 
party members and an acknowledged communist. Clem Seecharan suggests that after speaking 
with King the only logical explanation behind his actions seemed to be as a means of keeping the 
PPP focused on the class struggle at a time when racial issues threatened to undermine the 
party’s unity. Seecharan also suggests that King’s instigation of the strike may have been an 
effort to continue waging a struggle against the institutional framework of colonial capitalism.
164 
The SPA accused the strike of being politically motivated since negotiations with Chase toward a 
settlement were ongoing and it is noteworthy that Chase criticized the decision to strike as ill- 
conceived “extreme left-adventurism” within the PPP in a 1994 book.
165 
Colin Palmer suggests 
that GIWU leaders’ decision resulted from overconfidence that they could force a showdown to 
win their demands without compromising because they had PPP support.
166 
In response, the SPA 
immediately began mobilizing opposition to the strike in British Guiana and London through the 
West India Committee while refusing Savage’s request that the sugar producers resume the 
scuttled negotiations with Chase.
167
 
According to Ashton Chase, strike leaders articulated two goals, better wages and 
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field and factory workers formerly represented by the MPCA in mid-September.
168 
Palmer, 
however, suggests that the GIWU did not include recognition in its initial list of demands when 
they were presented on September 5, though he acknowledges it was clearly the central issue. 
William Christensen of the State Department’s Office of British Commonwealth and Northern 
European Affairs cabled his superior, Hayden Raynor, on September 18 and noted that PPP 
ministers offered different reasons for the strike. According to Christensen, Lachmansingh 
suggested the strike was for recognition while King insisted it was a disagreement over working 
conditions.
169 
Colonial Office and State Department officials expressed considerable suspicion 
that the PPP instigated the strike as a means of subverting the Waddington Constitution as a 




Meanwhile, the MPCA did not comment on the unrest until September 17 when they 
 
criticized GIWU failure to follow trade union procedures and for encouraging disorder.
171 
MPCA leaders defended their previous collective bargaining agreements arguing that the sugar 
industry could not sustain more drastic wage increases and criticized the strike as a blatant effort 
for recognition of a rival organization. Maddox reported on the MPCA position to the State 
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were also ministers in the PPP government.
172 
Palmer notes that Savage’s efforts to end the strike 
failed because of PPP-GIWU collaboration in forcing the issue of unqualified recognition and  
the SPA’s refusal to concede to GIWU demands until the strike was ended.
173 
He suggests that 
GIWU tactics, particularly initiating the strike while negotiations were ongoing, divided the PPP 
since some party leaders, including Chase and Lachmansingh disagreed with the strike. 
Moreover, Palmer suggests that the turmoil and the union’s inconsistent explanations for the 




Colonial officials concluded in mid-September that the constitutional suspension they 
 
began discussing in July was necessary since “an important section of the People’s Progressive 
Party” was “trying to turn the territory into a Republic completely independent of the United 
Kingdom with a Communist political bias and leaning towards Russia rather than the West in 
international affairs.” J.W. Vernon of the Colonial Office argued that the PPP was “increasing 
their hold over labor through the trade unions they control” to achieve their subversive objective 
and he elaborated on possible justifications for suspension while acknowledging that the action 
itself was undemocratic. Vernon suggested that intervention could be justified based on five 
broad ideas. First he suggested that financial consequences derived from the PPP’s economic 
policy justified colonial intervention to “protect them from their own folly.” Second, Vernon 
suggested that PPP policies obstructed raw material exports and thus were an international issue 
requiring the governor to intervene. Third, he suggested that British failure to act would 
encourage “communism in other B.W.I. territories would have serious repercussions.” Forth, he 
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argued that “the appearance of an overtly communist regime in British Guiana and its use as a 
communist centre would embarrass the U.K.” and inhibit relations with the United States and in 
the Western Hemisphere. Finally, Vernon insisted that the establishment of a communist 
government would undermine “law, order, justice and democratic rights as we know them.” 
Vernon concluded that the sugar strike “may well provide an opportunity” to justify suspension 
of the constitution and that “there can be no doubt any such opportunity should be vigorously 
seized.” Failure to intervene, he argued, would make it “necessary to take action on a matter 
which is trivial in itself but which is felt to be the ‘sticking point’ beyond which Ministers cannot 
be allowed to go.”
175 
Thus, the Colonial Office began searching for an incident to justify the 
 
PPP’s removal and the re-imposition of direct rule in British Guiana as PPP efforts gain control 
of institutionalized labor peaked in intensity. 
On September 22, several other unions joined the sugar workers walking off of their jobs 
in sympathy strikes while Savage worried that the protests would continue to spread to workers 
in other occupations throughout the colony.
176 
Significantly, Cheddi Jagan, Chief Minister of the 
government and head of the PPP, and Forbes Burnham, the second highest-ranking member of 
the party, led the sympathy strikers. Writing from Trinidad, however, Maddox noted that 
“Reports generally agree that large numbers of sugar workers had to be threatened and cajoled to 
join the strike.” 
177 
Most Guianese news sources during the early 1950s were financed by sugar 
companies or the PPP and the objectivity of reports making it out of the colony is open to 
question; however, American policymakers depended on Guianese news sources since there was 
no consul in British Guiana and British officials often intentionally offered only limited 
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information about the colony. Consequently, American officials operated under the assumption 
that the PPP was using force to mobilize workers in the colony and reports to that end reached at 
least Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Dulles sent Maddox copies of United States labor law 
on September 28 when it became clear that the PPP leaders planned to introduce legislation to 
achieve the institutional changes the strike failed to produce.
178
 
PPP leaders, United States government officials, and American labor leaders’ responded 
 
to the crisis consistently with their overall objectives. Janet Jagan argued that the MPCA’s 
failure to push for more drastic improvements evidenced their position as a “company union” 
insufficiently militant in its demand for workers’ rights and thus had to be replaced. The GIWU 
and BGTUC agreed that conditions on sugar estates were deplorable and that more effective 
negotiating was necessary.
179 
Additionally, PPP leaders argued that trade unionists should be 
appointed to chair committees in its government rather private citizens who were likely to be 
employed by influential businesses as a means of weighing policy in favor of the working class, 
procuring meaningful social change, and creating a balanced legislative environment.
180 
William 
Christenson warned the State Department that the thought of the strikes generating instability in 
the rest of the Caribbean was “disturbing to contemplate.” Christenson also expressed concern 
about the financial impact of unrest on British Guiana.
181
 
American labor leaders expressed concern regarding the failure to follow accepted 
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GIWU as the sole negotiating agent of workers which would displace the MPCA and directly 
challenge ORIT and American labor influence in the colony. American labor leaders also 
expressed concern that the relationship between the GIWU and PPP government did not allow 
for trade unions’ independence. The president of the GIWU, for example, Dr. Lachmansingh, 
held the position of Minister of Health and Housing and was a ranking member of the PPP. 
Moreover, Lachmansingh had been temporarily expelled from the PPP in August 1951 for acting 
against a decision of the party’s General Council while president of the GIWU, further calling 
into question the independence of his union from the PPP.
182 
PPP leaders argued that attempts to 
 
establish a unified, decolonized Guianese movement to increase pressure on the sugar producers 
for improved working conditions necessitated the removal of the existing union. However, 
efforts to remove the MPCA generated instability, which conflicted with the interests of the 
United States government while both the removal of an ORIT affiliated organization and the 
system of trade union-government relations the PPP pursued conflicted with the aims of 
American organized labor. Failure to force capitulation from the SPA by the time the strike was 
called off on September 24 drove the PPP to pursue the legislative action that was used as the 
justification for British suspension of the constitution on October 9. 
The PPP proposed a Labor Relations Bill similar to Cheddi Jagan’s proposed legislation 
introduced in 1949 and 1952 as a result of the impasse between the GIWU and sugar 
producers.
183 
PPP leaders argued that the bill was based on the 1935 Wagner Act that was the 
basis of labor law in the United States; however, Cheddi Jagan noted in hindsight that the bill 
differed from American legislation in that it did not incorporate the “Taft-Hartley portion” of 
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amendments that altered American labor relations in 1947.
184 
More importantly, as Colin Palmer 
notes, the bill deviated considerably from British trade union practices.
185 
The manner in which 
the bill was proposed and the legislation’s implications on government-labor relations led to 
dysfunction in the Guianese government and solidified British and American labor leaders’ 
opposition. George Woodcock, Assistant General Secretary of the TUC, noted that the PPP 
introduced the bill without consulting the trade unions or employers, presented the legislation 
with no discussion, and proposed it as a consequence of the failed GIWU strike.
186 
Robert 
Alexander was exceptional among labor leaders in the 1950s in comparing the American and 
Guianese legislation favorably; however, he interpreted the PPP’s legislative tactics as evidence 
of a militant plot to take control of the labor movement.
187
 
Ashton Chase authored the legislation and on September 24 Chase and Burnham moved 
 
to suspend the Standing Rules and Orders of the House to allow the bill to be introduced and 
passed on the same day. Sir Eustance Woolford, Speaker of the House, refused the motion and 
ruled that the proposal would follow normal legislative procedures. When Burnham suggested 
that normal procedures on his particular request were to submit the proposal to the House, 
Woolford refused and insisted “that is the case in ordinary matters” but “in the case of this bill he 
did not think hasty action was advisable.” In response, Burnham and most of the PPP ministers 
and other party representatives walked out of the proceedings in protest to the ruling and 
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Cheddi Jagan was absent from the proceedings that day, thus Burnham’s assumption of authority over the PPP. It 
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noise from the ensuing protests forced the legislature to suspend its activities for the remainder 
of the day and instability resulting from the shutdown worried American officials that the recent 
tensions could erupt into a more widespread crisis.
189 
On September 29 the Standing Rules were 




On September 24, the day the PPP walked out of the legislature, Oliver Lyttleton, 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, wrote to Savage expressing his conviction that the PPP was 
“seeking a one party totalitarian control of the country and a link-up with Russia which we 
obviously cannot contemplate.” Lyttleton argued that reports of the mid-September sympathy 
strikes “complete[d] the justification for immediate action” and that “I have decided this latest 
development makes a break inevitable and that we must now act against” the PPP ministers. He 
suggested Savage “place the dangerous leaders of the PPP under restraint and raid their premises 
for incriminating documents” as soon as adequate forces were available to maintain law and 
order.
191 
Lyttleton wrote a memorandum to the Colonial Office on September 25, which he sent 
 
on September 30, to make arrangements for troops and to prepare the legal justification for 
emergency powers necessary to secure British Guiana after a suspension of the constitution in 
early October.
192 
Thus, the British officials decided to suspend the constitution in British Guiana 
before the Labor Relations Bill was introduced in the House of Assembly and the suspension 




whereabouts given that the Labor Relations Bill was the culmination of the PPP’s program. Regardless of how the 
party’s objectives are interpreted, it is obvious that party members appreciated the magnitude of the bill even if they 
did not expect the extent of the British reaction. 
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The bill itself generated further controversy that is illuminating in its implications in the 
debate for institutional decolonization in British Guiana after 1953. Maddox pointed out that, 
despite similarities between American labor practices and the bill’s proposed methods for 
recognizing unions, the legislation appropriated considerably more discretionary powers in the 
hands of the Minister of Labor, Ashton Chase, than what was permitted under the American 
model. The bill also proposed giving more power to the Minister than Jagan’s proposed 1952 bill 
which vested discretionary powers in the hands of a British official, the Commissioner of Labor. 
In light of the fact that three of the six ministers retained positions as presidents of trade unions 
and a forth was an active protagonist in the strikes, Maddox informed the State Department that 
impartiality and neutral enforcement “could hardly be expected.”
193   
Passage of the bill, Maddox 
 
concluded, “would almost certainly” result in “the establishment or consolidation of PPP 
controlled trade unions in every major occupation.”
194
 
Leo Despres argues in Cultural Pluralism and Nationalist Politics in British Guiana that 
the bill effectively gave the Minister of Labor, and thus the PPP, “control of the whole trade 
union movement,” and the Marxists within the party access to the Guianese masses necessary “to 
control the nationalist movement almost completely.”
195 
Stephen Rabe disagrees with criticisms 
of the bill and argues in U.S. Intervention in British Guiana that even if the bill sought the 
replacement of the MPCA with the GIWU, it was democratically sound. Moreover, Rabe argues 
that bill’s requirement of a 65% vote of workers for certification of a union, rather than the 51% 
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WFTU allegations in the United Nations, however, the British government suggested that the bill 
compelled employers to recognize all unions supported by 52% of workers in an industry.
197 
Cheddi Jagan suggested that the bill varied in the percentage of votes required to achieve union 




The TUC also opposed the content of the Labor Relations Bill. George Woodcock argued 
 
that the bill was objectionable to British trade union principles particularly in its empowerment 
of the Minister of Labor to determine who was classified as a worker for purposes of the ballot to 
determine recognition. Woodcock also argued that the bill’s justification of mechanisms to 
determine jurisdictional disputes between “rival unions” obscured that its purpose was to replace 
the MPCA, which he noted was an established and not a rival union. He further argued that the 
bill’s claims to be based on United States labor legislation ignored that American labor laws did 
not permit jurisdictional strikes for recognition where a union was already recognized. Finally, 
Woodcock pointed out that United States law limited the length of strikes and allowed national 




It is significant that, as Jagan noted, the PPP’s bill did not include the Taft-Hartley 
amendments that altered United States labor law in 1947 and which American labor leaders 
referred to as a “slave labor law.”
200 
Nelson Lichtenstein suggests in The Most Dangerous Man 
in Detroit that the 1935 Wagner Act on which the Guianese bill was loosely based was possibly 
the most radical piece of legislation in United States history—and as Jagan noted the American 
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labor law was altered in 1947.
201 
Moreover, as Jennifer Luff argues in Commonsense 
Anticommunism, most unionists in the United States supported the Wagner Act; however, many 
influential labor leaders across the political spectrum expressed skepticism at the degree of state 
oversight in the legislation. Many labor conservatives, she argues, offered only tentative support 
for the bill or opposed aspects of it outright. At the same time, the general public’s support for 
the Wagner Act was inconsistent.
202 
Considering the broader context of the United States law 
suggests that it is misleading to reduce American policymakers’ and labor leaders’ opposition to 
the Guianese bill to merely a simplistic attack on the PPP. In fact, similarities between the 
Guianese bill and the Wagner Act may have acted to reinforce some American labor leaders’ 
suspicions that the PPP was moving toward an unacceptable centralization of authority in the 
state. Thus, the PPP’s trade union ideology reinforced American preconceptions about its 
political orientation. 
Most importantly, the PPP’s bill was passed in a colonial territory in a Cold War context 
rather than at the height of the depression in the United States and Anglo-American objections to 
the bill are most effectively understood in that context. As Gerald Horne notes in Cold War in a 
Hot Zone even though the bill was democratically-based and democratically-proposed, the 
concept of colonial democracy was the “ultimate oxymoron” and the Colonial Office never 
intended the introduction of the Waddington Constitution to be the advent of complete self- 
government in British Guiana.
203 
Thus, the bill was objectionable to British and American trade 
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was acceptable to British and American officials while attempting to establish a form of trade 
unionism that differed considerably from British or American trade union practices. In other 
words, it sought to decolonize labor institutions from the capitalist-British model of labor 
relations rather than decolonize Guianese society within the British model. 
The Labor Relations Bill was eventually introduced on September 29 and passed on 
October 8; however, the culmination of tensions and fear of communist infiltration in the British 
Guianese government resulted in the landing of British soldiers and suspension of the 
Constitution the following day.
204 
Within two weeks British and American government officials 
began discussing how to strengthen the MPCA and initially suggested working through the 
ICFTU.
205 
The intervention, rationalized in a 1954 White Paper as necessary to stop a communist 
takeover of the colony, was in part a response to fear of communist expansion into British 
Guiana; however, it was more broadly a reluctance to grant independence to a territory without 
first establishing the structural mechanisms through which the British could retain post-colonial 
control. 
Response to the Suspension and Conclusions 
 
PPP actions during their 133 days in office in 1953 are most effectively understood as the 
culmination of a seven-year-long effort to alter the institutional basis of organized labor in 
British Guiana. PPP leaders’ actions were consistent with the program left-leaning Guianese 
leaders’ undertook beginning in 1946 and were not a momentary spurt of overzealous activity by 
newly empowered colonial ministers. The Guianese left pursued a form of institutional 
reorganization, which necessitated a fundamental break from the Colonial Office’s instilled trade 
 
204 
Lily Ramcharan. “Cold War in British Guiana 1953-1966: The Trade Union Dimension,” The Round Table, Vol. 
94, No. 1, 113-128, January 2005. 
205 
Memorandum of Conversation, Sir Archibald Gordon, Labor Counselor, British Embassy and Daniel Horowitz 
Labor Advisor, Bureau of European Affairs, October 20, 1953, 841D.062/10-2053, Central Decimal Files, Box 
4814, RG 59, NARA II. 
226  
union practices as a precursor to the establishment of Guianese socialism. PPP leaders pursued a 
cooperative but party centered relationship with trade unions that retained connections to the 
WFTU and did not affiliate with the ICFTU or ORIT. Their pursuit of institutional 
reorganization and the development of a unity between the House of Assembly and militant 
minded labor organizations was a necessity in their push for deeper reforms. However, not all of 
the left-coalition agreed with the methods employed in seeking to supplant the MPCA in 1953 
and schisms emerged within the PPP based on leaders’ seeming attempt to subordinate the trade 
union movement to the party. 
Such a unification of party, government, and labor, however, was anathema to American 
labor leaders and British officials. The combination of the emerging government-labor 
relationship based on an explicitly stated intention to pursue social revolution convinced 
American officials observing the situation that there existed an existential threat to the capitalist 
system in British Guiana. While the United States government was not party to the suspension, 
Maddox approvingly speculated that Savage would consider instituting a state of emergency by 
September 23.
206 
Thus, American labor leaders opposed what they deemed to be subversion of 
 
independent labor and both labor leaders and American government officials concluded that the 
PPP was a threat to foreign capital investment and democratic government. 
The TUC’s role in the aftermath of the constitution’s suspension is significant. The 
Colonial Office aggressively sought cooperation from British labor and implored them to play a 
larger role in the colony in July 1953; however, British officials’ expectations for the TUC role 
in British Guiana drifted toward the pursuit of political subversion rather than institution- 
building. In October Oliver Lyttleton reminded Vincent Tewson of the TUC’s objection to the 
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Labor Bill’s proposed empowerment of the Minister of Labor and PPP contacts with the WFTU 
when he asked TUC General Secretary to nominate one of the three members of the Commission 
of Inquiry appointed to investigate the crisis and determine the Colonial Office’s course of action 
in British Guiana. Lyttleton’s direct appeal to the TUC underscores the importance the Colonial 
Office placed on the TUC’s role in decolonization.
207 
The TUC also indirectly supported the 
suspension on October 29 when the General Council issued a circular to all affiliated unions 
opposing Cheddi Jagan’s attempt to speak to trade unionists in London. The circular articulated 
several points of opposition to the PPP government including ministers’ affiliation with the 
WFTU and the Labor Relations Bill. TUC leaders also dismissed the Caribbean Labor Congress 
through which Jagan reached out to British unions as a communist-controlled organization.
208
 
Discussions in the State Department also tended toward the conclusion that the situation 
 
in British Guiana necessitated “a special effort…to strengthen the anti-communist trade union 
forces as a major part of strengthening of democratic forces in opposition to the Communists.” 
State Department officials determined that “it is imperative that the Manpower Citizens 
Association be strengthened” and that “outside assistance might best take the form of assignment 
by the British TUC of a competent representative, preferably under ICFTU auspices to work 
directly with the non-communist trade union forces in Guiana.” Lincoln Gordon, Chief of the 
United States Mutual Security Agency mission in the United Kingdom, suggested he meet with 
Sir Arthur Deakin of the British Transport Workers to discuss the matter when Deakin was in 
Washington for the International Transport Workers meeting.
209 
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James Barry of the Bureau of the Budget on November 13 to begin discussions of funding 
Foreign Operations Administration (FOA) programs in the colony at the request of Archie 
Campbell of the British Embassy. Christensen suggested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff “highly 
valued” the strategically important Caribbean region and that technical assistance could help 
counter communism in the volatile area.
210 
Thus, in late 1953 both the Colonial Office and State 
Department encouraged the TUC to increase its role in institutional decolonization in British 
Guiana while working to increase American influence in the colony. 
In November, the TUC issued a second circular to affiliated unions reserving judgment 
on the colonial policy in Guiana but criticizing the PPP “which had no scruples in seeking to 
subject trade unions to their own political ends” and appointing Assistant General Secretary 
George Woodcock to the Commission of Inquiry.
211 
The PPP’s attempt at institutional 
reorganization through domestic labor relations and international associations contributed to the 
TUC’s ambiguous response to the regressive policy toward British Guiana in London. In 
discussing the suspension with Winston Churchill on October 13, Lyttleton assured the Prime 
Minister that opposition from the Labor Party in the House of Commons “would not be united in 
condemning the action which the Government had taken in this matter” because of PPP policy 
toward the trade union movement and association with the WFTU.
212 
Thus, the PPP’s trade 
union policies impacted British domestic politics and shaped the response from the Labor Party 
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Conversely, American trade unionists had been actively involved in British Guiana 
throughout 1953 and thought their government was remiss in underappreciating the potential for 
communist subversion in the colony, Maddox’s discussions with the State Department 
notwithstanding. It is also significant that the GIWU remained the strongest union in the colony 
despite early TUC, Colonial Office, AFL, ICFTU, and ORIT financing for programs designed to 
strengthen the MPCA. 
Ultimately, the PPP’s ascension and the conflicts that led to the suspension of the 
constitution in 1953 are best understood as part of institutional decolonization. Guianese leaders 
conflicted over the nature of their increasingly autonomous society and sought to establish the 
institutional structures that would fortify the social and political-economic institutions necessary 
for the type of post-colonial system they envisioned for the territory. A left-coalition led efforts 
to institutionally restructure the colony intending to break from Anglo-American control through 
the establishment of socialism in British Guiana and increased affiliation with Eastern-bloc 
countries and international organizations abroad. Their objective was to establish mechanisms 
that could be used as the base for social revolution in the colony. 
Domestic opponents of the PPP worked to build institutions based on British or American 
models to establish a capitalist-democratic system in which their organizations could exact 
reforms from employers. Simultaneously, British and American policymakers and labor leaders, 
especially in the Colonial Office and AFL, sought to establish British-modeled trade unions and 
integrate colonial unions into Western-capitalist international labor organizations. A period of 
conflict between Guianese leaders and external actors unfolded between 1946 and 1953 that 
culminated when the PPP assumed office and began the process of institutional decolonization 
on its terms. Domestic opponents and British officials resisted the left-coalition’s efforts by 
230  
forcefully removing the PPP government from power and dissolving left-led trade unionism in 
British Guiana. Pointedly, Oliver Lyttleton admitted to Prime Minister Winston Churchill on 
October 13 that there was no threat of a Communist coup and that the constitution was 
suspended “to secure law & order while Comm. Ministers were removed.”
213 
Thus, the Colonial 
Office’s fear was not that the PPP was about to directly impose a communist government in 
British Guiana, but that the institutions holding Guianese society together were incapable of 
inhibiting the PPP from progressing toward that end with popular support over time. 
The first phase of institutional decolonization that began with the expansion of Colonial 
Office-TUC programs and the establishment of the PAC in 1946 ended when colonial officials 
realized the institutional structures they established in coordination with the MPCA and like- 
minded colonists were not a strong enough bulwark to stop the push for the greater social 
changes advanced by the left-coalition of Guianese leaders. The suspension of the Waddington 
Constitution disrupted left-coalition efforts at joining legislative and trade union activity to 
restructure Guianese society and set the stage for the second phase of institutional decolonization 
























Cabinet Minute by Oliver Lyttleton, October 13, 1953, CAB/195/11, BNA. 
 
Chapter 6: Checking the Excesses of Democracy: International Institution-Building in 
British Guiana from 1954 to 1957 
 
The paradoxical effort to establish democratic institutions for the purpose of changing the 
will of the Guianese people shaped Anglo-American institution-building projects in British 
Guiana between 1954 and 1957. The Guianese labor movement made progress toward 
establishing functional capitalist-democratic trade unions despite Anglo-American efforts to use 
institution-building to expand their respective nations’ influence and weaken Jagan. Nonetheless, 
the Jagan faction of the People’s Progressive Party (PPP) achieved electoral victory in August 
1957. Anglo-American labor leaders and policymakers lamented the election’s outcome; 
however, British and American interpretations of the institution-building effort differed. Colonial 
officials and British trade union leaders considered the programs a qualified success while 
American political and labor leaders concluded that institution-building efforts were a failure. 
Consequently, Colonial Office and TUC activities in British Guiana differed from American 
activities in the colony after August 1957. 
George Woodcock, Assistant General Secretary of the Trades Union Congress (TUC), 
was one of three members of the Robertson Commission that investigated the Waddington 
Constitution’s suspension in October 1953. Woodcock played a critical role in designing and 
implementing British development efforts in Guiana between 1954 and 1957. His retrospective 
explanation of colonial trade unions as “effective checks on the excess of democracy” 
illuminates the purpose and negative consequences of Anglo-American involvement in the 
Guianese labor movement during the second phase of institutional decolonization in British 
Guiana.
1 





Mr. Parry, signed by L.T. Stapleton to Mr. Foggon, “Draft of Notes from establishment of O.E.F.-T.U.C 
Committee,” April 1, 1959, CO 859-1118, British National Archives, Kew, Richmond, Surrey, (hereafter BNA). 
British and American discussions regarding the outcome of elections in British Guiana on August 12, 1957 provide 
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1953 and August 1957 and during that time myriad international actors carried out programs 
designed to strengthen moderate, pro-Western trade unions and counter the popular appeal of the 
left-wing of the PPP.  Institution-building efforts aimed at strengthening the foundations of 
democracy and capitalism in British Guiana; however, as Philip Rogers of the Colonial Office 
bluntly acknowledged, the primary objective of colonial policy in British Guiana after October 




Therefore, Woodcock’s emphasis on the Guianese labor movement’s role in protecting 
British interests in preparation for Guianese independence rather than as an expression of 
democratic voice in a capitalist society conformed to widely-held British plans regarding the 
most effective means of decolonizing colonial institutions. The institution-building project in 
British Guiana reinforced Secretary of State for the Colonies James Griffiths’ late-1951 
statements arguing that British colonial policy aimed at “as rapidly as possible build[ing] up in 
each territory the institutions which its circumstances require” to give colonial peoples “ a sense 
of belonging” in preparation for self-government.
3 
Ultimately, the Colonial Office engaged in 
 
institution-building to establish a capitalist-democratic political-economic system that protected 
British interests in British Guiana in the long-term; however, the promotion of democracy was 
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Analysis of TUC records heretofore unexamined and their juxtaposition with previously 
scrutinized materials suggests that Guianese unionists aggressively courted Western support and 
drove the process of institution-building in British Guiana to a greater degree than is represented 
in the existing scholarship. Close reading of the TUC materials also suggests that the literature 
does not adequately quantify the gains moderate unionists made within the existing political- 
economic system between 1954 and 1957. Nonetheless, international efforts did not alleviate 
Guiana’s poverty rapidly enough to undermine the PPP’s electoral support. At the same time, 
increased transnational connections slowly alienated pro-Western trade union leaders from 
workers even as international relationships financially and legally stabilized the movement. 
Consequently, the PPP returned to the head of government after elections in August 1957 and the 
strengthened trade union movement turned to anti-democratic practices to oppose the PPP. 
The second phase of institutional decolonization in British Guiana that took place 
between 1954 and 1961 was the most important period in determining the colony’s future. 
During the seven year period, Guianese trade union leaders and Anglo-American trade unionists, 
government officials, and employers established important legislative and procedural advances 
that strengthened the reformist labor movement in the colony. At the same time, MPCA leaders’ 
exclusion of PPP members from participation in the union, and the AFL-CIO’s short-sighted 
institution-building tactics, contributed to alienating an anti-democratic reformist labor 
movement from its constituents in British Guiana. Meanwhile, the PPP’s inability to work from 
within the sugar union fueled the drive for an alternative union and political action to replace the 
MPCA. Thus, the third phase of institutional decolonization that unfolded between 1962 and 
1964 was a direct result of failed institution-building in the second half of the 1950s. 
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Nonetheless, most scholarly historical studies of British Guiana’s decolonization focus on 
the 1953 suspension of the Waddington Constitution and covert American subversion of the PPP 
government between 1961 and 1964. The political scientist Matthew Lange points out there is a 
strong correlation between the nature of colonial rule and long-term development, political 
inclusivity, and stability in post-colonial societies. Specifically, Lange argues that directly ruled 
colonies such as British Guiana tended to establish effective bureaucratic and institutional 
structures. Guyana, Lange argues, is exceptional as a consequence of radical changes to the 
colony’s trajectory during the last two decades of colonial rule, what this dissertation refers to as 
the process of institutional decolonization.
4 
Throughout the second half of the 1950s British and 
 
American labor, political, and business leaders cooperated to build the Guianese trade union 
movement in order to establish the institutional framework for a capitalist, democratic post- 
colonial Guiana. Anglo-American leaders further aimed to integrate the Guianese labor 
movement into the Western liberal capitalist system in order to protect British and American 
interests. 
The historiography on the period between 1954 and 1959 explores the objectives of 
various parties involved in Guianese decolonization; however, it focuses on external efforts to 
counter popular support for Cheddi Jagan and the PPP. The most prominent study, Stephen 
Rabe’s U.S. Intervention in British Guiana, argues that British and American policymakers’ 
interpreted Jagan’s anti-colonial Marxism through a Cold War prism and determined to destroy 
the PPP.
5 
Similarly, Colin Palmer notes in Cheddi Jagan and the Politics of Power that the 
 
Robertson Commission, which investigated the Waddington Constitution’s suspension, 
recommended a period of “marking time in the advance toward self-government” to pursue 
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social and economic development and undermine Jagan’s popularity.
6 
Palmer echoes Rabe’s 
argument and suggests that various groups attempted to build power and oppose the Cheddi 
Jagan-led faction of the PPP between 1953 and 1960.
7 
Spencer Mawby’s Ordering Independence 
agrees with Rabe and Palmer that anti-communism shaped British interpretations of Jagan’s 
Marxism; however, Mawby notes that British trade unionists also opposed Jagan and the PPP out 
of a fear of disorderly decolonization.
8 
Thus, Mawby argues that the Colonial Office and TUC 





Clem Seecharan expands on Rabe’s argument, pointing out that Booker Brothers 
chairman Jock Campbell aggressively opposed the PPP and tried to establish an anti-Jagan 
alternative to the party between 1953 and 1956. However, Seecharan differs from Rabe and 
Palmer in arguing that Campbell agreed to work with Cheddi Jagan after the 1957 election and 
that Jagan’s doctrinaire Marxism undermined Campbell’s reform efforts leading to conflict 
between the PPP and British and American officials.
10 
Seecharan’s analysis of Booker Brothers’ 
 
efforts to support the Manpower Citizens’ Association (MPCA) on the sugar estates is important 
in acknowledging that institution-building efforts brought together employers, trade unions, and 
government agencies. British-owned businesses shared broad objectives with the Colonial Office 
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building efforts. The close association hints at the conservative nature of British programs that 
failed to address Guianese workers’ fundamental needs. In addition to British actors, American 
trade unionists and foreign operations officials, as well as representatives of the Western 
international labor organizations—the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions 
(ICFTU), Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers (ORIT), and Caribbean Area 
Division of ORIT (CADORIT)—also contributed to Guianese institution-building between 1954 
and 1957. 
Rabe suggests that, despite broadly shared objectives, colonial officials expressed 
considerable reservations regarding American influence in British Guiana before the Suez Crisis 
and Cuban Revolution ultimately undermined Anglo-American cooperation.
11 
Anglo-American 
competition in British Guiana was consistent with broader rivalry for post-colonial influence 
during the Eisenhower administration that complicated cooperative efforts in British colonies, 
particularly in labor movements, as Joey Long argues in Safe for Decolonization.
12 
Nonetheless, 
Anglo-American power struggles did not preclude cooperation in British Guiana.  Ultimately, the 
increased American role in British Guiana after 1953 is most effectively contextualized as part of 
a broader expansion of United States influence in the Caribbean that began in the 1930s and 
increased considerably during the mid-1950s. Carey Fraser’s Ambivalent Anti-Colonialism, 
Gerald Horne’s Cold War in a Hot Zone, and Jason Parker’s Brother’s Keeper all have 
considered the dynamics shaping the West Indies’ transition from British colonies to independent 
nations within what Parker refers to as an “American Lake.”
13 
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process unfolded in Singapore where American and British officials and labor leaders clashed at 




Most importantly, Palmer argues that the PPP’s Guianese opponents advocated 
 
limitations on political advancement and civil liberties even more aggressively than did British 
officials.
15 
Palmer’s analysis challenges Rabe’s depictions of anti-Jagan unionists as “timid” and 
“lethargic,” characterizations that TUC records suggest obscure the assertiveness of Guianese 
who courted external support and worked for improvements within the context of a British model 
of unionism.
16 
Nonetheless, Palmer suggests that the Colonial Office lamented Jagan’s expanded 
influence on sugar estates as early as mid-1955.
17 
The Jagans gained followers throughout the 
 
period. However, the PPP’s political influence did not translate into a trade union presence 
because of Anglo-American support for the MPCA, and MPCA leaders’ anti-democratic 
measures within the union. 
Origins and Background of the Second Phase of Institutional Decolonization in British 
Guiana 
 
The second phase of institutional decolonization in British Guiana began with the 
suspension of the Waddington Constitution in October 1953 as a way for the Colonial Office to 
remove suspected communists from government and regain control of the Guianese labor 
movement after trade union conflict disrupted the colony. Colonial Officials described the 
suspension as an opportunity to address the poverty and weak institutional structures that 
allowed the PPP to win political power and radically challenge the Guianese social order. Two 
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days after the suspension Governor Alfred Savage argued that a new constitution needed to be 
implemented and that the next phase of British rule should be of constructive progress rather 
than “marking time.”
18 
The Robertson Commission appropriated the phrase marking time to 
argue in favor of a period of pause in the advance toward self-government; however, it too 
emphasized that the interim government’s purpose was to promote social and political 
development to alter the views of the Guianese electorate.  Thus, the official British objective 
between the October 1953 suspension and the 1957 elections was to provide time for institution 
building to develop a capitalist system economically and politically connected to the British 
Commonwealth as British Guiana advanced toward self-government.
19
 
Colonial authorities levied a series of authoritarian measures to cripple the PPP in 
 
October 1953, including restricting freedom of speech and movement, while establishing an 
interim government designed to work in coordination with Anglo-American development and 
institution-building projects.
20 
The State Department and Colonial Office pushed to considerably 
increase British and American labor involvement in developing a pro-Western labor movement 
in the colony beginning in late 1953. Anglo-American trade union leaders traveled to British 
Guiana in early 1954 to evaluate the situation and in mid-1954 a variety of British and American 
institution-building programs began to take form. The American Federation of Labor (AFL) and 
Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) trained, financed, and advised Guianese trade union 
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British and American-led institution building projects in British Guiana were cautiously 
cooperative from their inception. Immediately following the suspension of the Waddington 
Constitution, Lincoln Gordon, Chief of the United States Mutual Security Agency mission in the 
United Kingdom, suggested allowing the TUC to take the lead in creating pro-Western trade 
unions aligned with the ICFTU and its hemispheric affiliate, ORIT.
22 
British and American 
institution-building tactics differed and aimed to advance national interests resulting in inter- 
union rivalry between the AFL-CIO and TUC. British government officials broadly criticized 
American institution-building projects in colonial areas in the late-1950s, suggesting that AFL- 
CIO activities impeded trade union development. British trade unionists and government 
officials alleged American labor leaders’ international agenda was an extension of official 
American policy as defined in the State Department and pursued through the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA). Most importantly, British officials accused American labor leaders of using 
bribery to build up privileged local leaders rather than constructing organized labor movements 
from the bottom up.
23 
Nonetheless, Anglo-American cooperation in British Guiana persisted 
despite British disagreement with AFL-CIO methods and anxiety regarding expanded American 
influence in British Guiana at the institutional level. 
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In addition to British and American collaboration, the suspension of the Waddington 
constitution led to a flurry of activity as Guianese activists and British employers responded to 
the crisis and labor unrest continued unabated. On October 10 the PPP initiated work stoppages 
on several sugar estates in protest of the suspension and the strikes lasted several weeks.
24 
Within 
days of its removal the PPP began printing and distributing handbills and propaganda through 
underground channels and initiated a program of civil resistance that led to the arrest of several 
prominent party members.
25 
Booker Brothers chairman Jock Campbell introduced several 
Guianese politicians to Labor and Conservative Party leaders in late October with assistance 
from the Colonial Office. Campbell suggested publicizing the exchange in London would help 
organize an “opposition” to counter the PPP.
26 
PPP contact with the World Federation of Trade 
Unions (WFTU) continued until Governor Alfred Savage banned all entry and distribution of 
WFTU publications on December 16.
27
 
Most importantly, conflicts between Guianese unionists persisted as they had in the late 
 
1940s in what British Guiana’s first Guianese Labor Commissioner James Ramphal referred to 
as a “continuous state of inter-union war.”
28 
The British Guiana Trade Union Council (BGTUC) 
disbanded in October 1953 citing communist infiltration and reorganized in early 1954 without 
the participation of the British Guiana Labor Union (BGLU) or Guiana Industrial Workers’ 
Union (GIWU). The BGLU and GIWU, two of the most important unions in the colony, refused 







political report by Sir A Savage on military intervention and its immediate aftermath, 
October 31, 1953, CO 1031/128, no 44, BDEEP. 
25 
Janet Jagan, “The Politics of Protest,” undated, Party Life, Cheddi Jagan Research Center (hereafter CJRC). 
26 
Colonial Office Minute, November 2, 1953, CO 1031-781, BNA. 
27 
Annex to letter from Ministry of Labor and National Service to A. McM. Webster, Colonial Office, July 1, 1954, 
CO 859-772, BNA; Palmer, Cheddi Jagan and the Politics of Power, 63-65. 
28 
James Ramphal, British Guiana Labor Commissioner, “Present and Future Outlook of the Trade Union 
Movement,” June 1954, CO 859-773, BNA. 
241  
Caribbean Labor Congress (CLC) or WFTU.
29 
The MPCA continued pressing the Sugar 
Producers’ Association (SPA) for a minimum weekly wage throughout November though no 
agreement was reached.
30 
MPCA General Secretary Sheik Shakoor traveled to Trinidad and met 
with Frank Walcott, Chairman of CADORIT, to discuss the situation in British Guiana in late 
December 1953. CADORIT officials noted the MPCA’s failure to secure workers’ support and 
determined that the union’s weakness derived from conservatism in the face of considerable 
poverty. Rather than overhauling the MPCA or suggesting policy changes, CADORIT produced 
10,000 pamphlets commending the MPCA’s aim of helping workers obtain economic security 
and political freedom in an attempt to help the Guianese sugar union gain grassroots support.
31
 
CADORIT likely understated the MPCA’s weakness and inefficiency in late 1953. Colin 
 
Palmer notes that increases in cost-of-living surpassed sugar workers’ modest wage gains 
between 1938 and 1954 providing evidence that material conditions for workers declined over 
time despite the MPCA’s officially recognized position as workers’ bargaining agent.
32 
Palmer 
argues that MPCA leaders’ policy proposals further undermined the union’s efforts to win the 
support of sugar workers. Palmer notes that the MPCA was part of the Joint Trade Union 
Committee (JTUC) along with the British Guiana Headmen’s Union, the British Guiana Sugar 
Estates Clerks Association, and the British Guiana and West Indies Sugar Boilers Union. The 
JTUC ostensibly acted as the unified representative of the colony’s 33,000 sugar estate workers 
in the early 1950s; however, the JTUC argued for policies that disempowered its constituency 
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despite negotiating for minor improvements to workers’ material conditions. Specifically, the 
JTUC argued for property or income restrictions to determine suffrage as a means of limiting 
sugar workers’ influence in electoral politics. The JTUC’s policy aimed at undermining the PPP 
after the Waddington Constitution’s suspension in 1953. Thus, as Colin Palmer argues, the 





Anglo-American efforts to strengthen the MPCA and pro-Western trade unions beginning 
in 1954 benefited from several changes in Guianese labor leadership and the GIWU’s 
considerable loss of influence after the PPP’s removal.
34   
First, the Colonial Office promoted 
Ramphal to Commissioner of Labor after repeated demands for “Guianization” of official 
positions despite skepticism that his East Indian background compromised his impartiality.
35 
Notwithstanding colonial officials’ initial uncertainty, Ramphal advocated a form of Guianese 
organized labor based on British trade unionism, encouraged educational exchanges between 
Guianese and British trade unionists, and won George Woodcock’s approbation for his overall 
cooperation with the TUC.
36
 
Second, Rupert Tello, former president of the MPCA, ascended to the position of General 
 
Secretary in the BGTUC in 1955 and assumed a position in the interim government.
37   
Governor 
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However, Tello played a central role in establishing connections between the BGTUC 
and the TUC, AFL-CIO, ORIT, and CADORIT. More significantly, Tello convinced British and 
American trade union leaders and government officials of his prominence in the Guianese labor 
movement and his shared views regarding the importance of capitalist development and free 
enterprise.
39 
Anglo-American officials’ trust allowed Tello to influence international 
interpretations of Guianese labor and political developments and use his overseas connections to 
pursue his own political objectives between 1954 and 1957. 
Finally, Richard Ishmael became the MPCA’s new president in early 1954. Ishmael, an 
East Indian Guianese educated at Gettysburg College in the United States, was an early member 
of the PPP who claimed that he left the party as a result of Cheddi Jagan’s communist views.
40 
Rabe notes that British officials regularly criticized Ishmael as an opportunist maneuvering for a 
future political position. However, as Colin Palmer suggests, Ishmael was an aggressive  
advocate of Guianese workers during the early part of his career.
41 
British officials’ and rival 
Guianese leaders’ criticisms obscured Ishmael’s activism as head of the MPCA between 1954 
and 1957 as well as the advancements the MPCA secured for sugar workers. As a result scholars 
fail to fully appreciate the importance of the MPCA’s policy shift after the August 1957 elections 
and the paradoxical effect of external assistance on the MPCA’s strength. Most importantly, 
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and fail to appreciate that the union’s limitations were a reflection of the unequal distribution of 
power in Guiana and sugar workers’ support for radical change.
42
 
Ramphal suggested in 1954 that Ishmael was driven to overhaul the union, convinced that 
“the whole internal organization [was] rotten,” and that Ishmael’s tenure represented a “new 
phase in the history of the MPCA.”
43 
In June 1954 Robert Alexander compiled Guianese 
analyses of Ishmael’s initial impact as head of the MPCA and his interviews suggested that the 
new MPCA president was an aggressive leader who engaged sugar workers on the plantations, 
held illegal meetings, severely criticized sugar producers, and pressed the SPA for considerable 
improvements to working conditions.
44 
Jane Phillips-Gay, Secretary of the GIWU, the MPCA’s 
rival union, dismissed Ishmael’s chance at wooing workers from her organization and criticized 
his motives as self-serving. Nonetheless, Phillips-Gay acknowledged that Ishmael was active in 
traveling the country meeting with workers.
45 
At least some sugar workers expressed confidence 
in his willingness to fight on their behalf and to serve as a break from previously suspect MPCA 
leadership. Several workers Alexander interviewed suggested that they would return to the 
MPCA if Ishmael’s reform efforts succeeded, despite their general skepticism of the union.
46
 
J.P. Lachmansingh, President of the GIWU, noted that Ishmael attacked sugar producers 
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General Secretary Sheik Shakoor confirmed that Ishmael wrote inflammatory articles against the 
SPA in the Labor Advocate that angered sugar producers who were allowed through contract to 
censor articles in the periodical.
48 
At the same time, colonial officials expressed concern that 
Ishmael’s aggressive tactics disrupted relations with the SPA.
49 
Alfred Thorne, editor of the 
 
Guiana Graphic, described Ishmael as a rash leader who “alienated employers.”
50 
Eventually 
Shakoor, Tello, and other MPCA leaders called for Ishmael’s suspension as a result of his efforts 
to rapidly reform the union.
51 
Shakoor retreated from his position when Ishmael agreed to 
moderate his methods. Nonetheless, Ishmael continued to use tactics that colonial officials and 
TUC leaders considered irrationally aggressive.
52 
Ultimately, Ishmael’s tenure as MPCA 
President changed the nature of MPCA leadership and contributed to the organization’s growth 
in the mid-1950s. 
Ishmael, however, included a political objective for the MPCA that dovetailed with 
British aims to undermine the PPP. Ishmael admitted that he pursued the MPCA’s presidency to 
obtain the opportunity to build the organization into an effective mechanism through which to 
defeat his former party. Nonetheless, Ishmael told Alexander that he was willing to cooperate 
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support to make external assistance effective.
53 
Crucially, Ishmael supported British trade union 
methods. Thus, British and American efforts to strengthen the MPCA coincided with the 
emergence of a new leader who shared their vision of institution-building and who had tentative 
support from sugar workers. 
American Foreign Policy toward British Guiana during the Eisenhower Administration 
 
The U.S. policy of institution-building in British Guiana between 1954 and 1957 was torn 
between the guided expansion of democratic mechanisms within Guianese society and the 
development of a capitalist labor movement based on business unionism. In contrast to the 
Truman administration, which focused its attention on Europe and Asia, President Eisenhower 
and his advisors were increasingly concerned with Latin America.
54 
High-ranking American 
officials discussed British Guiana at a National Security Council (NSC) meeting on October 8, 
1953. According to CIA director Allen Dulles, the British suspended the Guianese constitution in 
response to the election of a communist party in the colony.
55 
William Christensen, the Charge 
d’affaires in Trinidad and Tobago, expressed concern about the British suspension of the 
Waddington Constitution in a report to the State Department in November. Specifically, 
Christensen noted his apprehension about instability in the Caribbean, which the Joint Chiefs of 
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Meanwhile, United States diplomats supported the British use of force against the PPP in 
international forums. An NSC report emphasized the importance of regional diplomatic measures 
since several Latin American countries thought the question of colonialism more pressing than 
allegations of communist infiltration in British Guiana. Consequently, American diplomats “took 
further steps to impress on Latin American officials” that the alleged communist conspiracy in 
British Guiana posed a critical threat to the hemisphere.
57 
United States representatives at an 
 
Organization of American States (OAS) meeting in Caracas the following March pushed through 
an anti-communist measure in anticipation of involvement in the Guatemalan coup in June while 
pointedly abstaining from a vote on an anti-colonial resolution that every Latin American 
Republic adopted.
58 
Similarly, American diplomats supported the British refusal to allow the 




The importance of strategic resources, specifically bauxite, considerably influenced the 
Eisenhower administration’s policy toward British Guiana throughout the 1950s. Bauxite, the ore 
used to produce aluminum, was essential to a wide variety of civilian industries but most 
importantly to military preparedness in the early Cold War.
60 
British representatives in the 
Foreign Office noted that the Eisenhower administration impressed on them the considerable 
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In addition to concerns about American access to resources, the NSC acknowledged that 
increased trade of strategic items “would break certain bottlenecks in the development of Soviet 
war potential.”
62 
A secret evaluation of International Cooperation Administration (ICA) 
programs in British Guiana noted that the colony “held important deposits of strategic raw 
materials” that would represent a serious national security threat if traded to the Soviet Union. 
The report also noted that its proximity to the Panama Canal made British Guiana geographically 
significant.
63 
The reports collectively suggest that the Eisenhower administration expected a 
communist or communist-friendly government in British Guiana to trade strategic materials to 
the Soviet Union and increase the military potential of American’s Cold War rival.
64 
Moreover, 
historian Michael Adamson points out that the Soviet Union pursued an economic offensive in 
the developing world that focused on using technical assistance, trade, and financial aid to 
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expand Soviet influence beginning in 1953.
65 
The PPP’s pursuit of economic and technical 
assistance from the Eastern-bloc and an expressed desire for trade with the socialist world made 
British Guiana a critical area of concern for American policymakers.
66
 
Geopolitical threats and fear of material improvements to the Soviet military were not the 
only factors shaping American policymakers response to British Guiana. Harold Stassen, 
Director of the Foreign Operations Administration (FOA), wrote to President Eisenhower in June 
1955 arguing that the FOA played an important role in developing economic and social 
institutions in the underdeveloped world as a means of protecting the American economy. 
Stassen argued that increasing national output in the United States required “a great increase in 
imports of foreign materials” as well as locating “new markets for some products where 
domestic demand is relatively inelastic.”
67 
While British Guiana represented a small market, 
 
access to Guianese materials, from the perspective of American policymakers, could prove to be 
critical to the United States economy over time.
68
 
United States policymakers also considered British Guiana a potential source of 
economic opportunity throughout the Eisenhower administration. Throughout the 1950s there 
were persistent attempts to determine the colony’s mineral and resource wealth as the United 
States anticipated the expansion of economic opportunities in the decolonizing British 
Caribbean. Investors expressed interest in a wide range of possibilities, from exploiting yet to be 
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discovered offshore oil deposits to expanding into untapped markets for egg crate sales.
69 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles expressed optimism about the mineral wealth and future 
economic benefits the United States could attain from increased relations with the colony. Dulles 
encouraged attempts to locate strategic materials, such as uranium, and labeled exploratory 
studies on potential fisheries as “urgent.”
70 
Thus, while strategic concerns ultimately trumped 
specific economic issues in British Guiana, as James Siekmeier argues, United States 
policymakers viewed economic nationalism “as both more prevalent and dangerous than 
communism” during the Cold War and staunch opposition to economic nationalism both pre-and 
post-dated the post-World War II superpower rivalry.
71
 
Most significantly, Eisenhower administration officials argued for a perpetuation of 
 
informal American empire in the Western hemisphere through ideological expansion. In March 
1954 John Foster Dulles clarified his interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine to the NSC while 
explaining the background of the anti-communist resolution he advocated at the OAS meeting in 
Caracas. With the Guatemalan crisis in which CIA-backed opponents of President Jacobo 
Arbenz ultimately forced him to flee very much on his mind, Dulles argued that the resolution 
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expanded the American assertion of influence in the Western Hemisphere to include outlawing 
foreign ideologies in the American Republics.
72 
The Caracas Declaration of Solidarity, signed on 
March 28, argued that “the domination or control of the political institutions of any American 
state by the international communist movement extending to this hemisphere the political system 
of an extra continental power” constituted an existential threat to every country in the region.
73 
Crucially, the declaration confirmed that American efforts to counter subversion could not be 
considered intervention since the threat of communist control of political institutions in the 
American republics was tantamount to external aggression against the United States.
74 
Thus, the 
declaration provided a legal justification for a wide array of American programs aimed at 
controlling the direction of Guianese labor unions.
75
 
Moreover, despite Eisenhower’s skepticism, Vice President Richard Nixon and Allen 
Dulles convinced the NSC that specific U.S. domestic legislation should be aimed at countering 
subversives in labor unions because such legal justifications could assist in “combatting 
Communist control of labor unions in foreign countries.”
76 
On August 6 the NSC articulated its 
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NSC officials argued throughout 1954 for continued support for NSC 162/2, which 
argued that underdeveloped countries needed to be guided toward “orderly development into 
more stable and responsible nations” within the Western capitalist system through “all feasible 
measures.” United States policymakers perceived a revolution of rising expectations in the Third 
World. NSC members argued that failure to harness that revolution would result in 
underdeveloped nations and former colonies being absorbed into the Soviet system and tipping 
the world balance of power against the United States.
78 
Thus, United States policymakers 
 
concluded that national security, economic growth, and ideological expansion could be achieved 
in British Guiana through cooperation with conservative elements of the American labor 
movement. 
The relationship between the AFL, CIO, and the United States government in foreign 
policy evolved in the early 1950s as the State Department attempted to exert greater influence 
over labor leaders’ involvement in foreign countries.
79 
A number of prominent labor leaders 
argued that Eisenhower administration officials abused arbitrary powers in labor-government 
programs and deemphasized labor organizations’ role in foreign operations creating a schism 
between government officials and labor leaders in 1953.
80 
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Eisenhower and Latin America, the Eisenhower administration continued previous 
administrations’ consultation with labor leaders such as George Meany and Serafino Romualdi 
and secretly financed international labor programs that dovetailed with State Department aims. 
The administration also encouraged the advancement of United States foreign policy objectives 
through international labor organizations, most importantly ORIT.
81 
Eisenhower policymakers 
initiated a foreign policy program that called for increased AFL-CIO involvement in foreign 
operations, a policy that several members of the administration including Secretary of State 
Dulles and FOA Director Stassen reflected on positively in 1955.
82 
Nonetheless, the Eisenhower 
administration decreased the direct influence of the AFL and CIO in policymaking through 
bureaucratic reorganization aimed at increasing the institutionalized nature of labor-government 
cooperation in foreign operations to assure that AFL-CIO overseas programs were subordinated 
to State Department policy. 
The Eisenhower administration policy included Dulles’s renewal of State Department- 
labor relationships in August 1953, the appointment of James Mitchell as Secretary of Labor in 
early October 1953, and Stassen’s re-establishment of the FOA Office of Labor Affairs in early 
1954.
83 
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labor cooperation beginning in 1954. Dulles met with Meany and CIO President Walter Reuther 
to discuss international relations in August and Mitchell’s appointment was the impetus for 
improved relations between the Department of Labor and American labor leaders.
84 
Meanwhile, 
Mitchell wrote to Meany in late November 1953 to explain that he viewed the Department of 
Labor’s responsibilities in international relations as among its most important duties and stated 
his intention to reactivate the Department of Labor Trade Union Advisory Committee on 
International Affairs.
85 
Discussions at the CIO convention in November 1953 further 
underscored the shift in Executive policy toward greater official collaboration between the 
American labor movement and the United States government in foreign relations.
86 
CIO 
delegates noted that American foreign operations programs severely de-emphasized labor 
participation in the early 1950s; however, Dulles suggested that policymakers would renew an 
alliance with trade unions in the international sphere during his address to the convention. The 
Eisenhower administration’s increased participation with American trade unions coincided with 
a shift in program emphasis toward less developed areas.
87 
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emphasized the importance of State Department relations with American organized labor in 
stemming the spread of communist ideas into colonial and underdeveloped areas of the world.
88
 
At the same time, cooperation between labor leaders and policymakers in foreign 
operations changed under the Eisenhower administration’s 1953 Reorganization Plan number 
seven that created the FOA as the State Department’s administrative arm for U.S. foreign 
assistance to developing countries. The plan centralized programs to ensure conformity to State 
Department objectives and coordination with official policy established through the 
recommendations of the Security Council to the President.
89 
Congressional debates on the plan’s 
 
ratification acknowledged that appropriation requests from the FOA and its participants could 
influence policymaking in small ways and give labor leaders an indirect avenue through which 
they could help formulate policy decisions. However, the reorganization established a clear line 
of authority that increased the State Department’s influence over foreign policy based on what 
Undersecretary of State General Walter Bedell Smith called “a certain amount of willing 
subordination” to the Secretary of State.
90 
Edwin Martin, Special Assistant to the Secretary for 
 
Mutual Security Affairs, also acknowledged that the FOA “while independent, is subject to the 
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control and supervision and domination of the State Department.”
91 
Several labor leaders 
criticized the State Department’s influence in labor programs and argued that subordination to 
government officials compromised the independence of AFL-CIO actions.
92
 
Nonetheless, Undersecretary of State for Administration Donald Lourie noted that 
educational exchange programs involving “direct face-to-face communication and contact 
between the people and institutions of the United States” and other countries were more integral 
to foreign relations than complex, large-scale operations. He suggested that person-to-person 
programs were particularly effective because they delegated significant portions of 
administration to private organizations such as the AFL and CIO.
93 
Robert Murphy, Deputy 
 
Undersecretary of State, echoed Lourie’s view and noted that “more and more labor has come to 
accept and play its role in the development of the institutions of democracy the world over.”
94 
Harold Stassen suggested that the FOA planned to “maximize a people-to-people relationship 
parallel to the government-to-government relationship” while “expanding support for voluntary 
non-governmental organizations.”
95 
FOA head Stassen also argued that as programs gave new 
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that “the problems of labor have received increased attention.”
96 
Thus, labor leaders assumed an 
increasing role in foreign operations programs, were able to use FOA funding to enhance their 
international operations, and influenced policymaking through foreign operations channels; 
however, coordination with official policy limited the independence of AFL-CIO programs. 
Changes in foreign operations programs in the mid-1950s illuminate the increased 
significance United States policymakers placed on involvement in underdeveloped countries. 
The Eisenhower administration assumed increasing responsibility for perpetuating the 
international capitalist system and, as Michael Adamson argues, restoring “the liberal 
international political economy” that existed prior to World War I.
97 
FOA and International 
Cooperation Administration (ICA) programs were conceived as temporary measures designed to 
advance underdeveloped economies as a means of countering communism’s appeal and limiting 
Soviet influence in the third world; however, Adamson suggests that “promoting global 
capitalism” was the long-term objective.
98 
Furthermore, Adamson argues that the Eisenhower 
administration used foreign aid programs to address perceived threats to national security, rather 
than to promote economic development. However, Adamson suggests that the Eisenhower 
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American-dominated international financial institutions, and 
 
U.S. economic policies, gradually pressured developing world countries into reducing public 
spending and accepting greater privatization. Nonetheless, FOA and ICA programs failed to 
strengthen the democratic institutions necessary to complement financial liberalization. 
As such, AFL-CIO policies designed and implemented through the FOA inherently 
addressed State Department objectives while often advancing American labor leaders’ 
international objectives. A wide range of FOA programs in British Guiana began in May 1954 
and continued under the ICA when it replaced the FOA in 1955. Significantly, Eisenhower 
explained to Secretary Dulles that the ICA was necessary because the FOA was “regarded by 
many as merely a temporary unit of Government, established solely to meet certain short-term 
economic and military requirements.” The ICA, Eisenhower noted, reflected the recognition that 
“the functions and the need for cooperative development of economic and military strength 





Despite Eisenhower’s ideals, scholars and contemporaries generally agree that the 
administration’s foreign aid programs failed to promote effective economic development in the 
Third World.
101 
Likewise, the FOA, ICA, and later the American Institute of Free Labor 
Development (AIFLD), failed to solidify a position for reformist, pro-U.S. trade unions in British 
Guiana. Dennis FitzGerald, Deputy Director of the FOA and the most consistent administrator in 
its successor organizations, argued that FOA officials thought that the State Department looked 
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upon the aid agencies “as just a kind of convenient device by which you avoided the whole 
responsibility for anything that went wrong” while “order[ing] it to do what the State Department 
wanted done.” FitzGerald also reflected that the administration’s perspective on technical 
assistance grew increasingly cynical by the late 1950s.
102 
FOA and ICA programs in British 
Guiana overwhelmingly targeted development in PPP strongholds to undermine the Jagans’ 
support. Nonetheless, institution-building programs in the field of organized labor provided 
crucial funding to the MPCA and later the BGTUC. Tello’s and Ishmael’s participation in ICA 
programs between 1954 and 1957 established important connections between Guianese and 
American trade unionists that played a central role in the third phase of Guianese institutional 
decolonization after 1962.  Connections between Guianese and American trade unionists 
remained after the ICA suspended its programs in British Guiana after elections in 1957 returned 




Anglo-American Institution Building 
 
British and American labor and political leaders and their representatives in international 
labor organizations initiated a variety of institution-building projects in British Guiana beginning 
in mid-1954, intensifying in early 1955, and drawing down between 1957 and 1958 after failing 
to alter the colony’s political outlook.
104 
British officials resisted American influence over 
British Guiana’s institutional development, complicating attempts to coordinate institution- 
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building efforts. However, financial weakness limited British capabilities and American financial 
strength increasingly allowed the AFL-CIO and State Department to influence British Guiana in 
the mid-1950s. Moreover, colonial officials reappraised policies in British Guiana at the same 
time the Suez Crisis exposed British vulnerability on the international stage. However, as 
Stephen Rabe argues, British retreat from institution building in British Guiana began at the 




A variety of important developments unfolded in British Guiana between 1954 and 1957 
before institution-building efforts tapered off. Among the most important were the MPCA’s 
acquisition of a check-off system on sugar estates, the affiliation of several Guianese unions with 
ORIT, CADORIT, and the ICFTU, and the development of important relationships between pro- 
Western Guianese leaders and British and American trade union and political leaders. 
Authoritarian British rule in Guiana limited opposition to Western institution-building efforts 
between 1954 and August 1957. Nonetheless, the Jagan faction of the PPP, with brief assistance 
from the WFTU, resisted Anglo-American institution building and sought to advance its 
representatives in Guianese trade unions. 
At a session of the ORIT Executive Committee in January 1954, committee members 
passed a resolution condemning colonial administrators’ slow and insufficient efforts to improve 
working and living conditions in British Guiana. ORIT representatives suggested that inaction 
created an opening for communists to use the banner of anti-colonialism to “deform the will of 
non-independent peoples” in the Western Hemisphere. The committee resolved to provide 
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American labor leaders supported the Colonial Office’s decision to suspend the Waddington 
Constitution as a necessary measure that provided the opportunity to improve Guianese 
economic and social conditions and build viable, pro-Western trade unions, though the AFL-CIO 
and Western international labor organizations occasionally criticized British institution-building 
efforts as ineffective.
107 
Thus, regional labor leaders articulated a commitment to strengthening 
pro-Western trade unions and integrating them into ORIT. 
At the same time, the WFTU defended Guianese leaders who advocated lessened 
Guianese integration into the Western system. The Waddington Constitution’s suspension 
eliminated the possibility of direct affiliation of the PPP-aligned GIWU to the WFTU; however, 
the limited but important relationship between the left-wing of the PPP and the communist labor 
international continued into 1954. British officials expressed deep concern regarding WFTU 
support for the PPP in international forums and moderate Guianese leaders continued to warn 




In March 1954 the WFTU filed a complaint against the British government to the 
Secretary General of the United Nations (UN) alleging that British actions in British Guiana 
violated trade union rights and were part of a general attack on the rights and freedoms of the 
Guianese population.
109 
Specifically, the WFTU criticized British censorship of the 
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“blanket” banning of literature in its territories indefensible and specific legislation in British 
Guiana only allowed for individual pieces of literature to be withheld; however, officials made 
an exception in the case of WFTU publications entering the colony. Colonial governor Alfred 
Savage’s December 1953 ban on WFTU material argued that WFTU literature was Soviet 
propaganda and not trade union material, echoing former MPCA General Secretary and 




Lyttleton, Secretary of State for the Colonies, supported the measure despite Prime Minister 
Winston Churchill’s skepticism regarding the measure’s necessity.
111
 
British officials also contested the WFTU’s allegation that Savage’s censorship violated 
Guianese unions’ right to affiliate with the international organization of their choosing since no 
Guianese union was formally affiliated to the WFTU.
112 
However, colonial officials and TUC 
leaders cited informal connections between the WFTU and colonial unions as evidence of 
communist infiltration and used them to justify actions against the unions.
113 
Finally, colonial 
officials argued that British Guiana’s colonial status precluded the protection of trade union 
rights under International Labor Organization (ILO) rules.
114 
However, a retrospective TUC 
report noted that the Colonial Office and TUC established the Commonwealth Advisory 
Committee in 1937 “to improve the conditions of workers in the colonies, in part through the 
application of the ILO Conventions.”
115 
Therefore, British officials created a circular and 
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means of minimizing Eastern-bloc contacts and assuring Guianese unions’ integration into 
Western labor organizations. 
Delegates at the ILO convention in November 1954 dismissed the WFTU’s complaint 
arguing that Savage’s ban was a political action undertaken to deal with local circumstances and 
not a violation of trade union rights.
116 
Nonetheless, several Guianese unions continued their 
loose association with the communist-international. In early 1954 the GIWU sent a message of 
support to Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala at the urging of the WFTU and the BGLU requested that 
the reformed BGTUC rescind its ban on unions affiliated to the WFTU.
117 
Ultimately the failed 




Despite the WFTU’s diminished influence in the colony, British and American labor 
leaders expressed concern that the communist international was intensifying its programs. 
Anglo-American institution-building increased as a result of suspicions that the WFTU was 
using relationships between communist parties and democratic trade unions in underdeveloped 
countries to promote Soviet foreign policy.
119 
Serafino Romualdi, the AFL representative to 
ORIT, visited British Guiana for four days in April 1954 to determine the state of trade unionism 
 
in the colony and reported his findings to George Meany and ICFTU General Secretary J.H. 
Oldenbroek. Romualdi noted that various forms of assistance from the ICFTU, ORIT, TUC, 
AFL, and United States Information Service (USIS) helped the MPCA survive in the midst of the 
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colony’s political turmoil and in the face of challenges from the rival GIWU. Romualdi strongly 
urged, as did George Woodcock of the TUC who visited British Guiana the previous week, that 
ORIT or the ICFTU provide a trade union advisor to help build the movement among the rank- 
and-file. Romualdi criticized the “second string individuals” leading the anti-communist labor 
movement and concluded that there remained a dire need for external training of Guianese 
unionists since almost the entire labor force of the colony still supported leaders suspected of 
being communists.
120 
Romualdi’s contemporaries in the Western international labor movement 
 
also took action in British Guiana. CADORIT Secretary Ken Sterling and Charles Millard, acting 
National Director of the Steelworkers’ Union of Canada, traveled to British Guiana to facilitate 




High-ranking American policymakers finalized plans for operations in British Guiana 
 
while Romualdi visited the colony. On April 23 Secretary of State John Foster Dulles explained 
FOA plans to send Guianese trainees to Puerto Rico in a letter to William Maddox, the American 
Consul General in Trinidad tasked with overseeing British Guiana.
122 
The British and American 
governments agreed to terms for the initiation of a variety of technical assistance programs in 
June, though Dulles noted that FOA personnel began cooperating with interested Guianese prior 
to the official agreement. FOA programs began immediately and according to Dulles were “well 
underway” by August.
123 
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to continue until June 30, 1959 but allowed for early termination with thirty days-notice 
depending on local developments.
124 
The initial FOA programs ignored institution-building and 
complemented Colonial Office plans to use economic development to undermine the PPP’s 
appeal. However, Romualdi and Ernst Schwarz, the CIO’s Latin American representative, helped 




At the same time FOA programs began in late June 1954, Robert Alexander returned to 
 
the United States from a fact-finding trip in Latin America. Alexander sent a copy of his findings 
to Jay Lovestone and Lovestone forwarded the report Free Trade Union Committee (FTUC), the 
AFL’s covert anti-communist arm. Alexander argued that the suspension of the Waddington 
Constitution created an opportunity to build the MPCA because “the fight to displace the PPP 
will be decided in the trade union field” and that it was crucial to move quickly in strengthening 
the PPP’s opponents. Alexander warned that international support for anti-PPP trade unions 
since the suspension was insufficient and time was being wasted. He encouraged the AFL and 
ORIT to provide financial assistance to the MPCA since the union’s finances were dependent on 
Booker Brothers’ advertising. Alexander argued that the MPCA required financial independence 
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Alexander recommended that the FTUC send propaganda that emphasized anti-communism 
while providing material on how to run a trade union.
126
 
British planning for Guianese institution-building increased in the summer of 1954 as 
well. Alfred Savage informed the Colonial Office in June that he considered the development of 
non-communist, pro-British trade unionism a matter “of paramount importance.” Savage warned 
of vulnerability in the sugar industry; however, he suggested that the industry was open to British 
influence since the MPCA and GIWU remained insolvent.
127 
After consulting Woodcock and 
Romualdi, Savage concluded that Guianese unions required the presence of British trade union 
leadership and in June he requested that the TUC supply an exceptionally respected unionist to 
advise Guianese unions for an extended period.
128 
Acting on his advice, representatives of the 
Colonial Office approached the TUC to discuss expanding efforts in the field of organized labor 
in June. Five members of the Colonial Office met with Woodcock on July 1 to deliberate on how 
to most effectively build Guianese trade unionism.
129 
Woodcock and colonial officials outlined 




British institution-building in Guiana expanded to include employers later in the summer. 
 
In August the new Secretary of State for the Colonies, Alan Lennox-Boyd, held a series of talks 
with the TUC and Overseas Employers’ Federation (OEF) in which he encouraged increased 
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importance of colonial institution-building.
131 
Colonial Office, TUC, and OEF collaboration in 
supporting the MPCA between 1954 and 1957 contributed considerably to the process of 
institution building. Together, British governmental, business, and workers’ organizations 
cooperated to protect British investors and promote pro-British capitalism in British Guiana. 
In contrast to the FOA’s emphasis on organized labor’s acceptance of official policy, 
 
N.D. Watson of the Colonial Office emphasized the importance of allowing the TUC to act 
independently of British policy even if TUC autonomy occasionally led to decisions with which 
that the Colonial Office disproved.
132 
The TUC sometimes exercised its independence in 
implementing the program as was the case when British trade unionists rejected Savage’s 
suggestion of encouraging amalgamation between the GIWU and MPCA. At the same time, the 
Colonial Office consistently coordinated efforts with Woodcock and TUC General Secretary 
Vincent Tewson. Moreover, colonial officials developed covert means to provide financing for 
TUC expenses through the Colonial Development and Welfare Act. TUC leaders described the 
relationship with the British officials as beneficial; however, Woodcock and Tewson emphasized 
the need to obscure connections between their organization and the Colonial Office. Specifically, 
Woodcock and Tewson argued that the PPP and British trade unionists opposed to the project 
would use evidence of collaboration with the colonial office to undermine the program.
133 
Thus, 
the TUC and Colonial Office coordinated their efforts and trade unionists’ plan did not challenge 
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TUC leaders expressed agreement with their counterparts in the Colonial Office, as well 
as American labor leaders and policymakers, that the PPP’s removal created an opportunity to 
build Western institutions in British Guiana.
134 
In July the TUC General Council agreed to make 
Guiana the first territory to receive direct financial assistance from British trade unionists, 
initiating what it considered its “most important major attempt to help an individual union,” the 
“special effort made to establish an effective trade union in the British Guiana sugar industry.”
135 
The TUC General Council allocated £3,000 ($8,600) to support organizing efforts in British 
Guiana, giving the colony a third of all financial aid distributed for colonial territories as part of a 
larger prioritization of the Caribbean area.
136 
TUC leaders justified the effort by arguing that 
British West Indian trade unions were the most advanced in the colonies. More importantly, the 
General Council expressed a desire to use institution-building in British Guiana as a model for 
the rest of the Empire.
137 
According to Stephen Rabe, TUC funding for the MPCA totaled about 




At its meeting in December, the Council offered to send Andrew Dalgleish, a retired 
TUC official with experience advising colonial unions in Africa and the Middle East, to advise 
Guianese unions. The TUC offered to pay Dalgleish’s expenses and agreed to provide further 
funding for MPCA organization.
139 
TUC leaders coordinated their decision with the highest 
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ranking colonial officials. After coming to a decision, Tewson assured Lennox-Boyd that 
Dalgleish was an extraordinary choice for “the most difficult mission which we have ever asked 
a person to undertake.”
140 
Meanwhile, George Woodcock sent a detailed explanation to N.L. 
Mayle in the Colonial Office and assured him that the General Council would determine the 
allocation of TUC funding in British Guiana. Thus, TUC leaders limited the degree to which the 
Guianese unions, or even Dalgleish, could challenge official objectives. Woodcock also 
reassured Mayle that Dalgleish would stay in touch with British officials in Guiana while 
remaining “at arms-length” to avoid appearing too closely associated with the British appointed 
Guianese government.
141 
Tewson, Woodcock, and Lennox-Boyd met again on January 10 to 




British and American efforts to build the Guianese trade union movement intensified in 
 
early 1955 in conjunction with Ishmael’s re-election as President of the MPCA and Shakoor’s 
resignation as General Secretary.
143 
Woodcock and Dalgleish visited British Guiana in January 
to gather information and finalize the TUC program. Initially, the TUC provided funding for the 
General Secretary and an Assistant General Secretary of the MPCA and helped organize six 
Regional Officers.
144 
The Colonial Office encouraged efforts to institutionalize the labor 
movement’s participation in government as well. Specifically, Governor Savage established a 
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labor advisory board that included various trade unions and important unionists, including 
Ashton Chase, the former PPP Minister of Labor. In doing so, the Colonial Office expressed 
hope that it could coordinate colonial policy, legislative efforts, and the TUC’s support for the 
MPCA into a systemically strong capitalist labor movement.
145
 
During his visit Woodcock explained the TUC plan to the BGTUC and met with the 
 
SPA, Chamber of Commerce, and Shipping Association, arguing that employers could only 
avoid legislative interference in labor problems if the colony developed strong trade unions. The 
sugar producers acknowledged that they would have difficulty securing cooperation from some 
estate managers but agreed to support the program. However, the Chamber of Commerce and 
Shipping Association resisted Woodcock’s proposal and the Shipping Association refused to 
negotiate with the Forbes Burnham-led BGLU.
146 
Moreover, N.L. Mayle lamented in a letter to 
 




During his extended visits to British Guiana in 1955 and 1956 Dalgleish advised 
Guianese unionists to focus on industrial questions and refrain from political connections.
148 
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CIO informed as to the TUC’s plans and analysis of the situation.
149 
The MPCA used British 
funding and advice to create regional offices and invite applications for a five-week training 
course in industrial relations conducted through the University College of the West Indies.
150 
Kenedon Steins, the American Vice Consul in Trinidad, reported optimistically on the TUC 
effort to the State Department, though he expressed minor concern that TUC assistance might be 




The TUC General Council discussed its program in British Guiana at the TUC Annual 
 
Meeting in September 1955. Woodcock explained his study’s conclusions and the TUC plans for 
British Guiana, noting that institution-building depended on organizational efforts and training 
more so than financial aid. However, Woodcock suggested that seasonal fluctuations in the 
Guianese labor force and the wide dispersal of plantations made the sugar industry an exception 
to general policy and he suggested that there could be no expectation of financial stability for 
unions dependent on plantation employment. The General Council accepted Woodcock’s 
assessment; however, some members in attendance disagreed with his analysis. W.P. Blair of the 
Electrical Trades Union argued that the TUC’s financial support of the MPCA amounted to 
taking sides in a dispute between rival unions and that doing so was harmful to the trade union 
movement in British Guiana as well as in Great Britain. Blair cited the Robertson Commission 
report, which acknowledged the legitimacy of several GIWU accusations against the MPCA, 
specifically its weakness and subservience to employers. Blair argued that workers were justified 
149 
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in supporting the GIWU and that the Council erred in choosing the MPCA as the organization on 
which to build an effective trade union movement. Nonetheless, the TUC agreed to allocate 
British funds for MPCA field officers and organizational equipment with the objective of 
displacing the GIWU and establishing a viable sugar union aligned with British labor.
152
 
Like the TUC, the AFL-CIO expanded its efforts in British Guiana in early 1955. The 
 
FOA Office of Labor Affairs developed a labor program for British Guiana in January in 
consultation with Romualdi and Schwarz.
153 
While emphasizing the need for immediate 
attention, the program articulated short-term and long-term objectives, beginning with a six to 
eight week labor seminar in Georgetown financed through the FOA. American labor leaders 
insisted on including a clause in the proposal calling for coordination with the TUC and possibly 
the Colonial Welfare and Development Board. The FOA program also stressed the need for 
Schwarz’s and Romualdi’s participation as lecturers at the seminar.
154 
FOA labor officials 
anticipated using the seminar to assist American labor leaders in selecting Guianese unionists for 
further training in the United States.
155 
The planned person-to-person exchange was part of the 
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Eugene Clay, the FOA’s Director for the Northern Division of Latin 
America, forwarded the proposal to Savage, on January 10.
157
 
Despite the appeal for cooperation and initial optimism about the program, colonial 
officials’ expressed strong reluctance to allowing increased American influence over the 
development of colonial institutions and general concern about conflicting British and American 
interests in the colony.
158 
On April 12, N.L. Mayle questioned the proposal’s desirability as a 




Boyd forwarded a summary of Mayle’s concerns to Savage on May 10 and suggested that the 
Colonial Office needed to see the final proposal before officially contacting the TUC.
160 
Mayle’s 
detailed response to Savage on May 16 noted the Colonial Office’s “extreme apprehension about 
the risk of possible influence of American lecturers in the trade union field in British Guiana.” 
Mayle noted that the Colonial Office did not want to jeopardize relations with the FOA and 
acknowledged that flatly rejecting the labor program was unlikely from an official perspective 
because of the importance of preserving strong Anglo-American diplomatic relations. Woodcock 
shared Mayle’s position on behalf of the TUC.
161
 
Mayle was adamant that trade union training should remain “firmly in British hands;” 
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need for British trade unionists to use the seminar as a means of developing the Guianese unions 
based on British trade union methods and suggested that Schwarz and Romualdi might 
participate for a limited time as visiting speakers while the TUC provided the primary lecturers. 
Mayle also suggested that the Colonial Office would approve the program after adjustments 
addressed British concerns and if it eliminated the proposal to send Guianese unionists to the 
United States or Great Britain after the seminar.
162 
Specifically, Mayle and Woodcock argued 
 
that the additional expense involved in sending Guianese unionists to Great Britain could be 
inhibiting since the TUC was already financing a program in British Guiana. 
More importantly, Mayle suggested that Guianese unionists needed to remain in the 
colony to effectively build their organizations from the ground up, a criticism that is illuminating 
since it was echoed inside the FOA.
163 
George Delaney, International Representative of the AFL, 
argued that FOA labor programs would be more efficient if American trade unionists worked in 
other countries. Moreover, Delaney suggested that bringing foreign unionists to the United States 
mirrored communist methods in addition to being ineffective.
164 
Similarly, Dennis FitzGerald, 
Deputy Director of the FOA, argued in an oral history taken in 1976 that the Eisenhower 
administration’s emphasis on training foreign technicians in the United States rather than sending 
American technicians to foreign countries inhibited FOA and ICA programs’ effectiveness.
165 
The tactical disagreement created minor tension between British and American officials as well 
as between some American trade unionists and United States government officials. Nonetheless, 
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Mayle’s response to the FOA labor program on behalf of the Colonial Office is 
illuminating in several additional ways. It suggests that British officials expected to retain 
influence in post-colonial areas through institutional structures while acknowledging Britain’s 
financial limitations in the process of decolonization. TUC leaders echoed official concerns 
acknowledging the need for programs to counter WFTU influence while expressing fear that lack 
of funds enfeebled their efforts. Specifically, TUC leaders expressed concern that inconsistent 




Furthermore, Mayle’s response suggests that American institution-building efforts in colonial 
territories inherently extended American influence through institutional mechanisms. Colonial 
officials suggested pursuing a two-pronged effort with the TUC program focused on institution- 
building and the FOA education program helping undermine Communist and WFTU influence in 
the colony.
167 
Financial issues and debates about trade union methods continued as Anglo- 
American institution-building evolved in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Over time, Guianese 
unionists became caught in the middle, expressing a desire to perpetuate British trade union 
practices while increasingly dependent on American financial assistance. 
American officials expressed sympathy for British concerns and Dulles instructed 
American representatives in the Caribbean to refrain from initiating the program until the TUC 
sent assurances that they did not view the project “as an intrusion on its functions by the U.S. 
Government.” Dulles expected that adjustments to the program after further consultations with 
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addressing Mayle’s concerns in May.
168 
American involvement in British Guiana advanced in 
other areas while officials discussed the details of the FOA proposal. In April USIS finalized 
plans to build a reading room in the basement of the old consulate to provide material, including 
trade union films and literature. British officials agreed to the program despite strong 
apprehension about its being directed from Trinidad rather than by officials involved in the day- 
to-day affairs of the Guianese, as well as the possibility that Guianese confronted with American 
wealth would become disillusioned with their own situation.
169
 
After an Executive Order replaced the FOA with the ICA in May 1955, William Maddox, 
 
the American Consul General in Trinidad, informed the State Department that Savage placed 
“great value” on the project and encouraged that the plan move forward. Maddox agreed with 
State Department plans to identify left-wing PPP activists and exclude them from training. 
However, he acknowledged that there would be a possible advantage to “including an ‘insecure’ 
person or so in the seminar,” suggesting that the Consul general considered the possibility that 




acknowledgement that the trade union movement might benefit from collaboration between 
Guianese leaders of opposing political views represented a rare occasion in which an American 
official suggested engagement with the PPP’s left-wing. Nonetheless, American government 
officials and policymakers in some circles echoed Maddox’s hesitant recommendation of 
cooperation with the PPP several times in the ensuing years, suggesting that American 
governmental officials did not fully agree about how to most effectively confront Cheddi Jagan 
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in the late 1950s. Just as significantly, there is no evidence that American labor leaders shared 
Maddox’s perspective or considered working with members of the PPP. Thus, American labor 
leaders’ opposed Cheddi Jagan earlier and more definitively than government officials and used 
their influence in the United States to promote opposition leaders. Ultimately, AFL-CIO pressure 
contributed to the Kennedy administration’s conclusion to support covert action and diplomatic 




Stassen cabled FOA operatives on June 24 and explained that development needed to be 
coordinated with Dalgleish since the TUC held primary responsibility for implementing the labor 
program. Additionally, Dalgleish was also expected to commit to a full-time teaching role during 
the seminar.
172 
Woodcock assured the United States Labor Attaché in Trinidad that the TUC 
would approve cooperation; however, he disagreed with the FOA proposal that ORIT should 
participate in selecting the program’s candidates. Woodcock argued that Dalgleish and Ramphal 
were most familiar with the local situation in British Guiana and should be responsible for 
determining the participants.
173 
The ICA eventually implemented the proposed FOA program in 
1956; however, as early as September 1955 Dulles expressed a “lack of interest in the 




Thus, British and American labor and political leaders collaborated in pursuing 
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influence over Guianese institutional structures and disagreements regarding the most effective 
tactics to employ in the colony. The TUC most consistently worked to build Guianese trade 
unions but financial limitations restricted the extent of solely British programs. American trade 
union leaders campaigned for greater involvement in the colony but American government 
officials constrained AFL-CIO efforts to allow the TUC to play the primary role in the colony 
and to preserve diplomatic collaboration with Great Britain. Moreover, American government 
officials hoped to achieve political objectives through economic development programs with 




Guianese Activism and Internationalism 
 
British and American institution-building efforts focused on strengthening selected 
Guianese unions and institutionalizing the colony’s labor movement. Consequently, British and 
American programs tried to increase grassroots support for the MPCA through improved 
organization while training unionists to effectively negotiate with employers for improved 
wages, benefits, and working conditions. Moreover, institution-building efforts provided the 
MPCA with financial stability with the expectation that the union’s fiscal independence would 
increase as membership grew. 
Anglo-American institution-building efforts contained a final and crucial feature, the 
integration of Guianese trade unionists into Western international labor organizations. Several 
Guianese labor leaders enthusiastically cooperated with the Anglo-American institution-building 
efforts, particularly in seeking integration with the ICFTU, ORIT, and CADORIT. In early April 
175 
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1954, as Anglo-American institution-building efforts began in British Guiana, the MPCA sent 
Richard Ishmael and Rupert Tello to a CADORIT conference in Trinidad. Ishmael also attended 
an ORIT conference in Costa Rica later that month and an ICFTU conference in May.
176
 




Guianese labor leaders’ use of international connections in early 1954 remained consistent 
between 1954 and 1957 and considerably influenced the labor movement’s development during 
the period. However, Guianese labor leaders engaged in local struggles as well in seeking to 
develop their organizations. 
Ishmael, the MPCA president, used his connections to the American labor movement to 
offset the costs of travel to the ORIT conference in Costa Rica in 1954. During the meeting, 
Ishmael appealed to regional trade unionists for greater assistance for workers in British Guiana 
though his speech focused on themes of particular concern to American trade union leaders.
178 
Ishmael acknowledged that aid from the ICFTU and ORIT strengthened his organization and 
emphasized his pride in the MPCA’s association with “the free trade union movement and the 
free world against the unrelenting and viscous onslaught of world communism.” However, 
Ishmael suggested that assuaging Caribbean workers’ frustrations and defeating communism’s 
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Guianese unions’ integration into a Western labor network.
179 
Dalgleish assumed some of 
Ishmael’s duties in the MPCA to facilitate Guianese participation in the 1954 international 
conference and Ishmael’s subsequent visits to Great Britain and the United States.
180
 
Ishmael and Tello’s efforts contributed to the ICFTU and CADORIT decision to hold a 
conference of Sugar and Plantation Workers in British Guiana in early August that was widely 
attended and lauded by regional labor leaders. The conference examined plantation workers’ 
social and economic status while stressing the importance of collaborative efforts between 
workers, managers, and employers in supporting the capitalist system.
181 
Having increased 
connections with Western labor internationals, the MPCA claimed responsibility for a one-day 
strike on the sugar estates in the fall of 1955 to generate support among field workers. BGLU 
president Forbes Burnham suggested that the strike was a “clever success” since workers began 
walking off the job before the MPCA issued a strike call.
182 
Regardless of whether the MPCA 
initiated or reacted to the walk-off, the union enhanced its image as a result of the protest. 
Moreover, the MPCA’s international connections increased and its fiscal and organizational 
position slowly improved in late 1955. 
While MPCA leaders increased cooperation with international labor organizations and 
British and American institution-building projects, the GIWU’s left-coalition collapsed and 
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altered the nature of decolonization efforts among organized labor. In February 1955 the PPP 
split into two factions, one led by Cheddi and Janet Jagan and the other by Forbes Burnham. 
Conflicts over political ideology, personal rivalry between Burnham and the Jagans, racial 
tensions inherent in the considerably segregated nature of Guianese employment, and British 
attempts to create a schism in the party all contributed to the division.
183 
Regardless of the 
reasons, the separation led to British and especially American support for the Burnham faction 
and increasingly intensified racial politics.
184 
American labor leaders were among the most 
consistent and most vocal of Burnham’s Anglo-American political supporters; however, they 
wavered in their views of Burnham in the context of the Guianese labor movement. Robert 
Alexander reported to Jay Lovestone in February 1956 that Burnham “is someone with whom we 
can work,” a view generally unchallenged in American labor circles. Nonetheless, American 
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Most significantly, differences of political ideology and international alignment split the 
PPP and decimated the left coalition’s efforts in the organized labor movement. GIWU President 
J.P. Lachmansingh aligned the union with the PPP’s Burnham faction, which Burnham portrayed 
as a center-left coalition opposed to association with the Eastern-bloc. Burnham’s faction, which 
became the People’s National Congress (PNC) after the 1957 elections, claimed that the Jagan 
faction was made up of doctrinaire Marxists committed to international communism rather than 
Guianese nationalism. The GIWU continued to exist until at least 1959; however, the majority of 
sugar workers remained loyal to the Jagan faction of the PPP.
186 
Despite the support, the Jagan 
 
faction had no labor organization with which to organize sugar workers and lost further ground 
in the labor movement when Cheddi Jagan resigned as president of the Sawmill Workers’ Union 
(SWU) amidst controversy in late 1955.
187 
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encouraged workers to join the MPCA while organizing efforts to have PPP men ascend to 
prominent positions in the organization.
188
 
Colonial officials expressed considerable concern about the possibility of Jagan faction 
integration with the MPCA. Savage’s letters to Lennox-Boyd altered between warnings that the 
Jagans were infiltrating the MPCA with Ishmael’s assistance to dismissals of the reports as 
rumors promoted by the Burnham faction.
189 
Rivalry between MPCA leadership and the Jagan 
faction contributed to a political disconnect between union leadership and the rank-and-file in the 
sugar industry. Despite conflict over control of the union, the MPCA and PPP pursued some 
similar domestic policies. In November 1956, for example, the MPCA requested the Governor 
initiate a plan to acquire sugar companies’ unused land for redistribution to ease the frustrations 
of impoverished workers.
190 
Cheddi Jagan’s writings argued for similar land redistribution and 




split did not alter Anglo-American efforts to build the MPCA since the GIWU retained its 
sympathy for the WFTU and it was unclear whether Lachmansingh would be able to command 
the support of sugar workers absent an alliance with Jagan.
192
 
The BGTUC continued its reorganization while the MPCA and TUC collaborated to 
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radio broadcast to explain its purpose and functions beginning in late November 1955 and 
obtained affiliation to the ICFTU on January 1, 1956, after the MPCA joined the BGTUC.
193 
Moreover, the BGTUC grew considerably, increasing from a five-union membership in April 
1955 to twenty-five unions and up to 21,000 members in early 1956. The union held an eight-day 
training conference for its expanded membership in February 1956.
194 
Nonetheless, Tello 
requested that Romualdi send education and propaganda material to counter “subversive 
literature” infiltrating the colony. He also pleaded for financial assistance claiming that his 
organization had no funding and that he personally paid ORIT and ICFTU affiliation fees. 
Moreover, Tello noted that TUC funds were allocated for the MPCA and that ICFTU assistance 
was slow in forthcoming. Consequently, Tello warned that the BGTUC required American aid to 
address its fragile financial position.
195 
Romualdi contacted John D. Connors, Director of the 
AFL-CIO Department of Education to request the American union send propaganda material to 
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Meanwhile, Ishmael initiated a plan in early 1956 to further rehabilitate the MPCA’s 
improving image among workers and expressed hope that assistance from the ICFTU, ORIT, 
TUC, and AFL-CIO would provide the leverage needed to achieve substantial concessions from 
employers.
198 
The MPCA President instigated a strike for wage concessions and purposefully 
antagonized the SPA at the negotiating table causing discussions to fail. He then requested 
assistance from TUC and AFL-CIO associates in compiling studies countering SPA claims that 
the sugar industry could not afford wage increases. Ishmael informed Robert Alexander of his 
plan in advance of its implementation and Alexander wrote to Jay Lovestone suggesting that the 
AFL-CIO inform British Guiana’s new governor, Patrick Renison, that the American labor 
movement supported the strike.
199 
John Wall of the TUC Economic and Research Department 
was sent to British Guiana at the MPCA’s request in August to testify on the sugar workers’ 
behalf.
200 
Despite Wall’s assistance, the Committee of Enquiry ruled in favor of a ten percent 
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Anglo-American institution-building efforts in British Guiana expanded and evolved in 
1956 while Guianese labor leaders increased their collaboration with regional labor 
organizations. In April, the ICA held the trade union seminar that the FOA initially proposed in 
1955. A variety of Guianese, American, and British speakers gave lectures and forty Guianese 
students participated in the meetings.
202 
At the same time, the TUC continued its role in British 




British and American efforts, regional labor leaders expressed skepticism regarding the 
effectiveness of Anglo-American institution-building. 
CADORIT leaders met in Barbados in April and discussed the ways Caribbean trade 
unions could confront potential communist threats in the region while advancing workers’ 
interests. BGTUC General Secretary Rupert Tello, who served on CADORIT’s administrative 
committee, suggested that the ICFTU should work through Caribbean labor leaders rather than 
the TUC to make international participation in the Caribbean labor movement more effective. 
Tello further proposed that CADORIT should reorganize into a “more independent 
organization.” Most interestingly, Tello criticized external financing of Guianese unions as 
ineffective. In British Guiana, he argued, “persons who got no help were able to build real trade 
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workers’ sense of investment in their unions. Suriname’s Leo Eliazer, who was also a member of 
ORIT’s Executive Board, agreed with Tello and suggested that it might be possible to develop a 
regional labor federation independent of ORIT and the ICFTU through which Caribbean 
unionists could build their organizations. 
204
 
Despite appeals for regional solidarity and loosened ties with the heavily Anglo- 
 
American influenced Western international labor movement, fear of communism and personal 
rivalries reinforced Caribbean labor’s connections to ORIT and the ICFTU. At the same meeting, 
Eliazer suggested that communist influence in neighboring British Guiana threatened Suriname 
and he pressured Romualdi to provide funds promised for use in confronting regional 
communism. Tello echoed Eliazer’s fear of communism and appears to have tentatively accepted 





More significantly, Tello appealed to ORIT to intervene in the BGTUC’s July elections 
when it appeared he might lose his position as General Secretary. Tello wrote to Romualdi and 
ORIT General Secretary Luis Alberto Monge warning that, if Romualdi or Robert Alexander 
could not convince Ishmael to alter his nomination of the “communist” Andrew Jackson, Jackson 
could win the election. Jackson’s election, Tello argued, would lead to a communist takeover of 
the Guianese labor movement.
206 
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suspicious circumstances, won the right to have his name added after contesting the BGTUC 
ballot in the Guianese courts. Romualdi pressured Ishmael, arguing that Jackson’s participation 
in a 1953 WFTU conference and in strikes against the MPCA, as well as his association with the 
Jagans, were evidence that his “election would be a blow to free trade unionism.” Tello 
adamantly affirmed in a letter to Romualdi that his concern was not personal but sincere fear for 
the BGTUC. The validity of Tello’s claims is unclear; however, it is significant that Romualdi’s 
information about developments in British Guiana was gleaned almost entirely from Tello and 
Alexander. Romualdi copied nearly verbatim from Tello’s letter—at Tello’s request— in writing 




While the connection between Jackson and the Jagan faction is not certain, in August 
1956 the Jagan faction registered the British Guiana Sugar Workers Union (BGSWU) rather than 
continue seek integration into the MPCA.
208 
It is possible that the Jagan faction interpreted the 
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integration into the MPCA would be impossible. Regardless, the possibility of rapprochement 
within the labor-left decreased considerably with the founding of the BGSWU. 
Romualdi’s intercession did not convince Ishmael to withdraw his nomination of 
 
Jackson; however, Tello won the election and immediately traveled to Great Britain, Canada, and 
the United States to study Modern Labor Practices after the election.
209 
The United Steelworkers 
of America welcomed Tello as a guest during his two weeks in Canada, and during a three week 
visit to the United States Romualdi introduced him to high-ranking members of the AFL-CIO. 
The ICA organized Tello’s visit and gave him the opportunity to meet with a variety of 
representatives of the United States government during his three-week course.
210 
During his 
travels, Tello arranged for Monge and Harry Pollak of the AFL-CIO Department of International 
Affairs to visit British Guiana in 1957.
211 
Meanwhile, the BGTUC’s new President, Joseph 
Pollydore, also left British Guiana after the election and traveled to an ORIT seminar in Mexico 
City.
212 
Tello’s travels, like the FOA proposal in 1955, elicited fear of increased American 
influence in British Guiana among colonial officials. Patrick Renison commented in a letter to 
the Colonial Office that despite Tello’s “good impression” in the United Kingdom “some of the 
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CADORIT, etc. are able to be so much more free with their money and promises than can be the 
TUC and the unions in the U.K.”
213
 
Discussions at the CADORIT conference, Romualdi’s involvement in the BGTUC 
elections, and BGTUC leaders’ post-election travels illuminate several important dynamics that 
influenced the process of institutional decolonization in British Guiana during the mid-1950s. 
First, Caribbean labor leaders collaborated at a regional level to confront perceived communist 
threats in their territories and to undercut labor rivals. British and American labor and political 
leaders occasionally encouraged opposition to left-leaders; however, they did not impose such 
hostility on the Caribbean labor movement. Second, Caribbean trade unions used AFL-CIO 
funding and associations as leverage to undermine labor rivals and perceived communists, both 
overtly and covertly, often levying allegations of communist associations against rivals to exploit 
American anti-communism. 
Third, CADORIT leaders worked with Western international labor organizations and 
Anglo-American trade unions but did not express confidence in institution-building projects 
organized and financed from sources external to the region. Caribbean labor leaders regularly 
argued that developing grassroots support for labor organizations was the key to trade unions’ 
success even as those organizations became dependent on British and American funding. Forth, 
British and American labor organizations and Western internationals rapidly integrated newly 
elected labor leaders into training programs with the objective of transposing Western labor 
practices in the colony, suggesting that institution-building programs were dynamic and 
adaptable. Fifth, several issues plagued Anglo-American training programs in the mid-1950s 
beginning with Tello’s fear that external involvement in Guianese unions could create financial 
dependency. Internationalizing the Guianese labor movement also removed key labor leaders 
213 
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from British Guiana for extended periods at crucial points in time, in Tello’s case immediately 
after a contested election.
214 
Finally, British officials expressed considerable concern at the 
influx of American influence while accepting the need for cooperation with the United States 
government and the AFL-CIO in confronting challenges to British interests from left-wing 
Caribbean trade unionists. Anglo-American rivalry influenced Caribbean decolonization at both 
the diplomatic and non-governmental level. 
Legislative actions in British Guiana beginning on December 20, 1956 initiated the 
process toward new general elections in August 1957 and a return to partial self-government 
under the Renison Constitution.
215 
The imminent political change increased the significance of 
institution-building efforts and British attempts to establish the MPCA and Anglo-American 
elements in the BGTUC at the center of the Guianese labor movement. Nineteen members of the 
TUC, OEF, and Colonial Office met on January 3, 1957 to evaluate the institution-building effort 
in British Guiana and to consider its future in light of the coming Guianese elections. George 
Woodcock complimented Booker Brothers efforts to cooperate with the MPCA’s Regional 
Officers in building union membership on the sugar estates and supported Ishmael’s request for a 
check-off as an exceptional measure to address the union’s financial difficulties. However, Mr. 
Eccles, speaking on behalf of the OEF, contested the establishment of a check-off with the 
MPCA as a result of Ishmael’s “unreasonable dealings,” though Eccles thought it possible to 
have a check-off with smaller estate unions. The committee expressed general apprehension at 
the prospect of solidifying Ishmael’s position, suggesting that he too aggressively challenged the 
214 
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SPA’s interests. At the same time, committee members reaffirmed the importance of preserving 
the MPCA given the likelihood that the Jagan faction of the PPP would win a majority at the 
polls later in the year.
216
 
Despite suggesting that the MPCA had developed “as well as could be expected,” 
 
Woodcock doubted the union would withstand the political attacks he expected during the 
electoral process. Woodcock argued that “if by the end of the year the MPCA still exist[s] it 
would be a real victory.” Eccles suggested that the MPCA’s position deteriorated since 
Woodcock’s visit making its position in advance of the election even more precarious than the 
TUC realized. A TUC report in May confirmed that the MPCA claimed only fifteen percent of 




Eccles agreed that Ishmael’s antagonizing estate managers and disunity in the labor movement 
resulting from conflict between Ishmael and Tello most significantly inhibited the Guianese trade 
unions’ effective development. Regardless, British and American labor leaders and government 
officials widely agreed that Tello was the most effective trade union leader in the colony. 
Ironically, given his support for Tello, Woodcock noted that the Ishmael-Tello rivalry 
originated with Tello’s maneuvers in 1953 and that Ishmael was justified in his hostility. 
Specifically, Tello formed a breakaway union and re-started the BGTUC against TUC advice 
after he lost his position in the MPCA to Ishmael in 1953.  Furthermore, Tello’s position in the 
interim government compromised his reputation among sugar workers. Woodcock suggested that 
Tello might be more effective working for CADORIT rather than in British Guiana as a result of 
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experienced” to lose to an organization “preaching the doctrines of American trade unionism,” 
echoing the consistent British fear of American ideas taking hold in the colony. In his final 
analysis, Woodcock reiterated Tello’s theme at the CADORIT meeting the previous April and 
recommended against financial assistance for the BGTUC with the expectation that aid would 
encourage “laziness and incompetence” from the “weak and incompetent organization.”
218 
Despite Woodcock’s skepticism, the TUC General Council expressed satisfaction with reports of 
the MPCA’s development and wage and benefit increases for sugar workers in early 1957. As a 
result, the TUC continued to send £220 grants to the Guianese union throughout the year.
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The TUC, OEF, and Colonial Office meeting illuminates one additional aspect of the 
 
British institution-building project in Guiana as it stood in 1957 prior to the election that has not 
been previously addressed. Specifically, it suggests that TUC leaders attempted to directly 
influence Guianese politics. Discussions regarding Tello suggest that TUC representatives 
encouraged his participation in the Legislative Council and that Woodcock offered general 
advice on how he should act in his position. Despite reservations, the TUC supported Tello’s 
dual participation in politics and organized labor rendering inconsistent claims that the British 
union did not support connections between trade unions and politics in the colonies. Colonial 
officials and TUC leaders cited labor-party connections as a central aspect of their argument 
against the PPP and TUC support for Tello suggests that British labor leaders accepted colonial 
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Similarly, in 1960 Governor Ralph Grey lamented that sugar workers supported Ishmael “in purely trade union 
matters” and the PPP politically. Grey’s disappointment that sugar workers did not support Ishmael in political as 
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In addition to trade union vulnerability, the persistence of sugar workers’ strikes suggests 
that ongoing tension between workers and employers contributed to instability in Guianese labor 
relations. Ishmael planned a colony-wide strike of sugar workers to protest unemployment on 
sugar estates and low wages among factory workers after winning re-election in the MPCA in 
February 1957. The MPCA president rescinded the strike call on February 12 or 13 at the behest 
of Commissioner of Labor Ramphal, perhaps hinting at Ishmael’s turn toward a slightly less 
aggressive stance in labor relations. Despite the reversal, workers on at least two estates struck 
and police dispersed striking workers at Skelton using tear gas and a Greener gun, injuring 
thirteen. In the aftermath of the violence, the MPCA held a 48-hour strike across the colony and 
strikers at Skelton reassembled to strike for three additional weeks. More telling, an estate 
colonial official noted that workers at Skelton had “one of the best management/labor 
relationships of any estate.” Intelligence reports noted that no political parties were involved in 
the strikes; however, both the Jagan and Burnham factions aggressively criticized the colonial 
government in the aftermath of the violence. Thus, institution-building efforts failed to alter 
severely depressed conditions and intelligence officials feared that political attacks against the 




The TUC sent its representative to Trinidad, Martin Pounder, to British Guiana in May to 
evaluate the MPCA and assist the Guianese sugar workers in negotiating with the SPA in an 
attempt to achieve a negotiating victory for an anti-Jagan group prior to the election. The 
negotiations resulted in the MPCA’s acceptance, under protest, of a seven and one-half percent 
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increase in the cost-of-living allowance and the colony’s first sickness benefit plan. Nonetheless, 
the MCPA petitioned the governor to increase the sugar’s local selling price to support a more 
substantial wage increase. Pounder suggested the union grew slightly as a result of intermittent 
wage gains, increasing its membership from just over 1,600 in 1955 to about 4,600 in mid- 
1957.
222 
British intelligence reports suggested that sugar workers reacted positively to the 
 
increase and that “the atmosphere on the estates is better than it has been for some time.” Of 
greater concern to colonial officials were reports that the Jagan faction abandoned its plan to 
build the BGSWU after an ineffective year of organization in order to return to a strategy of 
“penetrating” the MPCA.
223 
Most significantly, the MPCA obtained a check-off system in the 




Thus, two years of institution-building helped the MPCA achieve notable advances. 
However, efforts to build a strong sugar workers’ union remained incomplete. Criticisms of the 
MPCA are accurate in noting the organization’s conservatism and inability to overcome planters 
hold on the economy to meaningfully address workers’ dire poverty. However, scholarly 
condemnation of the union underappreciates the significance of precedent-setting advances such 
as the colony’s first sickness benefit plan and the initiation of a check-off system on the sugar 
estates.
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The BGSWU’s failure to gain popularity among sugar workers suggests that the 
 
MPCA gained at least some support as a mechanism for negotiating with employers. Ishmael’s 
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union leaders did not think he was the “responsible” leader they needed to head the sugar 
workers union and either believed or accused him of using his position in the MPCA merely as a 
means of political advancement. However, the tactics that led British leaders to view Ishmael as 
irresponsible improved the union’s standing among sugar workers. 
While the TUC continued its efforts to build the MPCA, American labor leaders and 
Western labor internationals increased their support for the BGTUC and Tello. Luis Alberto 
Monge and Harry Pollak visited British Guiana in late March and early April 1957, traveling 
with Tello and appearing on Radio Demerara to express support for BGTUC. Monge assured 
listeners that ORIT supported the Guianese workers and planned to “intensify [ORIT’s] support 
to our friends in British Guiana,” following through with a six-hundred dollar donation from 
ORIT for the BGTUC in late-summer 1957.
226 
Pollak assured the Guianese that he would discuss 
 
the colony’s problems with American labor leaders and “seek means to assist the trade union 
movement in the area” while assuring workers that their situation could best be improved 
through the establishment of a trade union movement free from political control.
227 
Moreover, 
the United Steelworkers of America donated a public address system to the BGTUC and the 




A. John Cope, the former ICA representative and newly appointed American Consul in 
 
British Guiana, reported optimistically to the State Department that Guianese unions continued 
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However, Cope warned the State Department that the Jagan faction continued 
to challenge Western influence in the Guianese labor movement and cited the SWFU’s recent 
suspension of its Acting General Secretary, Patrick Alleyne, a Jagan faction candidate for the 
Legislative Council in the August elections.  Alleyne requested assistance from the CLC in a 
letter aggressively criticizing “American penetration in the trade union movement through the 
ICFTU, CADORIT, and the AFL-CIO under the guise of financial and moral support” and 
sending greetings to a WFTU affiliated organization. Alleyne argued in his defense that the 
Executive Council of the SFWU approved the letter and that his suspension was an attempt to 
undermine his candidacy in the August elections. Crucially, Cope turned to Tello for information 
and Tello explained that Alleyne was acting on Cheddi Jagan’s behalf, noting that Jagan had 
been General President of the SWFU from 1950 to 1956. Tello informed Cope that “leftist 
sources” in Brussels provided information suggesting that Communists previously agreed to use 
the CLC to fund Jagan as a reward for his commitment to the Communist cause.
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It is unclear whether Tello passed along accurate information or used the situation as an 
 
opportunity to solidify his own position, particularly since Alleyne’s letter also strongly 
criticized the BGTUC. Nonetheless, the Alleyne letter incident provides further evidence that 
Tello served as a crucial source of information for American trade union leaders and government 
officials. Regardless of his motivations or the legitimacy of his claims, the BGTUC General 
Secretary exercised a considerable influence on American interpretations of Guianese politics 





A. John Cope to Department of State July 16, 1957, Box 13, RG 84, Classified General Records, NARA II. Cope 
worked for the ICA before taking a position as Consul in British Guiana and gained some familiarity with the colony 
through ICA programs. 
230 
A. John Cope to Department of State, July 30, 1957, 841D.062/7-3057, Box 4814, RG 59, Central Decimal File, 




Secondly, the letter suggests that the PPP continued to seek cooperation with 
international labor organizations that were not part of the ICFTU, ORIT, or CADORIT 
increasing the internationalization of the trade union conflict in British Guiana. 
The PPP won a majority of seats in the August elections, eliciting concern from 
American officials who felt that despite some collaboration British officials were not entirely 
cooperative in joint efforts to oppose Jagan before the election. Under-Secretary of State Robert 
Murphy ominously warned the British Ambassador that the United States would protect its 
interests in the Western Hemisphere despite a general reluctance to interfere in British territories. 
The guarded conversation further hinted that British officials intervened to build anti-Jagan 
parties and noted that British and American development projects prioritized undermining the 




officials expressed concern at the extent of American influence in mid-1957 while criticizing the 




Ultimately, TUC, Colonial Office, AFL-CIO, FOA/ICA, ICFTU, ORIT, and CADORIT 
 
institution-building efforts in British Guiana between 1954 and 1957 were somewhat effective in 
developing capitalist-oriented, moderately democratic trade unions. This conclusion is  
significant because the institutional foundations for a functioning society existed in an embryonic 
stage in 1957 despite colonialism’s repressive nature and ongoing conflict between Guianese 
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seeds of ethnic violence, bureaucratic dysfunction, and repressive government existed; however, 
the colony was predisposed as late as 1957 toward economic development, political democracy, 
and stability. As Lange suggests, developmental reforms during the 1950s were limited; 
however, important advances in institutional development took place between 1954 and 1957.
234
 
Nonetheless, important precedents in labor legislation and collective bargaining did not 
 
alleviate sugar workers’ considerable poverty. The MPCA and BGTUC experienced improved 
organization, small increases in membership, and minor improvements in funding, and obtained 
some concessions from employers. However, the unions were financially unstable and dependent 
on external assistance, were weakened as a result of leaders’ personal rivalries, and did not 
fundamentally alter the impoverished conditions under which Guianese workers’ labored. As a 
result, workers supported a change in union leadership by late 1957. While the PPP continued to 
seek its own external connections to strengthen affiliated unions, evidence in British and 
American archives does not suggest that there was substantial CLC and WFTU support for the 
PPP during the period. When the PPP returned to power after the August 1957 elections, the PPP 
continued to seek a union with which to gain support and engaged in legislative struggles that 
shaped the labor movement between 1957 and 1964. However, it primarily focused on obtaining 
external assistance for development and improving economic connections abroad since its base 
of support and transnational labor connections were eroded. 
The PPP victory in 1957 increased the Americanization of external influence in British 
Guiana and the global and regional context in which it occurred was important. British and 
American institution-building programs in British Guiana stalled in early 1957. While American 
labor unions increased their involvement in the colony in response to the election, the TUC 
dismissed colonial officials’ irritated appeals to re-establish British trade union connections in 
234 




Moreover, British policymakers embraced full-scale decolonization after the Suez 
Crisis in 1956 and the Cuban Revolution challenged United States hegemony in the Caribbean 
after 1959.
236 
As a result, American policymakers’ increasingly aggressive pursuit of American 
objectives at the diplomatic level complemented the slow Americanization of development and 
institution building in British Guiana throughout the 1950s that portended a transition from 
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Chapter 7: The Fracturing of British Guiana, 1957-1961 
 
British Guiana’s institutional decolonization changed as a result of domestic labor 
conflicts and changes to Anglo-American institution-building between 1957 and 1961 in ways 
that laid the foundation for the violence that rocked the colony from 1962 to 1965. British and 
American institution-building between 1954 and 1957 contributed to the establishment of 
important precedents in Guianese trade union development; however, advancements only 
incrementally helped impoverished workers while generating negative side-effects that worsened 
the situation for others. In part, sugar workers’ continued impoverishment contributed to the re- 
election of the People’s Progressive Party (PPP) when the Colonial Office implemented the 
Renison Constitution, named for the colonial governor Patrick Renison, establishing restricted 
self-government in British Guiana in August 1957. 
At the same time, the PPP’s efforts to work through the Manpower Citizens’ Association 
(MPCA) underlay union president Richard Ishmael’s adoption of an authoritarian position within 
the organization. Moreover, racial tensions increased dramatically as the predominantly East 
Indian PPP assumed the position of employer to the colony’s public sector unions—the vast 
majority of whom were Afro-Guianese. Thus, conflict between the PPP and MPCA, and tensions 
between the PPP and Afro-Guianese over labor relations, fractured Guianese society between 
1957 and 1961. Ultimately, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) financing of anti-PPP forces in 
1962 and 1963 prolonged tense protests and allowed social unrest to be driven toward violence 
for political purposes. 
The most important developments in Guianese institutional decolonization between 1957 
and 1961 involved the colony’s trade unionists, political leaders, and workers, rather than British 
or American trade unionists in the colony. Four overlapping trends best explain these changes. 
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First, the PPP continued to pursue socialism in British Guiana, while Cheddi Jagan moderated 
some of the party’s tactics in response to the Renison Constitution’s restrictions on Guianese 
autonomy.
1 
Second, disagreements regarding trade unions’ institutional role and the appropriate 
international orientation of the Guianese labor movement led to a significant increase in conflict 
between leadership of the MPCA and the PPP. MPCA President Richard Ishmael undermined 
democracy within the union while the PPP used a variety of methods to displace the union’s 
leadership and eventually replace the organization altogether. Third, the PPP’s position as head 
of government placed the party in opposition to the predominantly Afro-Guianese civil service 
workers in ongoing debates over government employees’ wages and working conditions. As a 
result, government workers became politicized against the PPP, which contributed to increasing 
racial tensions within the colony. Finally, general labor unrest led to workers’ movements to 
unionize throughout the colony and the struggles for recognition increased Guianese trade union 
connections to the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL- 
CIO). Ultimately, the return of partial self-government in British Guiana contributed to moving 
trade union conflicts into the political sphere, and governmental debates regarding the labor 
movement shaped British and American analyses of Guianese politics. 
British and American policymakers interpreted the PPP’s election differently; however, 
at the highest levels policymakers agreed to oppose the PPP’s attempt at social revolution and to 
prepare to suspend the constitution should the PPP pursue a course similar to that which it 
followed in 1953.
2 
At the same time, British and American officials in Guiana and in the 
International Cooperation Administration (ICA) suggested working with the PPP government as 
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a way to encourage Jagan to moderate the party’s policy further while alleviating the poverty that 
underlay support for the party.
3 
Perhaps most importantly, institution-building programs 
floundered as the Trades Union Congress (TUC) retreated from its role in the colony and 
disagreement between the TUC and AFL-CIO in the International Confederation of Free Trade 
Unions (ICFTU) impeded collaborative programs to develop the Guianese labor movement. As a 
result, the MPCA and BGTUC grew increasingly reliant on the AFL-CIO for support, and the 
American labor leaders became progressively more dependent on reformist Guianese trade 
unionists in their opposition to the PPP. 
The Guianese labor movement continued to grow between 1957 and 1961 in part as a 
result of Anglo-American trade union and government efforts to strengthen a capitalist-oriented 
labor movement in British Guiana. More importantly, Guianese labor leaders and workers 
persistently struggled to establish functional trade unions and achieved significant successes  
even though conflict undermined the labor movement as a whole. Nonetheless, the depth of 
poverty resulting from colonialism and from the asymmetries of power between Guianese 
workers and foreign capital was too severe for a moderately successful capitalist labor movement 
to reform rapidly enough to generate popular support for the unions, particularly when the PPP 
promoted more drastic change. 
Close examination of the conflict within the labor movement over British Guiana’s 
institutional framework and analysis of PPP materials suggest that the PPP continued its pursuit 
of social revolution, and that the party’s governing strategy centered on advancing toward self- 
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period between 1957 and 1961 focuses on examining the colony’s political developments and 
emphasizes PPP moderation, though scholars disagree on the reasons the party’s governing 
methods differed from 1953. 
Leo Despres argues that the PPP temporarily cooperated with the Colonial Office out of 
necessity after Cheddi Jagan concluded that the party could not pursue social revolution until it 
became head of an independent government. As a result, Despres suggests that the PPP adopted 
a conciliatory position designed to solidify its support among East Indians and pursue self- 
government.
4 
Similarly, Clem Seecharan argues that Jagan remained committed to breaking the 
capitalist system in British Guiana. Seecharan suggests that the Jagans’ uncompromising 
Marxism impeded reform efforts advanced by the Colonial Office and Booker Brothers chairman 
Jock Campbell despite the party’s restrained rhetoric.
5 
Robert Waters and Gordon Daniels’s 
study of the 1964 strike also suggests that the PPP’s moderation between 1957 and 1964 was a 
change in tactics meant to bide time until British withdrawal, and that it did not constitute a 




Conversely, Stephen Rabe argues that Cheddi Jagan attempted to cooperate with British 
 
and American officials while pursuing social change. More importantly, Rabe notes that British 
and American interpretations of the August 12, 1957 election differed considerably. Rabe 
suggests that, after the election, British officials tended toward a reevaluation of the 1953 
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Jagan government to succeed or fail on its own may have more effectively served British 
interests. On the other hand, Rabe argues that American policymakers continued to uphold the 
notion that the suspension was necessary. Assessments of the newly elected government, Rabe 
suggests, reflected the differing interpretations of 1953. British officials prepared to work with a 
seemingly moderated Jagan-led government and American officials recommitted to the Anglo- 
American policy of undermining the PPP pursued since October 1953.
7 
Similarly, Colin Palmer 
 
argues that Cheddi Jagan retained his Marxist values but did not attempt to govern as a Marxist 




The Anglo-American Response to the 1957 Election 
 
British and American government officials, labor leaders, and businesses invested in 
Guiana argued that a labor movement dominated by the left wing of the Cheddi and Janet Jagan- 
led PPP most directly threatened capitalism in the colony after the suspension of the Waddington 
Constitution in 1953. As a result, an array of British, American, and international labor leaders 
engaged in institution-building to undermine the Jagan-led faction of the PPP and the party’s 
prospects for electoral victory as the colony advanced toward self-government. Ultimately, 
Anglo-American institution-building programs in British Guiana between 1954 and 1957 
intended to establish a liberal capitalist-oriented labor movement to protect British and American 
strategic and economic interests and promote political democracy in Guyana after 
independence.
9 
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restricted the improvements achieved for unionized workers on sugar estates and increased the 
dependency of Guianese unions on external financial assistance. At the same time, gains for 
unionized sugar workers frequently came at the expense of displaced field workers. The MPCA’s 
inability to substantially improve the lives of rural East Indians despite institutional advancement 
reinforced the tendency of Guianese sugar workers to look to the PPP for political alleviation of 
their impoverished condition. 
At the same time, lack of cohesion between British and American labor leaders in the 
ICFTU undermined organization’s usefulness as a labor international. Reformist Guianese labor 
leaders trying to establish trade unions to support a capitalist economic system needed external 
assistance to finance their stagnated movement and pressure employers, whose influence over 
the Guianese economy and society was nearly absolute. However, the AFL-TUC conflict in the 
ICFTU made it necessary for Guianese labor leaders to spend a great deal of time traveling to 
England and the United States to obtain assistance the ICFTU failed to provide. British and 
American uncertainty about whether to channel assistance to the Guianese unions through the 
ICFTU exacerbated the problem and resulted in several of the most significant Guianese trade 
unionists traveling to Western Europe and throughout Latin America rather than organizing on 
the sugar plantations. Moreover, the Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers (ORIT) 
and Caribbean Area Division of the Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers 
(CADORIT), the ICFTU’s regional associations, achieved limited success in assisting the 
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shortcomings to the organizations’ subordination to the AFL-CIO and TUC.
10 
Ultimately, 
employers’ resistance to substantive changes in labor relations made the internationalization of 
the labor struggle in British Guiana necessary. However, reliance on external trade unions 
disrupted grassroots organizing and weakened the local nature of the labor movement while 
leaving Guianese trade unions financially dependent on outside assistance. 
The August 1957 elections that replaced the interim government with the Renison 
Constitution laid bare institution-building’s failure to achieve British and American political 
objectives.
11 
The new constitution served as a moderate advance toward Guianese self- 
government which Colin Palmer suggests was effectively closer to re-establishing an 
authoritarian Crown colony than providing meaningful autonomy in British Guiana. Under the 
new government, fourteen of the twenty-eight seats in the Legislative Council were elected 
positions and the remaining fourteen were divided between eleven members nominated by the 
governor and three ex officio members. Palmer argues that the equal balance of elected 
representatives and appointed positions in the Executive Council and the governor’s reserve veto 
powers constituted a continuation of the period of politically “marking time.” Despite British and 
American attempts to use institution building projects to increase support for the PPP’s 
opposition and British gerrymandering of electoral districts prior to the August 12 election, the 
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After the election, the Forbes Burnham-led faction ended its claim to represent the PPP 
and formed the People’s National Congress (PNC). 
American officials, as Rabe and Palmer suggest, expressed considerable discontent about 
the Jagan faction’s electoral victory and criticized British policies between 1953 and 1957 while 
threatening intervention if American interests were challenged.
13 
Domestic politics also 
influenced the State Department’s response to the Guianese election. As Chester Pach notes in 
The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World, and the Globalization of the Cold War, 
contentious debates and appropriations struggles regarding foreign aid programs shaped 
American politics throughout the 1950s.
14 
In the environment of broad foreign policy debates, 
the British Embassy reported to the Foreign Office on August 17 that American government 
officials were “embarrassed politically in view of the Foreign Aid debate and the amount of 
technical assistance” committed to British Guiana between 1954 and 1957.
15 
Nonetheless, an 
ICA report analyzing the situation in British Guiana in 1959 suggests that American officials 
held a more complex view than the State Department. The report argues that Cheddi Jagan “can 
be dealt with as a Communist leader who is presently friendly and whose economic and social 
policies are acceptable, whose freedom of action is circumscribed by British authority, and who 
appears to be independent of ties to Russian Communism.” It is important to note that the ICA 
report concluded that assisting “the British government in its efforts to encourage the 
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Government” was “essential to our overall political and security objectives.”
16 
Carroll Woods, 
who became the American Consul in British Guiana in September 1958, similarly encouraged a 
substantial increase in ICA programs in the colony in September 1959. Woods warned the State 
Department that ICA programs between 1954 and 1959 were insufficient in combatting Guianese 
social maladies, including unemployment and malnutrition. Significantly, Woods warned that 
Cheddi Jagan was “openly flirting” with the “Soviet bloc with approval [of the] majority [of the] 
electorate.”
17 
Thus, at least some departments of the United States government advocated 
cooperation with the PPP during the 1957-1961 government; however, American officials did 
not agree on the extent to which Cheddi Jagan posed a direct threat to United States interests by 
engaging the Soviet Union. 
As Rabe notes, British colonial officials and investors expressed a moderation in their 
opposition to the now Jagan faction-dominated PPP; however, British policy was also 
inconsistent. Close reading of a note from newly appointed Prime Minister Harold Macmillan to 
Colonial Secretary Alan Lennox-Boyd suggests that the official British policy toward the colony 
in 1957 mirrored British policy in 1953. Macmillan instructed Boyd to keep American officials 
closely informed with developments in British Guiana since United States defense of British 
policy in 1953 was critical “in keeping the other Latin Americans quiet.” Crucially, Macmillan 
argued that retaining open lines of communication was imperative in case a similar suspension 
became necessary in 1957.
18 
The Prime Minister’s note suggests a British policy of limiting 
 
Guianese autonomy and a willingness to use force if challenged even if the Colonial Office 
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employed more conciliatory rhetoric. The Colonial Office’s cooperative posture and the 
difference between 1953 and 1957 were attributable to the limited nature of the 1957 
constitution. As Palmer argues, the Renison Constitution included constitutional safeguards 
reserving power in the governor’s hands to render impossible a PPP attempt to pursue policies 
similar to 1953, and British officials took pains to impress that point on the State Department.
19
 
The PPP’s rhetoric between 1957 and 1961 suggests that the party’s leaders understood 
 
the constitution’s limitations and calculated their actions in a manner that contributed to British 
willingness to cautiously work with the newly elected government. In 1959, Cheddi Jagan noted 
in the PPP’s journal, Thunder, that the party remained committed to socialism with the objective 
of progressing into the “second stage” wherein society would be based on the principle “to each 
according to his need, from each according to his ability.” Nonetheless, Jagan assured readers 
that as elected socialists the PPP had to accept temporary limitations. Specifically, Jagan noted 
that socialism could not be implemented immediately and that because of colonialism “the PPP 
is in office but not in power.”
20 
Jagan’s views articulated in 1959 remained consistent with his 
 




Even so, a close examination of the PPP’s attempts to institutionally alter labor relations 
suggests that the party’s moderation between 1957 and 1961 is overstated. In his autobiography, 
The West on Trial, Jagan noted the limitations the Rension Constitution placed on the PPP. Jagan 
also describes Renison’s encouragement of “talking out” issues on which PPP ministers and 
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British-appointed members of the legislative bodies disagreed as a tactic the governor regularly 
employed to impede the introduction of controversial legislation. Crucially, Jagan lists 
legislation aimed at polling sugar workers to determine union recognition as among the 
“fundamental issues” undermined through Renison’s process of talking out.
22 
There is no 
evidence of a labor bill in archival records, likely as a result of Rension’s killing the proposal 
before a one could be introduced. However, if the PPP attempted to pursue the issue as Jagan 
suggests, then the party moved to introduce legislation that Jagan described in the same way as 
the controversial Labor Relations Bills that preceded the British suspension of the Waddington 
Constitution in 1953 and that initiated massive American-funded strikes in 1963. Therefore, 
Jagan acknowledged that the PPP moderated its actions while still pursuing social revolution and 
the moderation to which the party leader referred was less significant than even close 
examination of legislative records suggests. 
Regardless of the PPP’s commitment to social revolution, Jagan convinced colonial 
officials of the party’s willingness to govern moderately. Renison informed Secretary Boyd that 
he believed in Jagan’s sincere desire to establish a responsible government. Renison told Boyd 
that PPP leaders understood that they could not pursue radical or fundamental changes to the 
structure of the Guianese social or political-economic system at the time.
23 
Boyd wrote to 
Renison on August 23 explaining three policymaking priorities in the colony emphasizing “the 
ultimate responsibility of H.M.G. of both the legitimate interests of Commonwealth and United 
States governments and legitimate outside economic interests” and the importance of preserving 
British authority to protect those interests. Boyd suggested that Renison should cooperate with 
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that Renison nominate members to the Executive Council acceptable to Jagan while insisting that 
the governor should not allow Jagan himself to nominate members for the council.
24 
Most 
importantly, Renison constantly worked to build the colony’s trade union movement as an 
institutional bulwark against the possibility that the PPP would try to restructure Guianese 
society after independence.
25 
Thus, the Prime Minister and Foreign Office did not fundamentally 
alter their policy toward the PPP. Some colonial officials and British employers in Guiana 
cooperated with Cheddi Jagan based on the assumption that the new government’s power was 




While colonial officials continued to jealously guard their prerogatives in shaping 
 
colonial affairs, information-sharing with United States policymakers in 1957 suggests a growing 
acceptance of the expanding American role in the Caribbean.
27 
As Stephen Rabe suggests, 
British policymakers did not discuss the suspension of the Waddington Constitution in 1953 with 
American officials.
28 
Between 1953 and 1957 British officials staunchly refuted the notion of 
American influence over policymaking toward British Guiana while courting American support 
for colonial policies. Despite attempts to cooperate in institution building, American officials 
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suggested that there was no such disconnect.
29 
Nonetheless, the decision to increase exchange of 
information did not entirely alter British parochialism and Colonial Office representatives 
carefully avoided giving American officials the impression that increased in shared information 
were tantamount to consultation on questions of colonial policy.
30 
Ultimately, Anglo-American 
collaboration on questions of policy toward British Guiana increased at the highest-levels while 
colonial officials continued to resist American influence. 
British and American policymakers and labor leaders re-evaluated the purpose and 
methods of institution building programs as a result of the PPP’s victory in the 1957 election. In 
early September British and American policymakers discussed how to move forward with 
institution-building efforts in light of the PPP’s victory. On September 4 the British Colonial 
Attaché and the British ambassador in Washington D.C. met with Robert Murphy, Deputy under 
Secretary of State for Political Affairs, to continue Anglo-American discussions regarding the 
Guianese elections. British officials noted that one of the primary American concerns was Janet 
Jagan’s appointment as Minister of Labor for the new government and the possibility that she 
would use her position to strengthen the Guiana Industrial Workers’ Union’s (GIWU) links to 
the communist-dominated World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU).
31 
The American concern 
 
belies a lack of understanding of the Guianese labor movement. The GIWU broke from the Jagan 
faction of the PPP in conjunction with the PPP’s split in January 1955 and Renison’s response to 
an inquiry from the British ambassador in Washington strongly refuted the alleged claims of 
GIWU-WFTU connections.
32 
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Minister of Labor suggests that the PPP placed paramount importance on using the structures of 
government to address workers’ needs and increase the party’s ability to shape the Guianese 
labor movement. The American response to Jagan’s appointment is evidence that the State 
Department considered the labor movement the heart of the struggle to determine the nature of 
Guianese independence. 
International Labor Developments and American Labor’s Expanded Connections in British 
Guiana 
Tensions between British and American labor leaders further disrupted Guianese 
institution building. AFL and TUC leaders disagreed about trade union methods since the early 
twentieth century and each advocated international agendas that advanced their nations’ interests, 
which led to long-term tension and occasional conflict between the unions that increased with the 
onset of the Cold War. The slow evolution of colonial policy toward decolonization increased  
the AFL-CIO’s influence in British colonies and amplified tensions between the unions as the 
1950s progressed. AFL-CIO-TUC cooperation in British Guiana was unique given the acute 
Anglo-American trade union rivalry in Africa; however, the impact of trade union conflict 
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First, AFL-CIO conflict with the TUC undermined the establishment of an effective 
internationally-supported institution building program operated through the ICFTU. Specifically, 
lack of British and American cohesion in the ICFTU impeded organizational unity and sense of 
shared purpose while administrative disagreements diverted attention from institution building 
efforts in underdeveloped areas.
34 
Second, AFL-CIO-TUC tension limited cooperation between 
British and American efforts in Guiana before the TUC conceded AFL-CIO predominance in the 
colony after 1957. The AFL-CIO’s ascension resulted in a change to institution building tactics. 
AFL-CIO policy focused on supporting individual Guianese trade union leaders and using 
relationships with Guianese unions to support political objectives rather than emphasizing broad- 
based institution building at the grassroots level and the pursuit of economic achievements. 
 
General international disagreements in the ICFTU further disrupted collaborative AFL- 
CIO-TUC involvement in British Guiana. In November 1957 Charles Millard, ICFTU Director 
of Organization, proposed that the TUC should aid colonies through the ICFTU as a way to end 
the AFL-CIO’s policy of independently aiding colonial unions.
35 
CIO President Walter Reuther 
expressed general agreement with the policy of ending national unions’ independent activities, 
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participate in ICFTU Executive Board meetings. Nonetheless, Reuther suggested that exceptions 
could be made if independent activities were conducted within the ICFTU’s framework.
36
 
Labor historian Anthony Carew suggests that George Meany, president of the AFL-CIO, 
and Jay Lovestone, the most influential member of the AFL-CIO’s International Affairs 
Department, dismissed Millard’s call for ending independent activities despite a weak 
commitment to accede to working through the ICFTU.
37 
At the same time, the TUC continued to 
operate autonomously. Together, AFL-CIO and TUC actions suggest that advancing national 
interests superseded appeals to international solidarity for British and American labor leaders.
38 
Moreover, ORIT policies in Latin America and the AFL-CIO’s influence in the organization 
increased tensions between American trade union leaders and the international labor 
movement.
39 
Nonetheless, the AFL-CIO-TUC efforts in British Guiana were not as contentious 
as was the case in other parts of the world and Lovestone even rejected a request for aid from 
Rupert Tello of the British Guiana Trade Union Council (BGTUC) in 1958 citing the AFL-CIO’s 
agreement not to independently intervene in the colony.
40
 
Guianese-American trade union relationships increased outside of institution building 
 
projects in the mid-1950s as well, and individual American unions became involved in the 
colony as part of an effort to expand organizing internationally. Not all Guianese labor struggles 
unfolded in a Cold War context. Rather, some Guianese unions peacefully integrated into the 
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Western international system. On October 15, 1957 Nick Zonarich and George Rattinger of the 
United Steelworkers of America (USW) visited British Guiana in the company of Ken Sterling 
of CADORIT. The trade union leaders met with officials of the British Guiana Mine Workers 
Union (BGMWU) at Mackenzie.
41 
USW representatives had experience in Guiana, having 
donated a public address system to the BGTUC in 1956 and visited the colony in March 1957. 
Zonarich’s public criticism of mineworkers’ wages during his March visit initiated a backlash 
from the Demerara Bauxite Company (Demba), a member of the Aluminum Limited Group of 
Companies based in Canada and the United States.
42 
In response to Zonarich’s criticism, Demba 
representatives appealed to A. John Cope, the American Consul in Georgetown, condemning 
Zonarich for inaccurately suggesting that Demba paid sub-standard wages. In addition to 
suggesting that Zonarich’s reproach undermined “the most happy employer-employee 
relationships within the colony,” Demba’s appeal accused the American unionist of aiding local 
communists, a criticism that resonated with Cope and the American Consul suggested that 
United States government officials should impress on American unionists the delicacy of 
Guianese labor relations to discourage similar statements during future visits.
43
 
Hugh Roach, Public Relations Officer for Demba, leveled similar condemnations of 
 
Zonarich and Sterling in October when he accused the men of agitating for strike action among 
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disrupt the existing wage pattern in the colony and lead to runaway inflation.
44 
Nonetheless, the 
BGTUC-sponsored radio program “Union Call” assured the Guianese that Zonarich and the 
USW expressed strong interest in establishing close association with Caribbean labor unions 
particularly in the bauxite mining industry. The program cited Zonarich’s agreement to purchase 
a high powered motor boat to assist the BGMWU in organizational efforts as evidence of the 
USW’s increased support for Guianese bauxite workers.
45 
Thus, the motives driving American 
trade union involvement in British Guiana varied; however, individual unions, as opposed to the 
national front AFL-CIO, built relationships emphasizing industrial matters rather than narrow 
Cold War objectives. Ultimately, efforts to integrate Guianese unions into the Western 
international system continued to increase the internationalization of labor struggles in the 
colony after the PPP’s election in 1957. 
Guianese Trade Union Conflicts and the PPP’s Alienation from the Labor Movement 
 
The Colonial Office, TUC, and Overseas Employers’ Federation (OEF) expressed 
considerable skepticism that the MPCA would survive the political attacks expected to emerge 
during the 1957 election.
46 
The MPCA withstood the PPP’s political attacks more effectively 
than British officials predicted in mid-1957 largely as a result of President Richard Ishmael’s 
anti-democratic measures to retain control of the union.  Martin Pounder of the TUC visited 
British Guiana in December and reported to the General Council that institution building efforts 
successfully solidified the MPCA, that membership increased considerably, and that the sugar 
workers’ union was prepared to be financially self-sufficient. In evaluating the union’s progress 
the council noted that the MPCA won a ten-percent wage increase, an additional eight-day pay 
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bonus during the second half of 1957, and that the colony’s first sickness benefit scheme began 
on January 1, 1958. Moreover, the MPCA was able to fund three full-time field officers and 
fifteen part-time assistants to aid in expanding the union’s influence.
47 
TUC leaders determined 
that the MPCA was “in better shape than ever before” and Governor Patrick Renison argued that 
the MPCA was “as good as almost any Union in the Caribbean” a year later.
48
 
Nonetheless, conflict for control of the MPCA intensified after the PPP’s victory in the 
 
August elections and colonial officials acknowledged that Ishmael manipulated the union to 
exclude PPP influence in late 1957. In October Ishmael attempted to remove three PPP members 
from the MPCA on the grounds that they no longer worked in the sugar industry.
49 
In January 
1958 MPCA leaders rejected Balram Singh Rai’s nomination to contest the union’s presidency 
as a result of his membership in the PPP. The BGTUC supported the MPCA leaders’ decision 
and passed a series of resolutions aimed at undermining the PPP’s attempts to gain influence in 
the MPCA.
50 
Consequently, Ishmael won an uncontested election to retain his position as MPCA 
 
president after removing Rai from the ballot. MPCA leaders amended the union’s rules allowing 
Ishmael to retain the presidency for three years after expressing fears that PPP members might 
ascend to positions of prominence in the MPCA. MPCA rules were altered further in February to 
complicate the admission of persons not directly employed in sugar industries as a way to avoid 
including PPP leaders in the union. BGTUC leaders effectively endorsed the MPCA’s policies 
when General Secretary Rupert Tello dismissed complaints about the new MPCA rules raised in 
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Thus, anti-PPP trade union leaders used their organizations as an institutional 
barrier to exclude PPP members from participation in the established labor movement. 
The PPP took a dual approach in responding to Ishmael’s maneuvers. First, Janet Jagan 
appealed to the ICFTU in protest of the election. The American Consul in British Guiana, A. 
John Cope, informed the State Department of Jagan’s appeal and speculated that she also 
contacted the WFTU. Cope’s personal comments noted that only “the irregular electoral 
procedure of the MPCA” kept PPP members Balram Singh Rai and Abdul Sallim from winning 
the union’s election. Nonetheless, Cope dismissed Jagan’s protest as an attempt to embarrass the 
MPCA and BGTUC, exacerbate personal tensions between Tello and Ishmael, and facilitate 
future PPP domination of the trade union movement.
52 
Cope’s comments illuminate a 
 
rationalization for anti-democratic measures as a necessary tactic to preserve democratic 
institutions and United States’ interests in British Guiana that permeated American activities in 
the colony. 
Second, PPP leaders encouraged workers to withdraw permission for automatic 
deduction of dues as part of the check-off system supporting the MPCA. Cope warned the State 
Department that the PPP also renewed efforts to build the British Guiana Sugar Workers’ Union 
(BGSWU) which was registered the previous year in an attempt to give the party a union to rival 
the MPCA.
53 
Despite the PPP’s efforts the MPCA experienced a twenty percent increase in 
membership in the first five months of 1958 to bring its enrollment to 11,500. The PPP returned 
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designed to prevent their success in 1959. Colonial officials suggested that the PPP’s tactical 
shift proved that their effort to form a new union failed.
54 
It is also possible that the PPP shifted 
its policy in response to Renison’s scuttling Jagan’s attempt to reintroduce a labor relations bill 
since the MPCA would remain the sugar workers’ official representative in the absence of 
legislation to force recognition of a PPP-aligned union. Thus, the PPP’s attempt to work through 
the existing institutional structure was rejected damaging the quickly disintegrating possibility of 
cooperation between the colony’ most popular political party and anti-communist Guianese 
leaders. Meanwhile, MPCA leaders continued to work to strengthen the union’s institutional role 
while the struggle for control of the sugar union unfolded when Ishmael met with the Sugar 
Producers’ Association (SPA) in November 1957 to negotiate production targets for 1958.
55 
Wages Council Debate 
On March 22, 1958 Forbes Burnham introduced a proposal in the legislature to establish 
a wages council in the sugar industry. If established, a wages council would give the government 
considerable influence in setting workers’ pay rates. Supporters argued that the MPCA 
ineffectively bargained on behalf of deeply impoverished Guianese sugar workers. Opponents 
countered that empowering the government in wage debates interfered with collective bargaining 
practices, undermined free trade unionism, and threatened the institutional structure of a post- 
colonial liberal capitalist democracy. Burnham’s proposal initiated a debate in the Executive 
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GIWU President and Burnham advisor J.P. Lachmansingh, is important to understanding 
Guianese institutional decolonization between 1958 and 1961 for two reasons. 
First, the bill’s introduction was misattributed to Janet Jagan and used as evidence of the 
PPP’s attack on trade unionism independent of PPP influence. The error reinforced the notion 
that the PPP uncompromisingly sought the destruction of Guianese trade unions and persisted 
even after the mistake was corrected. Janet Jagan received criticism for the bill’s discussion even 
when officials correctly identified Burnham as the original proponent of the legislation. Cope 
informed the State Department that Burnham realized the proposal was a mistake in July and 
attributed the continued conversation to PPP attempts to destroy the MPCA, thus absolving 




colonial officials were unclear of the bills’ origins as late as 1960 which suggests that factual 
inaccuracies muddled analysis of the debate.
57
 
Significantly, the mistake was partially attributable to information passed from Rupert 
Tello to contacts in the Colonial Office and forwarded to the TUC.
58 
Tello also used the 
allegation of “Dr. and Mrs. Jagan’s move to destroy the trade unions by means of their proposed 
wages council” as the justification for requesting financial assistance from the USW during his 
ICA-USW-supported “Foreign Leader” tour of the United States in the summer of 1958.
59 
Tello 
argued that the BGTUC needed money to support organizational efforts rather than previously 
emphasized educational missions to confront the alleged threat emanating from the PPP. While 
appealing for American assistance, Tello assured colonial officials he sought to protect the 
 
56 
A. John Cope, Jr. to Department of State, July 15, 1958, 841D.062/7-1558, Central Decimal Files, Box 4814, RG 
59, NARA II. 
57 
Ralph Grey to Ambler Thomas, February 22, 1960, CO 1031-3421, BNA. 
58 
C.C. Gibbs, Colonial Office to Marjorie Nicholson, International Department of the Trades Union Congress, 
November 19, 1958; C.C. Gibbs to Marjorie Nicholson, January 8, 1959, CO 859-1150, BNA. 
59 
A.M. Morgan, Colonial Office to G.C. Wilson, Minister of Labor and National Service, Overseas Department, 
October 3, 1958; Fred Kennedy to Patrick Renison, November 20, 1958, CO 859-1150, BNA. 
323  
integrity of British trade unionism in Guiana.
60 
Crucially, Tello and Burnham debated the 
proposed wages council from opposing positions in the BGTUC Executive Council; therefore, 
Tello was not misinformed regarding the proposal’s origin but intentionally mislead British and 
American officials and trade unionists. At the same time, Burnham’s motives in proposing the 
bill were also suspect and several colonial officials, including Renison, were under the 
impression that the proposal was a political maneuver intended to undermine the PPP 
government.
61 
In a discussion with Ralph Grey, who replaced Renison as governor in 1960, 
Burnham suggested that his objective was to embarrass the PPP for supporting higher wages in 
the sugar industry while failing to raise wages in the aftermath of the Postal Workers’ strike in 
early 1958.
62 
It is likely that Burnham, like Tello, was insincere in his explanation since he 
supported the wages councils in the BGTUC after Cope’s report. Moreover, Burnham 
resubmitted the proposal in 1959 after the initial bill lapsed.
63
 
The debate about a wages council offers a second insight into institutional decolonization 
 
in addition to the impact of the bill’s association with Janet Jagan. Specifically, it sheds light on 
the challenges Guianese political leaders faced in balancing support for trade unions as 
institutions and advocacy of measures that most effectively addressed workers’ grievances. The 
PPP campaign manifesto opposed wages councils that empowered the Governor to rule on pay 
disagreements between workers and employers. However, the party’s opposition derived from 
the notion that a British governor could hold power over wage rates and did not inherently 
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After Burnham introduced the proposal, Janet Jagan supported the motion and argued 
that sugar workers’ wages lagged behind other businesses in the colony that were less profitable 
than sugar production despite the MPCA’s collective bargaining efforts. Jai Narine Singh, a 
former member of the PPP who joined Burnham and Lachmansingh in initiating the PPP split in 
1955, introduced a minimum wage bill for sugar workers to address what he considered the 
MPCA’s failure to raise wages to a livable rate to counter the proposed wages council. Singh’s 
proposal suggests that regardless of their disagreement on the efficacy of a wages council 
Guianese leaders of opposing political viewpoints acknowledged that the MPCA ineffectively 
served sugar workers despite the union’s gains.
65 
Nonetheless, some members of the Executive 
 
Council suggested that the MPCA’s successful negotiations placed sugar workers in a relatively 
advantageous position compared to workers in other industries with slightly higher wages but 
little means of increasing them in the future.
66
 
Janet Jagan disagreed, arguing that the MPCA efforts were futile, and that workers only 
 
joined the union because of the check-off system, which assured non-union workers would lose 
their jobs if they opted out of the organization. Moreover, she criticized the tendency to evaluate 
sugar workers’ wages based on hourly rates since most field laborers did not work an eight-hour 
day year round and much plantation employment was task-work. Jagan also noted that studies 
suggested sugar workers made less than 80% of urban workers’ weekly wages, less than half of 
bauxite workers, and that unemployment among sugar workers was higher than in other areas of 
the economy.
67 
Nonetheless, there was unified hostility to the wages council proposal outside of 
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voluntary machinery existed to address wage issues in the sugar industry eliminating the need for 
a wages council. The BGTUC and SPA collectively opposed the measure and received strong 
support from Renison and the Guianese Commissioner of Labor James Ramphal.
68
 
Janet Jagan, in her capacity as Minister of Labor, solicited the BGTUC’s views on the 
 
council after Burnham’s proposal. Upon receiving word of the BGTUC’s vehement opposition 
and of Renison’s and Ramphal’s disapproval Jagan allowed the bill to lapse without 
deliberation.
69 
Nonetheless, the debate over a wages council in the sugar industry did not end 
with the expiration of Burnham’s 1958 proposal. According to Cope, BGTUC leaders were not 
as unified in their opposition to the council as their report to Jagan suggested. Cope informed the 
State Department that BGTUC disagreement on the issue of a wages council was so severe that 
union leadership concluded it was impossible to submit an organizational position and ended the 
conversation. Tello aggressively opposed the bill during the July meeting and likely submitted 
the response to Jagan; however, the BGTUC General Secretary left the colony and was not 
present during the final discussion in August.
70
 




Tello wrote a letter protesting Jagan’s proposed appointments to the wages council on July 13 
and followed with an appeal to Renison for a meeting to protest the councils on July 23.
72 
Subsequently Tello wrote to Harry Pollak, Associate Inter-American representative of the AFL- 
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CIO and warned him of Janet Jagan’s appointment of H.J.M. Hubbard as Chairman of the 
proposed wages council. Hubbard, Tello insisted, was “a great believer in the Soviet way of life” 
and staunch supporter of the PPP.
73   
Moreover, the BGTUC officially informed the government 
of its general opposition to the appointment of nominated legislators to the wages council in late 
July.
74 
While records suggest that Janet Jagan and the PPP supported the notion of a wages 
council, Ralph Grey noted that neither Jagan nor the PPP pushed for the council when legislators 
resisted and he suggested the party’s held a nuanced position on empowering the government to 
address employer-employee debates. Grey also “wonder[ed] whether there is not something in 
[Janet Jagan’s] story that the wages are not adequate” though he concluded the Legislative 
Council did not have adequate information to draw such a conclusion.
75
 
Meanwhile, colonial officials attempted to use the debate to aid the SPA in countering 
 
MPCA demands to increase wages in the sugar industry. Negotiations stalled in June 1959 when 
the MPCA demanded a $4 million increase in sugar workers’ pay and the SPA countered with an 
offer of $750,000. Renison warned MPCA leaders through Commissioner of Labor Ramphal that 
failure to agree to arbitration and compromise would suggest a failure of negotiating machinery 
and be used as a justification for the PPP’s imposition of a wages council.
76 
Renison’s use of the 
wages council debate to pressure the MPCA on behalf of the sugar producers suggests that the 
nature of the colonial political-economy impeded the effectiveness of trade unions and 
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negotiate more aggressively left the union open to the charges of weakness that underlie PPP 
support for the wages councils while the question of wages councils limited the possibility of the 
MPCA taking a firmer stance against the SPA. Therefore, the institutional framework of labor 
relations in the colony considerably impeded the MPCA’s effectiveness as a bargaining agent for 
workers. 
Thus, Guianese trade union leaders and government officials responsible for labor 
relations disagreed considerably on the institutional mechanisms that would most effectively 
address sugar workers’ impoverished conditions. Opponents of the wages council, however, 
framed the debate as an attack on free trade unionism and convinced British and especially 
American officials that the councils could only be interpreted as a PPP attempt to subvert the 
colony’s embryonic democratic institutions. 
Guianese Appeals for American Funding and Anglo-American Tensions 
 
Anglo-American rivalry in British Guiana’s institutional decolonization continued in 
1958 and Cope warned the State Department of British “anti-American” attitudes when three 
members of Parliament visited the colony in May 1958. Specifically, the British MPs feared 
American influence in the trade union movement and allegedly encouraged Guianese unionists to 
appeal directly to the TUC rather than working with American unionists or regional affiliates of 
the ICFTU. Cope argued that the TUC offered inadequate assistance and as a result American 
trade union assistance remained necessary.
77
 
Ishmael and Tello increased their efforts to appeal to the AFL-CIO and ICA as American 
 
influence expanded in the Guianese trade union movement. Ishmael traveled in the United States 
and Canada from May through August receiving training on American trade union organization 
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and practices through the ICA.
78 
While he remained in the United States Ishmael was elected 
vice-president of the BGTUC and he held the position concurrently with his role as president of 
the MPCA. At the same time, the PPP publically presented a moderated position on trade 
unionism in the colony. In addressing the BGTUC annual conference on June 29 Janet Jagan 
argued that trade unions could not exist apart from political life but suggested that the PPP based 
its views of unionism on the relationship between the British Labor Party and TUC.
79 
Her 
advocacy of political unionism was consistent with PPP policy since its founding; however, it is 
noteworthy that she appealed to British unionism to justify the PPP’s position rather than 
reiterating an appeal for labor organization along socialist lines. 
The contentious labor issues driving conflict between the PPP and conservative members 
of the Guianese labor movement contributed to schisms within the BGTUC throughout 1958. In 
addition to conflicts regarding the wages council debate, Cope noted that some members 
attempted to repeal the BGTUC’s clause barring unions’ affiliation to the WFTU or CLC but that 
the motion was defeated. More significantly, trade unionists disagreed on questions of political 
affiliation for trade unions. Numerically there was support in the BGTUC for affiliating the 
union with the PNC, a move which Burnham advocated strongly as a delegate to the BGTUC in 
the summer of 1958. However, there other members proposed joining the PPP or establishing a 
Labor Party and union leaders prevented a motion from being passed to propose affiliation to any 
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Cope’s appraisal of the PNC’s sway in the BGTUC likely overstated the party’s influence 
as evidenced in a report from Carroll Woods, Cope’s replacement as American Consul, to the 
State Department in November. Woods noted that Burnham lost a November 14 bid for re- 
election for the presidency of the British Guiana Labor Union (BGLU) which also removed him 
from a position of direct influence in the BGTUC. Samuel Walker, a waterfront worker, won the 
position as Burnham’s replacement.
81 
In addition to illuminating the limits to Burnham’s 
 
influence in the labor movement, the BGLU election was also significant in that it suggests the 
union was relatively institutionally sound and independent of powerful political figures and 
external organizations in late-1958. As an important member of the BGTUC, the democratic 
nature of the BGLU suggests that some Guianese trade unions were growing in strength and 
functionality at the grassroots level, even if improvements remained gradual in the late-1950s. 
In the midst of internal debates, the BGTUC looked to American trade unions to address 
an ongoing financial crisis owing to the inability of affiliated unions to provide funds to the 
congress. Tello and Wendall Bobb of the BGTUC Executive Council attended an international 
conference of the USW in September 1958 at the American union’s invitation. Tello used the 
conference as an opportunity to request financial assistance from the AFL-CIO through Serafino 
Romualdi, the AFL-CIO’s inter-American representative. At the same time the BGTUC, with 
Cope’s support, appealed to the AFL-CIO to fund a lecture tour of the United States that 




Colonial officials noted Tello’s attendance at the conference, his request, and his 
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distorted by too much American influence.”
83 
According to A.M. Morgan of the Colonial Office, 
Tello used the threat of the PPP destroying Guianese trade unions through the wages council to 
justify his appeal for funding. While Tello expressed appreciation for the TUC’s educational 
efforts and a desire to continue building Guianese unions in the British tradition, he 
acknowledged that the TUC could not provide the funding the BGTUC required. Importantly, 
Tello also noted that he could not apply for funding through the ICA, since as a United States 
government entity an application needed to be submitted through the Minister of Labor, Janet 
Jagan. Thus, Tello used connections with Romualdi and the Labor Attaché in Washington D. C. 
to obtain funding for a three-week long “Foreign Leader” tour of the United States.
84 
Tello’s 
increased relations with the United States disturbed colonial officials who voiced their concerns 
to Renison and Marjorie Nicholson, one of the leading figures in the TUC International 
Department.
85 
Nonetheless, Tello and the BGTUC grew closer to the AFL-CIO and increasingly 
networked within the United States while warning American unionists of alleged PPP attempt to 
destroy free trade unions in British Guiana. 
Labor Relations between the PPP and Government Workers 
 
Trade union conflict outside of the sugar industry increased after the 1957 elections as 
well and tensions between the PPP and government workers influenced Guianese institutional 
decolonization as much as any facet of the late-colonial period. The transport workers’ strike in 
November 1957 portended a shift in labor conflict that resulted in disaster for the colony. On 
November 23 transport workers walked off the job to protest newly imposed working conditions 
and the attitude of an unpopular marine superintendent. The Transport Workers Union (TWU), 
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which Cope referred to as the most financially powerful union in the colony, initiated 
negotiations with the Transport and Harbor Department to settle workers’ grievances. Most 
importantly, Cope noted that Forbes Burnham, leader of the PNC, rallied to enlarge the strike to 




Burnham’s exploitation of the transport workers’ strike represents a crucial turning point 
 
in British Guiana’s institutional decolonization, after which trade unions increasingly struck to 
undermine governmental authority rather than to negotiate on workers’ behalf. Institution 
building programs between 1954 and August 1957 employed tactics designed to build a 
structural framework to promoted stability and, to a lesser extent, a functional democracy despite 
the political objectives that motivated those efforts. Jagan, Burnham, and other Guianese leaders 
used labor unrest to protest colonial policies as well as wages and working conditions throughout 
the late 1940s and early 1950s; however, their demonstrations were not aimed at subverting an 
elected government of their peers. After the transport workers’ strike in December 1957 
Guianese trade unions gradually became tools of political subversion directed against other 
Guianese leaders rather than foreign employers or the colonial government. 
Moreover, trade union developments exacerbated the racial animus that grew steadily 
since the PPP split. Increased conflict between Afro-Guianese and Guianese of East Indian 
descent was partially a consequence of the Burnham and Jagan factions’ use of racial political 
discourse prior to the 1957 elections. However, Walter Rodney, the Guianese historian and 
political activists assassinated during the Burnham dictatorship, argued in A History of the 
Guyanese Working People that colonial employment patterns and laws were most significant in 
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As a result of colonial employment patters the majority of rural 
Guianese, especially field workers in the sugar industry were East Indian while the urban 
population and the overwhelming majority of civil servants were Afro-Guianese. After the 1957 
elections employment patterns shaped tensions between the PPP government and primarily Afro- 
Guianese civil service employees increasing trade union conflict and racial schisms.
88
 
In mid-November 1958 government workers struck again for several days in response to 
 
a disagreement with the PPP government over the conclusions drawn by the Whitley Council, an 
arbitrating body established to examine inequities in government employees’ salaries. The PPP- 
accepted the council’s decisions excepting the provision that government workers’ pay raises be 
implemented retroactively to January 1, 1957, which party leaders claimed the government could 
not afford. The strike ended when the PPP agreed to have the matter adjudicated and adhere to 
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Guianese government predated the PPP’s resumption of office in August 1957.
90 
Thus, the PPP 
inherited a contentious situation that it could not effectively confront. Underlying racial tensions 
exacerbated and amplified in response to continuing tension between civil servants and the 
government. Burnham’s increasing mobilization of primarily Afro-Guianese civil servants 
against the PPP and later American-backed urban strikes were therefore an exploitation of an 
ongoing labor conflict. The CIA began funding anti-PPP movements in British Guiana sometime 
between 1959 and 1962 through AFL-CIO connections with Guianese public service unions 
established in the 1950s.
91 
The extent to which CIA and AFL-CIO influence exacerbated 
conflicts between Afro-Guianese civil servants and the PPP government is unclear. However, it 
is important to note that the tensions between public servants and the Guianese government were 
considerable regardless of external meddling and preceded any attempt at covert manipulation 
while acknowledging that American subversion clearly prolonged and made increasingly violent 
unrest in the early 1960s.
92
 
The MPCA, BGTUC, and International Relations 
 
Tensions between civil service unions and the government challenged the PPP’s 
influence among government workers, a group already inclined toward support for the PNC. At 
the same time, the MPCA continued to build on its institutional strength. The check-off system 
increased the MPCA’s membership to just fewer than 26,000 by March 1959, impressing 
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Meanwhile, MPCA leaders negotiated an increase of one-third for manual sugar 
workers’ pensions with the funds derived from the previous year’s sugar profits.
94
 
In March 1959 MPCA President and BGTUC Vice President Richard Ishmael, BGTUC 
General Secretary Rupert Tello, BGTUC President Cecil Cambridge, and BGTUC Executive 
Council member Wendell Bobb embarked on an international tour that began with participation 
at an ICFTU conference in Geneva.
95 
Subsequently, the Guianese trade unionists visited the 
TUC General Council in Great Britain. The BGTUC delegation appealed to senior officials in 
the Colonial Office for development assistance and a plan to address the colony’s substantial 
unemployment with assistance from the TUC.
96 
The mission is also important in that it provides 
further evidence that the TUC continued to support political activity for anti-PPP Guianese 
unions despite rhetoric opposing political activities for colonial labor organizations. Most 
importantly, the BGTUC mission was the first of its kind received by the Colonial Office, 
reinforcing the significance the TUC and Colonial Office placed on supporting pro-British 
Guianese trade unions.
97 
Thus, colonial officials and British labor leaders worked through the 
BGTUC rather than the PPP despite an official policy of cooperation with the Jagan-led 
government. 
The BGTUC leaders left London for the United States on April 11 where they 
rendezvoused with Forbes Burnham who had been traveling to several American cities 
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encouraging private investment in British Guiana and criticizing the PPP government as 
communist and anti-democratic. The BGTUC delegation joined Burnham’s request for private 
investment and appealed for funds to support their labor activities. Woods warned the State 
Department that the meeting of Guianese delegations in Washington D.C. provided “further 
evidence of the very thin line between the PNC and the assertedly [sic] non-political” BGTUC.
98 
Connections to American labor offset the cost of Guianese labor leaders’ campaigning. The 
USW covered part of the BGTUC leaders’ expenses in traveling to the United States and 




Several State Department officials organized a meeting with Tello, Bobb, and AFL-CIO 
 
representatives at the American union’s request on April 14. The memorandum of conversation 
from the meeting notes that the AFL-CIO was “squiring” the “British Guiana Trade Unionists 
around the U.S.” The conversation appears to have been short and centered on political issues, 
such as Tello’s fear of political parties infiltrating Guianese unions. Interestingly, despite his 
opposition to the PPP Tello encouraged the State Department officials to extend assistance to 
Cheddi Jagan when he visited the United States later in the year. Tello noted his disagreement 
with Jagan’s political orientation but emphasized that Guiana needed assistance to confront 
poverty and deprivation and he suggested that the PPP would benefit more from continued 
economic strife than from economic improvements.
100 
After the meeting at the State Department, 
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In addition to AFL-CIO and USW assistance, contributions from leading businesses 
including Booker Brothers and Demerara Bauxite eased the financial burden of sending the four 
men on a trip to Europe and the United States for over a month.
102 
The cost left to the BGTUC is 
unclear; however, the assistance of British employers and American trade unionists suggests a 
continuing effort on the part of non-governmental Anglo-American organizations to integrate the 
Guianese labor movement into the Western capitalist system. The BGTUC’s and MPCA’s 
increased appeals for American funding and dedication to traveling internationally after the 1957 
election suggests that anti-PPP trade union leaders did not expect to be able to defeat PPP- 
supported labor activists at the grassroots level. 
Ironically, the reformist labor movement’s increasing appeals for outside funding 
conflicted with Tello’s and Ishmael’s previous warnings that external financing of Guianese 
unions would prove counterproductive and the extent of international travel undermined the local 
involvement that initially gained Ishmael supporters on the sugar plantations.
103 
In 1953 
Ishmael’s opponents begrudgingly acknowledged that he tirelessly traveled around the colony to 
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travel outside of Georgetown while he was in British Guiana.
104 
Moreover, despite the BGTUC’s 
considerable efforts at international diplomacy in mid-1959, including sponsoring several ORIT 
visits to the colony, the union inconsistently participated in Guianese workers’ aggressive efforts 
to unionize.
105 
In the midst of labor disputes in British Guiana, for example, Tello was named 
CADORIT’s representative to the International Plantation Workers’ Confederation.
106 
Tello led a 
 
six-man Guianese delegation that included Ishmael to the conference in Barbados on September 
17 while strikes in the colony persisted.
107
 
Industrial Labor Unrest and Workers Protests in from 1959-1960 
 
Guianese workers’ aggressive attempts to unionize and improve wages and conditions 
continued while Guianese leaders internationalized the debate over the nature of post-colonial 
trade unionism. On July 15 workers at Matthew’s Ridge walked off in protest against the African 
Manganese Company’s low wages, poor living facilities, and failure to recognize the BGMWU 
as miners’ bargaining agent. Substantial unrest resulted in a call for the riot squad to quell 
hostilities after an attempt to dynamite the main building. The strike led to negotiations aimed at 
addressing workers’ grievances and at the urging of the Department of Labor the initiation of 
discussions for recognition of the BGMWU on the estate.
108 
The Motor Transport Workers and 
 
Municipal Employees Union also negotiated wage increases in late 1959.
109 
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Matthew’s Ridge calmed, tension continued between civil service employees and the PPP 
government. Clerks picketed the Public Works Department on September 17 protesting delays in 
wage increases.
110 
On September 20 the TWU passed a resolution requiring its Executive to 
work with the Federation of Unions of Government Employees (FUGE) to demand a four-dollar- 
a-day minimum wage for all government employees retroactive to January 1.
111 
In response, 
Cheddi Jagan announced a proposal on September 22 to increase minimum wages while refusing 
immediate pay increases and abolishing leave passes for some categories of civil servants.
112 
Meanwhile, the MPCA continued negotiating precedent-setting agreements with the 
SPA. Ishmael, Ramphal, and representatives from Booker Brothers and Demba agreed to the 
introduction of an eight-hour workday with minimum wages for field workers on September 17, 
along with cost-of-living increases retroactive to January 1, 1959, and the introduction of a 
pension scheme that would begin on January 1, 1960.
113 
Nonetheless, MPCA gains came with an 
important consequence, namely that the union accepted the “stabilization of the labor force.” The 
SPA policy created a smaller labor force of regular workers who enjoyed negotiated benefits 
while leaving significant numbers of sugar workers with diminishing amounts of casual 
employment and no protection under MPCA-SPA agreements.
114 
The reduction of employment 
opportunities on sugar estates coincided with a general labor crisis resulting from increases in 
population that far surpassed new employment opportunities. The colony’s rising population 
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represented an ongoing problem. Political scientist Matthew Lange notes, for example, that 




The BGTUC’s acceptance of British employers’ funding also contributed to a split in the 
 
BGTUC in May. Andrew Jackson, a PNC representative in the Legislative Council and head of 
the Post Office Workers Union and FUGE, cited the acceptance of employers’ funds as part of 
the reason for the withdrawal of the unions he led from the BGTUC. Carroll Woods suggested in 
his report to the State Department that Jackson’s personal feud with the Postmaster General also 
contributed to his decision.
116 
Nonetheless, anti-PPP unions relied increasingly on external 
financing as British Guiana moved closer to self-government. AFL-CIO funding and diplomacy 
increased Tello’s and the BGTUC’s profile in the United States while the ICFTU agreed to begin 
an ongoing program of assistance through the International Solidarity Fund (ISF) to assist 
BGTUC organizing in July 1959.
117
 
Ongoing conflict between civil service workers and the PPP government superseded 
 
tensions between Jackson and the BGTUC. The BGTUC intervened on FUGE’s behalf when 
10,000 government workers struck again on December 2, 1959 after negotiations with the 
government broke down. Workers returned to work on December 17 having accepted the 
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At the request of the BGTUC, the TUC sent Lawrence Sapper, a full-time trade union official in 
London, to assist FUGE in their negotiations in January.
118 
Sapper spent two weeks advising the 
civil service unions and helping prepare their case which centered on pay anomalies and 
protested conditions of service.
119 
Even as Sapper advised Guianese labor leaders some members 
of the TUC suggested that British trade union involvement needed to be reduced as 
decolonization progressed. Walter Hood, head of the colonial section of the TUC’s International 
Department, argued in a meeting with the OEF and Colonial Office that British trade unions 
could only intervene in colonial affairs at the invitation of colonial unions as British territories 
approached independence. Colonial officials meeting with Hood in 1960 requested British trade 
unionists’ increased participation in institution-building and suggested that the TUC’s 
involvement in colonial affairs remained stagnant since mid-1957. Hood countered the reproach 
and argued that the OEF was the only party in the talks that would retain direct influence in 
colonies after independence and therefore should be most involved in the decolonization.
120
 
British and American cooperation in supporting reformist, anti-PPP trade unionists 
 
continued in March 1960 as the British government discussed a return to full internal self- 
government in British Guiana the following August.
121 
British diplomats, ICA workers, and 
American trade unionists developed plans to send roughly half a dozen Guianese trade unionists 
to Puerto Rico and the United States for intensive training to follow-up on a seminar given in 
Georgetown. Plans also called for sending either a British or American unionist to British Guiana 
for a year to assist the anti-PPP unions that were expected to be “the only effective opposition to 
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the pro-Communist line” of the PPP.
122 
Robert Buchanan, the Canadian Executive Secretary of 
the International Journalists and Writers’ Union, traveled to British Guiana on behalf of the 
AFL-CIO in May and presented the BGTUC with a $4,500 station wagon as a gift from ORIT.
123 
The TUC assisted Oxford University and Ruskin College in holding a series of week-long 




Guianese labor leaders also made changes in anticipation of the following year’s election. 
 
In May the TWU passed a resolution overturning a forty-year-old rule and allowing the union’s 
executive members to simultaneously hold positions in political parties for the first time.
125 
On 
June 25 Woods opened the BGTUC annual conference with a speech discussing the ICA’s 
considerable efforts to build the Guianese labor movement. His speech expanded into an 
explanation of the “neighborly” motives that shaped American policy toward the Caribbean 
appealing to Guianese workers to increase their connections to the United States.
126 
In June 
Richard Ishmael won re-election as President of the BGTUC and Tello retained his position as 
General Secretary though Colonial Office reports suggest that Tello’s influence declined 
beginning in 1959.
127 
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Council to take whatever stand it deemed advisable to procure a national minimum wage of four 
dollars per day, a rate that the PPP government previously rejected.
128 
Ishmael and Tello led the 
union on a picket line in protest against Kirpalini Brothers in November as a result of the firm’s 




Guianese connections with international labor expanded when Ishmael and Tello received 
 
appointments to the Executive Committee of the Caribbean Congress of Labor (CCL), which 
replaced CADORIT as the regional arm of Western international labor on September 25, 
1960.
130 
In October the TUC General Council sent a representative to assist the MPCA in its 
 
negotiations with the SPA. The negotiations resulted in a wage increase, severance pay, and a 
pension scheme for sugar workers. Moreover, the agreement established a minimum wage rate 
for sugar workers that exceeded the rate for unskilled government employees for the first time.
131 
The compromise built on important precedents in the sugar industry’s labor relations and was 
possible in part as a result of British Guiana’s record sugar production in 1960.
132 
The PPP-led 
government, however, deemed the pension scheme unacceptable and blocked its introduction in 
 
much more consequence” than Tello by mid-1960. Nonetheless, Grey praised Tello’s contributions to the Guianese 
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Thus, the MPCA’s internationalization increased its bargaining power and 
institutional position despite the tenuous support of Guianese sugar workers and the direct 
opposition of the workers-supported PPP. 
Conclusion 
 
The Guianese labor movement was inherently political since its founding and Anglo- 
American labor leaders’ support for Guianese trade unions exacerbated the tendency toward 
using trade unions for political objectives. Institution-building efforts between 1954 and 1957 
were designed to achieve political objectives through the establishment of a functionally sound 
trade union movement; however, when the project failed to achieve its objective the labor 
movement became increasingly corrupted and utilized to directly attack the elected PPP 
government. Thus, institution-building efforts worsened the inherent weakness in the Guianese 
trade unions. In turn, the politicization of labor organization that was an important aspect of 
British and American labor leaders’ criticism of the PPP became more predominant. 
Moreover, because of its anti-PPP nature, the institution-building program lessened the 
possibility of true nation building through diplomacy and compromise between Guianese of 
differing views. It is possible that no compromise would have been reached regardless since 
there is evidence that the PPP received funding from the Eastern bloc, which likely inhibited 
their willingness to strike agreements as well.
134 
Nonetheless, the PPP accurately interpreted 
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Anglo-American support for anti-democratic trade union practices to keep PPP leaders 
out of the MPCA reinforced PPP suspicions and further undermined the possibility of 
compromise between Guianese leaders. British and American officials and trade union leaders 
explained their ideological compromise as necessary to establish the representative institutions 
they argued were ideal and necessary to achieve long-term Anglo-American objectives, most 
importantly the establishment of liberal-capitalist, democratic post-colonial societies. As a result, 
the Guianese labor movement remained institutionally dysfunctional and anti-democratic, while 
inconsistently representing Guianese workers. Moreover, the movement was highly 
internationalized. British, American, and possibly Eastern-bloc imperatives shaped the internal 
debates between Guianese over how to design post-colonial society. Since the colony was 
institutionally dysfunctional, conflict was nearly assured when the British government agreed to 




At the same time, TUC involvement in the colony decreased between 1957 and 1961 
leading British some officials to lament the lack of British trade union involvement and growing 
American influence in the Caribbean. While colonial officials expressed understanding that the 
United States would play a larger role in the region as colonies became independent they 
encouraged the TUC to take an active interest in protecting British commercial influence after 
independence.
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The TUC’s reasons for retreat were threefold. First, British labor leaders prioritized the 
ICFTU’s long-term viability and cooperation with the OEC in colonial areas undermined the 
organization’s claim to support workers in the international labor body. Second, the TUC, like 
the British Empire, was financially weakened after World War II and labor leaders’ argued that 
cutting colonial programs was a practical necessity. Finally, TUC leaders noted that the 
advancement of self-government inherently demanded decreased TUC involvement in colonial 
areas. Nonetheless, the OEF and Colonial Office consistently expressed hope that the TUC 
would continue to play an important role in the colonies instead of delegating an increased role 
to the ICFTU. British policymakers and businesses appeals suggest that they expected 
decolonization to establish political independence but preserve traditional pro-British capitalism 
in the region.
139 
Moreover, the TUC’s withdrawal hinted that the American expansion of 
 
influence continued to erode British power prior to the West Indian colonies independence.
140 
Ultimately, the TUC’s diminished colonial influence suggested that American labor’s tactical 
objectives increasingly determined the nature of external involvement in Guianese institution 
building during the last phase of decolonization. 
Thus, the structure and racial composition of Guianese socio-economics, British and 
American support for anti-democratic pro-Western unions, and the PPP’s efforts to incorporate 
trade unions into a social revolution combined to create an inescapable conflict. This conflict, 
between the PPP and anti-PPP trade union movement, proved crucially important when full 
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internal self-government was established as a precursor to independence in 1961.
141 
Because of 
the AFL-CIO’s assumption of the primary role among external trade unions between 1957 and 
1961, reformist, anti-PPP trade union leaders turned to American unionists more so than the 
TUC when unrest broke out in 1962 and 1963. The AFL-CIO and CIA used the unrest and 
American labor leaders’ connections to exacerbate conflicts and destabilize the PPP government, 
and objective that dovetailed with the aims of some elements in the anti-PPP labor. Despite TUC 
efforts to stabilize the government and compartmentalize labor struggles apart from politics, 
diplomatic efforts at the highest levels of the American and British governments agreed to 
remove the PPP through electoral changes. 
Most importantly, the actions of Guianese trade unionists after 1957 proved most 
significant in fueling the colony’s unrest after 1961. The MPCA increasingly had difficulty 
balancing its role as an organization representing Guianese workers and its opposition to the 
PPP, though the union continued to obtain important concessions for sugar workers. At the same 
time predominantly Afro-Guianese urban unions mobilized politically against the PPP largely as 
a consequence of ongoing disagreements over civil servants’ wages. Politicians and external 
actors manipulated the racial aspects of urban opposition to the PPP; however, it is critical to 
acknowledge that the labor issues underlying resentment originated organically. Each of the 
participants in labor unrest increasingly looked to the outside for assistance, as did the PPP after 
1961, continuing the internationalization of Guianese decolonization. 
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“‘Time was not in [sic] our side.’ The tide of events was moving rapidly, and might well not 
allow scope for the organizations and structures which we wished to see develop in Colonial 
societies to grow up by the slow and sure process of natural evolution and ‘learning by 
experience.’” Minutes of a confidential conference of heads of labor departments, Colonial 




Institutional Warfare and American Intervention 
 
Ultimately, British Guiana’s political dysfunction beginning in 1962 directly resulted 
from the colony’s failure to establish an institutionally functional system of labor relations 
during the late colonial period. Internal labor conflicts began in 1946 between social 
revolutionary labor leaders and reformists as well as between the revolutionaries and colonial 
officials. The trade union conflict became internationalized throughout the 1950s, was 
complicated as a result of racially divided employment demographics after 1957, and exploded 
in 1962.
2 
Social breakdown resulted from 150 years of colonial labor relationships that 
 
segregated society and contributed to endemic racial tensions, local ideological disagreements 
that motived perpetual struggle between Guianese, and American intervention that aimed at 
exploiting the situation to remove the People’s Progressive Party (PPP).
3
 
Between 1962 and 1964 internationalized efforts to shape the colony’s post-colonial 
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and trade unionists worked to establish capitalist-democratic institutions in British Guiana that 
were integrated into an Anglo-led system. The Trades Union Congress’s (TUC) retreat in the 
colony in 1957 signified the beginning of a shift toward increased American influence over 
colonial developments.
4 
As a result, American labor leaders’ wielded substantial influence in the 
colony when the PPP won elections to determine the government expected to lead the colony to 
independence in early 1962. At the same time, the Kennedy administration exerted increasing 
influence over British policy in Guiana and pressured Prime Minister Harold Macmillan to delay 
the colony’s exit from the empire.
5
 
The British-led attempt at guiding Guiana toward self-government resulted in a quandary 
 
when economic and political institutions conflicted. Guianese trade unions, particularly the 
Manpower Citizens’ Association (MPCA), won benefits for workers and set important legislative 
and collective bargaining precedents between 1954 and 1961. At the same time, mechanization 
and stabilization of the workforce in the sugar industry led to record profits and the Guianese 
experienced one of the most prosperous years in the colony’s history in 1961.
6 
Nonetheless, 
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year undermined sugar productivity.
7 
Moreover, improvements for the primarily Afro-Guianese 
urban laborers did not keep pace with advances on the sugar estates. The economic situation 
reinforced the racialized political rhetoric Guianese politicians increasingly employed after the 
PPP split in 1955. The predominantly East Indian sugar workers attributed economic 
improvement to PPP policies while remaining receptive to the party’s appeal for more radical 
change to offset the consequences of increasing productivity for displaced workers. Conversely, 
most Afro-Guianese interpreted economic developments as evidence of PPP favoritism for East 
Indians. 
Racial strife played a major role in political debates in 1961 and ethnicity determined 
voting patterns far more than any other factor. When the polls closed on August 21 the vast 
majority of East Indians had voted for the PPP and the majority of Afro-Guianese for the Forbes 
Burnham-led People’s National Congress (PNC).
8 
Importantly, some sugar workers continued to 




to racialized politics, however, the vast majority of East Indians had no economic motives to 
shift party loyalties. Burnham’s PNC articulated a political ideology similar to the PPP’s 
expressed views but specifically appealed to an Afro-Guianese constituency. The only other 
party of note, the Peter D’Aguiar-led United Force (UF), remained a relatively minor party 
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laborers. Therefore, the PPP’s victory divided the Guianese racially and exacerbated the 




However, the struggle in the labor movement during the early 1960s differed from earlier 
 
trade union conflicts in ways that contributed to political breakdown and violence. The dispute 
over labor relations devolved into a multifaceted conflict based on three separate dynamics. First, 
the social revolutionary PPP and the reformist MPCA struggled for control of labor institutions 
in the sugar industry as a result of ideological disagreements. Second, the East Indian-dominated 
PPP conflicted with Afro-Guianese labor leaders and workers positioned against the party and 
who aligned with the PNC. Finally, the CIA and AFL-CIO worked through local opponents of 
the PPP to undermine the Guianese government. 
Stephen Rabe demonstrates that United States intervention in British Guiana in 1962 and 
1963 made a mockery of the colony’s right to self-determination and played a significant part in 
impeding state formation in addition to directly putting in power a dictatorial and oppressive 
kleptocracy under Forbes Burnham. Rabe also shows that the Kennedy administration pressured 
British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan into replacing the first-past-the-post electoral system in 
British Guiana with a system of proportional representation to create the conditions for the 
removal of the popularly elected PPP government.
11 
American participation was the decisive 
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“more subtle than we knew.”
12 
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the American 
Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) were only part of the 
complex debate over the nature of British Guiana’s post-colonial labor organizations that tore 
apart British Guiana beginning in 1962. Piero Gleijeses notes in his analysis of the American- 
backed coup in Guatemala there was no “convenient villain” singularly controlling events on the 
ground.
13 
Similarly, the CIA/AFL-CIO role in British Guiana was part of a diverse combination 
of events and actors throughout the world but centered on local conflict within the colony. Three 
specific issues addressed throughout this dissertation contributed to the institutional failure that 
the CIA and AFL-CIO exploited in 1962 and 1963. 
First, colonialism created racially divided employment demographics that placed the 
predominantly Afro-Guianese government workers against the PPP once the party became the 
administrating authority in 1957. Racial tensions preceded the PPP’s founding and several 
factors, including Anglo-American meddling, contributed to racializing Guianese politics.
14 
Nonetheless, when the PPP assumed the responsibility of governing it created an impossible 
situation for the working class party. The PPP advocated on behalf of sugar workers negotiating 
against foreign capitalist employers while being forced to bargain against wage increases for 
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Civil service unions’ demands for increased wages preceded the PPP’s assumption of power; 
however, once Cheddi Jagan took the reins of government the unions turned their disillusion 
against the party.
16 
The racialized nature of the dispute intensified the divisions between East 
Indians and Afro-Guianese but it remained a class dispute at its core. 
The first major strike against the PPP in February 1962 began in response to a PPP 
budget that included a compulsory savings plan designed to generate necessary development 
capital for the government. The budget was democratically constructed, practical if unappealing, 
and not at all radical.
17 
There is definitive evidence that the AFL-CIO and CIA supported anti- 




Nonetheless, protests cannot be divorced from the broader context. Civil service workers had 
been in conflict with the administrating authorities in Georgetown for eight years. In October 
1961 government workers requested a hearing from the Whitley Council in attempt to negotiate a 
pay increase and apparently received no response prior to the protests.
19 
Thus, the 1962 strikes 
are most effectively understood as a complex demonstration in which different motives drove 
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several administrations in Georgetown that did not increase pay for civil servants.
20 
At the same 
time, Burnham and other political leaders clearly used workers’ disappointment to further their 
own political objectives and the CIA and AFL-CIO likely took advantage of the disturbances to 
prolong unrest and destabilize the PPP. While it is possible that the CIA contributed to the timing 
of the strike in addition to providing funds for protesters, it is important to acknowledge that 
underlying domestic tensions were structural and had been gesticulating since the Interim 
government—and indirectly for over a century. 
Second, ideological differences created an immutable struggle between the PPP’s social 
revolutionary intentions as the head of an elected government and the largest union in the colony. 
The conflict between PPP leaders and the MPCA that began when Jagan left the union in 1945 
exploded after the PPP’s election in 1961. The PPP formed the Guiana Sugar Workers’ Union in 
1961, which became the Guiana Agricultural Workers’ Union (GAWU), and in 1963, the party 
again introduced a Labor Relations Bill designed to legally replace the MPCA with the party- 
affiliated organization.
21   
Brindley Benn, a member of the PPP executive council and Minister of 
 
Natural Resources openly stated that his party remained committed to removing MPCA president 
Richard Ishmael after the elections.
22
 
Ishmael immediately traveled to the United States in response to the election and 
received a warm welcome from the AFL-CIO. Importantly, Ishmael intimated to AFL-CIO 
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independence until Jagan could be removed from office.
23 
The MPCA president’s trip 
corresponded with Cheddi Jagan’s official visit as head of state in what proved to be a fateful 
meeting with President John F. Kennedy.
24 
By the time the two men returned to Guiana the 
Kennedy administration determined against offering development aid to Jagan and presumably 
the AFL-CIO agreed to increase support for the MPCA.
25 
The MPCA president also appealed for 
aid from the ICFTU and the international labor organization forwarded the request to the AFL- 
CIO.
26 
While Ishmael and Jagan engaged in international diplomacy, sugar workers continued to 
struggle for small improvements and to cope with displacement in British Guiana. The result was 
a clash between the democratically supported political party pursuing social revolution with 
increased ties to the Eastern bloc and the legally entrenched and anti-democratic reformist trade 
union that advocated capitalism and had integrated into the Western system. 
Compromise between the PPP and MPCA was impossible because as Osmond Dyce, 
Secretary Treasurer of the American-affiliated Caribbean Congress of Labor (CCL) explained, 
“The problem in British Guiana is not just another question of one union raiding the other. It 
involves a fundamental struggle between two systems of trade unionism and must be treated as 
such.”
27 
Time had passed too rapidly for Anglo-American officials, labor leaders, and employers 
to construct a democratically-run reformist labor movement amenable to Western interests in the 
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Relations Bill providing the CIA and AFL-CIO with the opportunity to exploit the unrest by 
financially supporting protests against the PPP.
28
 
Third, the conflict over Guianese labor institutions was internationalized throughout the 
1950s. Immediately after the PPP’s re-election in August 1961 labor leaders on both sides of the 
ideological debate turned to outside actors for assistance rather than negotiating internally. 
External appeals suggest that the internationalization of the Guianese labor struggle contributed 
to an institutional breakdown before the unrest began in 1962. The motives of Guianese labor 
leaders and rank-and-file workers merged with the objectives of external actors to frame the 
conflict after the PPP’s election. Striking workers could prolong their protests since they had 
financial support; however, the strikes’ aims evolved to address concerns of external actors as 
well as Guianese workers. 
The AFL-CIO’s displacement of the TUC as the most influential external actor in the 
Guianese labor movement was crucial in shaping the MPCA-PPP conflict in 1963. Specifically, 
American labor leaders’ emphasis on removing the PPP took precedence over the TUC’s efforts 
to salvage labor relations and solidify a functional movement that would reduce the appeal of 
social revolution. Most importantly, the MPCA and British Guiana Trades Union Congress 
(BGTUC) continued to strike despite TUC mediation and the PPP’s compromise on all of the 
major points of protest.
29 
CIA, AFL-CIO, and some Guianese labor leaders’ aim of subverting 
 
the PPP government supplanted Guianese reformist trade unions’ opposition to the bill’s 
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movement into the Western system for mutual benefit degenerated into a symbiotic relationship 
that allowed the MPCA and CIA to collaborate in a policy of overthrowing the PPP in 1963. 
Ultimately, both internal and external factors contributed to institutional dysfunction. The 
series of strikes that destabilized the PPP government are most effectively understood as a third 
phase of conflict in the process of institutional decolonization in which dysfunctional labor 
relations led to systemic collapse in British Guiana.  However, the context and small differences 
between the various strikes illuminate an important complexity. The 1962 strikes, as Rabe and 
Palmer note, were irrational if understood as a response to the PPP financial plan; however, the 
budget debate became a tangible symbol of more deeply-held disagreements between the PPP 
and the Afro-Guianese community. As Robert Waters and Gordon Daniels note, the budget’s 
austerity measures fell hardest on urban Afro-Guianese laborers and it is significant that the 
MPCA played virtually no role in the strike.
30 
Conversely, the BGTUC easily mobilized urban 
 
workers, many of whom had been engaged in conflicts with the government in Georgetown for 
since 1954. Thus, broad disillusionment between Afro-Guianese workers and the PPP played the 
most significant role in generating a backlash to the budget initiating the strike, which the CIA 
then used to mobilize anti-PPP sentiment.
31 
The unrest in 1962 was far from unexpected, new, or 
external in origin, though the ongoing turmoil and extent of destruction increased as a result of 
American involvement. 
Similarly, the 1963 Labor Relations bill was, like the 1953 bill, designed to give sugar 
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as much and noted that the MPCA would not win a referendum among sugar workers.
32 
Nonetheless, the bill was coupled with the GAWU’s campaign encouraging workers to withdraw 
from the MPCA and the PPP’s attempt to decertify the MPCA and fourteen other unions.
33 
At 
the same time the Labor Relations Bill again codified provisions that would have allowed the 
PPP to exercise considerable influence over the process of certifying unions. Reformist labor 
leaders in the MPCA and BGTUC rejected empowering the government in such a manner in 
addition to their ideological opposition to the relationship between the PPP and GAWU. BGTUC 
president Brentnol Blackmon warned AFL-CIO president George Meany that the bill would act 
as a “beachhead for the subversion of all democratic institutions on the continent.”
34 
Federation 
of Unions of Government Employees (FUGE) president and PNC General Secretary Andrew 
Jackson also protested the bill and specifically warned the United Nations (UN) that he did not 
think the bill was similar to the American Wagner Act regardless of the PPP’s protestations.
35
 
Reformist labor leaders’ resistance to the Labor Relations Bills in 1953 and 1963 resulted 
 
from two factors. First, the PPP’s 1963 bill targeted a broader section of the workforce. Waters 
and Daniels note that the PPP created competing civil service and mining unions in addition to 
creating the GAWU.
36 
Second, American funding supported the strikers, encouraged Guianese 
unionists to continue protesting, and shifted the discourse from criticism of the bill’s provisions 
to a referendum on the PPP government. Nonetheless, it is important to acknowledge that even 
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though American funding allowed the strikes to continue the protesters themselves were 
Guianese and they were motivated to strike for domestic reasons. Thus, the unrest in Guiana 
already existed and the conditions were ripe for Anglo-American manipulation. Finally, the 1964 
strikes, as Waters and Daniels have shown, were primarily a PPP effort to generate support for 
the government in advance of elections designed to remove the party from power and very likely 
were undertaken with Cuban aid.
37 
Ultimately, the labor conflicts that undermined Guiana were 
 
internationalized but grounded in domestic disputes. 
 
There was a substantial capitalist, pro-Western current in Guianese politics; however, 
parties based on those ideals only acquired a small amount of support. The MPCA made 
considerable gains in negotiating benefits and securing a large base of membership between  
1954 and 1961 and evidence suggests that Ishmael achieved as much as was possible in 
extracting concessions from the Sugar Producers’ Association (SPA). Indeed, the SPA frequently 
considered his demands irrational and his positions nearly undermined any cooperation between 
the union and employers in the late 1950s.
38 
Nonetheless, the depth of poverty and asymmetries 
 
of power in employer-employee relations meant that reform within the existing system could not 
effectively addressed workers’ demands rapidly enough to undermine support for a popular 
leader offering fundamental systemic changes, especially after racial conflict distorted the 
political environment. Some sugar workers continued to support both the MPCA and PPP; 
however, many shifted allegiance to the GAWU and the PPP retained overwhelming grassroots 
loyalty among East Indians. The colony’s institutional framework collapsed when the MPCA 




Waters and Daniels, “Striking for Freedom?”. 
38 
Ralph Grey to Everett Melby, October 17, 1961, British Guiana: US Consulate, Georgetown, Classified General 
Records, 1957-1963, Box 13, Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, RG 84, NARA II.; 
Ralph Grey to Angus MacKintosh, July 5, 1960, CO 1031-3421, BNA. 
359  
Diplomacy between the PPP and United States could have resolved tensions enough to 
minimize American intervention absent the Cuban revolution, which polarized American foreign 
policy and emboldened the PPP. Nonetheless, such an accord was unlikely to resolve labor 
conflicts since the ongoing conflict to determine the nature of Guyana’s post-colonial institutions 
persisted. American, British, and Guianese political and labor leaders were too committed to the 
outcome of the trade union struggle to compromise and the issue at stake was more fundamental 
than diplomatic or trade agreements that could vacillate over time. The structure of Guyana’s 
institutions would determine the political-economic system on which post-colonial society would 
be based, and the nature of the political-economic system would shape transnational relations 
more than superficial diplomatic overtures. 
The Lessons of British Guiana for Post-War United States Foreign Policy 
 
The Anglo-American manipulation of Guianese sovereignty achieved American goals. It 
is clear that the aims of policymakers and labor leaders in the United States were secured as an 
outcome of intervention in the colony in 1962 and 1963. Self-determination and democracy were 
powerful ideals but remained the least important objectives for the United States government and 
AFL-CIO in hemispheric relations. The short-term objective of removing Jagan from office 
came to pass when Commonwealth Secretary Duncan Sandys imposed a system of proportional 
representation and held elections in December 1964.
39 
The new electoral system allowed a 
 
coalition between the PNC and UF to head the government when Guyana became independent 
two years later despite the PPP’s accrual of the plurality of votes.
40
 
In the long-term the Eisenhower administration made clear that it intended to secure 
access to Guianese raw materials, strictly limit the colony’s trade outside the Western sphere, 
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and vigorously oppose the entrance of communist ideas into the hemisphere.
41 
In 2014 the 
Guyanese economy remains based on agricultural and extractive industries and is supported with 
investments from the Inter-American Development Bank. Sixty-six percent of the colony’s 
export trade is to the United States, Canada, and Great Britain. Though its imports are more 
diversified, Guyana brings in more goods from the United States than from any other country. 
Raw material extraction, liberalized finance, and trade with the United States have not addressed 
the country’s needs and it remains among the poorest nations in the hemisphere.
42 
Guyana, as 
Stephen Rabe notes, was in many ways a casualty of American aims, though as this dissertation 
shows it was a victim of colonialism and a complex process of institutional decolonization most 
of all. 
It is possible absent American-funded subversion the PPP would have been forced to 
moderate its policies to accommodate the political views of the substantial reformist presence in 
British Guiana. It is also conceivable that the growing relationship between the PPP and Cuba 
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regardless of domestic sentiments. At the same time, it is likely that the PPP’s domestic 
opponents would have had to accept considerable socialization and an Eastern-bloc oriented, if 
neutral foreign policy. It is equally imaginable that ideological disagreements and racial tensions 
would have exploded without external involvement; however, the possibility of cooperation 
would have continued to exist in a way it did not once external actors made the determination to 
subvert the PPP. Most importantly, the Guianese could have struggled together as citizens of an 
independent nation to determine their own future absent the interference of Cold War actors. 
The most recently available evidence suggests that the PPP’s Marxist-Leninist leaders 
began working toward the establishment of a socialist-communist society connected to the 
Eastern-bloc in 1946 through the institutional transformation of the colony while expecting to 
retain cordial relations with the United States and Great Britain.
43 
The actions undertaken by the 
left-wing of the PPP suggest that a Jagan-led government would have provided a strategic 
challenge and perhaps a direct threat to American interests as the National Security Council 
(NSC) and American labor leaders defined them. While it is unclear the extent to which the PPP 
received support from the Eastern-bloc, it is possible that similar criticisms could be levied 
toward communist involvement as well.
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Perhaps most importantly, the PPP’s removal paved 
the way for the dictatorial Burnham government and oppression thereafter. In light of new 
evidence, critics of American foreign policy toward British Guiana should emphasize the 
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far too frequent use rather than suggest that American intelligence misread Cheddi Jagan’s 
intentions. PPP policies were designed to pursue what party leaders thought was in the best 
interest of the Guianese people and the party had popular support even though it also faced 
considerable domestic opposition. 
Thus, there are three key questions for scholars of American foreign policy that provide 
the opportunity for future research. The first is whether United States labor leaders’ and officials’ 
pursued policies that were in the best interest of American citizens. A considerable amount of 
information about Guiana came from AFL-CIO leaders who in turn gleaned information from a 
select few colonial trade unionists. Much recent research considers American labor’s foreign 
relations and there is room for much more research evaluating whether AFL-CIO activities 
advanced or degraded Americans’ interests. There is also a need to evaluate whether the NSC 
and State Department defined foreign policy objectives in a manner that benefited ordinary 
Americans. 
The second question is whether or not the costs of intervention were worth the price of 
achieving American objectives. The Guyanese people, most importantly, paid a heavy price as a 
consequence of United States intervention.  More fundamentally, interventionist policies are 
corrosive to international relations and seem to be self-perpetuating. External interference in 
Guiana’s domestic disputes compromised principles of self-determination and negatively 
impacted the domestic situation in the United States. In conceding that it is acceptable to outlaw 
ideas, as Dulles argued that it was in defining his notion of the Monroe Doctrine, policymakers 
reinforced a logic that justified restricting intellectual freedom within the United States as well. 
Finally, scholars have the opportunity to evaluate whether institution-building efforts could have 
succeeded if they were implemented more effectively. Some aspects of institution-building 
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succeeded, and it would be useful to pursue further studies to examine those programs more 
systematically. It is worth considering whether a collaborative international program could have 
benefited the Guianese and simultaneously achieved Anglo-American interests. 
Perhaps most importantly, this dissertation uses the prism of institutional decolonization 
to argue that the British colonies’ transition to independence was a complex and 
internationalized process involving a plethora of state and non-state actors debating the structure 
of post-colonial Guyana. Labor leaders played a central role in the process of negotiating the 
nature of post-colonial institutions and their ideologies and objectives influenced international 
relationships. Transnational connections exacerbated ideological disagreements and resulted in a 
web of symbiotic relationships that ensconced the progression toward self-government in the 
Cold War. At the same time, the ideological debates unfolding in decolonizing areas created the 
ground on which the Cold War conflict raged. Nonetheless, the Cold War and decolonization 
were merely superficial manifestations of a phase of adjustment in international relations. The 
underlying struggle between promoting self-determination and securing Anglo-American 
interests preceded the period and continues to the preset day. 
In the end, American labor leaders and the various agencies of the U.S. government 
involved in British Guiana achieved their objectives more than any other actor in the struggle— 
other than Forbes Burnham, who came to power as a result of the chaos. Regardless, American 
labor’s support of neo-liberal foreign policy contributed to its demise in the United States. 
Moreover, Guyana remains an impoverished country that is the source of a variety of 
transnational criminal activities, including narcotics and sex trafficking, and forced labor of 
children.
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devolution of the colony into a country that represents a destabilizing force in the region, despite 
the preservation of American economic interests. British suppression of Guianese self- 
determination destabilized a fragile domestic situation in the colony. Rather than facing the 
challenges of developing a nation through difficult discussions and compromise, Guianese 
leaders used external support and anti-democratic practices to advance their objectives— 
precluding domestic state-building. Most importantly, institutional decolonization in Guyana 
culminated in the failed promise of a multi-racial coalition of Guyanese citizens cooperating to 
develop the country based on the will of the people. Debates about how to structure post-colonial 
Guyana devolved into a violent, internationalized conflict that created racial discord which 
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